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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates corporate Ireland's attitude to dividend payments and 
examines how the Irish stock market reacts to company announcements about dividends. 
Prior to this study, the attitude of company executives and investors to dividend policy in 
Ireland was not reported in the academic literature in a systematic fashion. A number of small 
studies on the topic had been undertaken but the findings of those studies are relatively old 
and the perspective adopted limited. 
In the mid-1980s, company managers in the US and the UK aggressively altered 
dividend policy because the disadvantageous income tax rates to which dividends were 
subject meant that paying dividends was not an efficient way to return money to shareholders 
(Campbell, 2003). The double taxation of cash dividends was the primary motivation behind 
the decision of corporations to repurchase their own shares rather than implementing or 
increasing dividend payouts (Wood, 2002). In addition, for much of the 1990s dividends 
seemed unimportant to company executives and investors, as much of the share valuation 
analysis undertaken by financial commentators, appeared to focus on top line and bottom line 
growth rather than expectations about periodic dividend distributions (Goodbody, 2003). 
However, dividends have recently become more important as growth rates in earnings have 
declined (Jones, 2004). 
The Irish economy has changed dramatically over the last decade with greater wealth, 
increased numbers at work and an ageing population (E. S. R. I., 2003). In this new 
environment, Irish dividend distributions, and more specifically the taxation treatment of 
those distributions, is an increasingly important issue for Irish economic policy makers as 
they seek to encourage companies to re-invest their profits for the long-term and to provide 
incentives to individuals to increase savings and provide for retirement. 
V 
The current research finds that dividend policy matters to Irish investors. Specifically, 
Irish investors appear to react to a dividend announcement as if that announcement conveys 
important news about the future prospects for the firm. This reaction was very pronounced on 
the dividend announcement date. Irish firms support the suggestion that dividend policy 
affects share valuations. In particular, quoted firms believe they know the nature of their 
shareholder base, and perceive that Irish investors discriminate, according to their tax status, 
between those companies which pay dividends and those which do not, when selecting 
securities for their portfolios. In addition, Irish quoted companies follow a policy in which 
dividend reductions are anathema and an increased dividend will only be declared if 
management are convinced that the new dividend level can be maintained. Finally, for 
unquoted firms, dividend policy is strongly driven by the taxation status of their owner 
shareholders. Tax advisors play a key role in determining dividend policy for such companies 
and a case can be made for re-examining the inflexibility of Irish tax rules on dividends, 
particularly for those relating to small and medium-sized companies. 
The findings represent a contribution to understanding as to why Irish firms pay 
dividends. In particular, the findings relate to a recent period for Ireland where little evidence 
exists. In addition, the findings emerge from a comprehensive investigation of the topic using 
a large-scale sample questionnaire, an event study and a sizable number of interviews. The 
focus of the investigation is also novel in that the views of unquoted company executives are 
sought in addition to the perspectives of managers from listed companies. What emerges is a 
comprehensive investigation of the dividend decisions of Irish companies. 
vi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The almost universal corporate policy of paying substantial dividends to shareholders 
represents one of the longest standing puzzles in the modem corporate finance literature. For 
most tax environments, there is a considerable levy on paying dividends to investors. 
Specifically, in many jurisdictions, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains 
while there is no concurrent tax liability on retained earnings. The rise in the market value of 
a share that results from retained earnings is taxed only when the shareholder sells the share 
and then a substantial part of the gain may not be taxed because of indexation relief, tax 
allowances and certain capital gains tax exemptions. 
Prior to 1974 companies in Ireland paid income tax and corporation profits tax on 
income only. Capital gains tax was introduced in the Republic of Ireland on the 6th of April 
1974 and in 1976 a new single rate corporation tax was introduced, which replaced the 
previous income tax and corporation profits tax regime. The scheme of the 1976 legislation 
was similar to the corporation tax regime introduced in the UK in 1965 in that companies 
were liable to corporation tax on profits, which included income and capital gains. As in the 
UK, Irish companies pay the same rate of corporation tax whether or not they choose to 
distribute profits by way of dividend. ' 
A key feature of the Irish corporation tax regime when it was introduced was that 
shareholders were entitled to income tax relief on dividend income received through the 
provision of an attaching tax credit on the dividend to reflect the underlying corporation tax 
paid by the paying company (i. e. the imputation system)? As the imputation system entitled 
' The exception to this generalisation is a close company (a company under the control of five or fewer 
shareholders). An additional tax (the close company surcharge tax) applies to the after tax investment income, 
rental income and professional service income of close companies if such income remains undistributed after 
eighteen months of the end of the accounting period in which the income is earned (TCA, 1997). 
2 Although the original scheme of UK Corporation introduced in 1965 did not provide shareholders with income 
tax relief on dividend income through the provision of an attaching tax credit to reflect the underlying 
corporation tax paid by the paying company the UK regime was changed to the imputation system in 1973. 
2 
shareholders who were exempt from income tax to claim a repayment of the imputed tax 
credit, companies were obliged to pay advance corporation tax amounting to the value of the 
imputed tax credit on payment of any dividend. The advance corporation tax paid was 
allowed in full as a tax credit against the company's main corporation tax liability. 
4 As is 
common in many jurisdictions, Irish capital gains tax only arises on inter-vivos disposals so 
the effective capital gains tax liability might be zero if the investor chooses not to sell or to 
pass his/her shareholdings on to estate beneficiaries after death. 
5 
The overall effect of the tax legislation introduced in the mid-1970s was that 
dividends from Irish companies were taxed at approximately the same rate as that which 
applied to capital gains. However, since the late 1980s successive reductions in the imputed 
tax credits on dividends, a change in the tax treatment of scrip dividends (re-invested 
dividends) and the introduction and extension of various capital gains tax reliefs have 
resulted in a higher rate of tax on dividend income compared to capital gains. In recent years, 
the difference in favour of capital gains has widened significantly. 
3 When the Corporation tax regime was introduced in Ireland in 1976 the scheme did not include an advance 
corporation tax (ACT) requirement. This resulted in a number of abuses. The Irish Department of Finance 
estimated that the annual cost to the exchequer of those abuses was in the region of E50 million (Dukes, 1983). 
Anti-avoidance legislation was introduced in 1983 to prevent such abuses. 
From 1983/84 if a firm paid a dividend amounting to E1 the Irish government would take 35 cent as advance 
corporation tax. The tax liable shareholder would receive only 65 cent. Individuals paying tax at the standard 
rate paid no further tax but exempt taxpayers (e. g. pension funds) in receipt of the 65 cent could claim a full 
refund of the advance corporation tax, amounting to 35 cent, from the Irish Revenue Commissioners 
5 An investor who decides to sell a holding of stock around its ex-dividend date faces a timing decision 
regarding whether to sell on the cum-dividend day or the ex-dividend day. If that person is resident in Ireland 
for tax purposes, then under Irish tax legislation, if he or she sells cum, they receive the cum-dividend price and 
pay tax at the capital gains tax rate (current rate 20%), on the cum-dividend price minus the adjusted indexed 
cost of the share. An inflation adjustment in the form of indexation of the base cost of a capital asset by 
reference to the movement in the Irish consumer price index over its holding period was available from 1978 to 
2003. Indexation relief was abolished for tax periods commencing on or after 1" January 2003. If he or she sells 
ex-dividend, they receive the dividend and pay income tax at their marginal income tax rate (current standard 
rate 20% and top rate 42%) plus social security levies (current rate 5%) minus the dividend withholding tax and 
capital gains tax on the ex-dividend price minus the adjusted indexed cost of the share. For a buy decision, 
timing causes a change in the cost of the investment. For a given holding period buying cum rather than ex 
increases the initial outlay and increases the after income tax dividend flow, but reduces the future capital gains 
tax liability. 
3 
Specifically, from 3rd December 1997, the capital gains tax rate was halved from 40% 
to 20%. In July 1998 the Irish government obtained the agreement of the EU for the 
introduction of a single low rate of Corporation Tax on trading income of 12.5%. The then 
Irish Minister for Finance in delivering his 1999 budget speech to Dail Eireann (the 
Parliament of Ireland) announced a major change in the income tax charge on Irish dividends. 
He stated that: 
"Since the owners of capital in the form of shares will benefit 
from the reduced tax rate on [company] profits I believe it right 
that the government should accordingly take action to ensure 
that [shareholders in companies pay] income tax on 
dividends.... [I propose therefore to abolish] the existing tax 
credits on dividends from the 6`h April 1999 and to introduce a 
dividend withholding tax at the standard rate ... Those individual shareholders liable to tax at the higher rate will be 
required to pay the balance [of any income tax] due under the 
self assessment system. " 
(Charles Mc Creevy, T. D., Budget 1999,3'd December 1998) 
In view of the abolition of the imputation system and the reduction in the capital gains 
tax, it might have been expected that Irish companies would change their dividend 
distribution policies. Indeed, in July 1997 the British Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
delivering his budget speech to the House of Commons, made a clear attempt to use the tax 
system to encourage lower dividends and greater investment by abolishing refunds of tax 
credits on dividend income. He stated: 
"The present system of tax credits encourages companies to 
pay out dividends rather than re-invest their profits. This 
cannot be the best way of encouraging investment for the long 
term...... so, this is the right time to undertake long-needed 
reform [and] with immediate effect I propose to abolish 
refundable tax credits [on dividends]... " 
(Rt. Hon. Gordon Browne, M. P., Budget Speech, 2 "d July 1997) 
4 
However, in spite of the severe tax penalty, a substantial number of Irish companies 
continue to pay dividends to their shareholders (McCluskey et al., 2003). 
By paying 
dividends, Irish companies effectively impose a substantial tax liability on their shareholders. 
This dissertation investigates, in the context of such a severe tax penalty, why Irish 
companies continue to pay dividends; specifically, it attempts to identify the explanatory 
factors that justify this apparently irrational behaviour. 
Behavioural finance theorists have offered several possible explanations of why 
investors continue to exhibit preferences for cash dividends despite the apparent departure 
from wealth maximisation. Many of these theoretical explanations have been tested in the 
literature and yet the results, largely based on US data, raise almost as many questions as they 
answer. However, in terms of overall conclusions, four themes can be identified from the 
literature. 
First, since the early 1930s, the literature has identified a desire on the part of 
investors for a steady stream of income with which to finance consumption. Although the 
same level of consumption might be financed in a more tax efficient manner by selling 
shares, the transaction costs and the psychology of dipping into `principal' to finance 
consumption is often thought to be a deterrent to that course. Indeed, Shefrin and Statman 
(1984) noted that shareholders appear to behave in a manner as though consumption can only 
be financed out of dividends and not out of capital. Shareholders seem to prefer companies to 
supply them with a dividend pattern that matches their consumption pattern thereby relieving 
them of the burden of having to adjust this cash flow for themselves. In that context, a 
particular company may appeal to a clientele of shareholders whose consumption patterns 
accord with its dividend pattern (Miller, 1977). Examination of the clientele argument in an 
Irish context is one of the areas considered in this work. 
Second, the empirical literature suggests that dividend payments have a direct and 
5 
measurable impact on equity returns. The analysis requires the actual share return to 
be 
compared with the expected share return around the period of the dividend announcement 
date in order to determine whether or not any stock market reaction has occurred. If the flow 
of information to the market ensures that the announcement of a change in dividend does not 
come as a total surprise to the investor community, there will not be a statistically significant 
abnormal share return generated during the announcement period. According to this 
methodology, a statistically significant abnormal share return generated during the 
announcement period clearly indicates that the dividend announcement has not been fully 
anticipated, and consequently conveys important additional information to the market. An 
observation of small and statistically insignificant post-announcement abnormal returns 
indicates that the market is informational (semi-strong form) efficient; it reacts quickly to 
new information releases and impounds that information into share prices rapidly, leaving no 
opportunity to earn above-average returns using publicly available information. If post- 
announcement abnormal returns are statistically significant it may indicate that the market 
takes time to respond to the news implicit in the announcement once any uncertainty about 
the implications of a dividend change have been resolved (Brown et al., 1990). 6 This study 
employs that conventional event-study methodology to examine the reaction of the Irish stock 
market to dividend announcements by Irish quoted companies. 
Third, dividends are normally required because of the separation of ownership and 
management (Jensen, 1986). In particular, dividends may be a reliable signal of the 
6 This approach is not new. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) have noted that there is a substantial academic 
literature that has documented stock market reaction to firm specific announcements such as earnings news, 
mergers, etc. For example, in their early work Ball and Brown (1968) observed that positive (negative) 
unexpected earnings changes were associated with positive (negative) abnormal returns and that while the 
majority of the share price movements in response to earnings news occurred before the earnings release date, a 
significant response also occurred in the announcement month. Similar conclusions have emerged from the 
studies of Brown (1970), Brown (1978), Foster (1975,1977), Watts (1978), Randleman, et al., (1982), while the 
findings of Beaver (1968) and Beaver et al. (1979) indicated that both the sign and the magnitude of the 
earnings news influence the stock market response. 
6 
sustainability of corporate profits (Pettit, 1972). Management therefore selects a dividend 
policy to communicate the level of (and anticipated growth in) profits because conventional 
accounting reports are not entirely adequate guides to current earnings and future prospects. 
Since the mid-1950s, the published literature has indicated that most companies follow a 
policy in which dividend reductions are anathema but an increased dividend will only be 
declared if management are convinced that the new dividend level can be sustained (e. g., 
Lintner, 1956). In this context, management may view the level of and rate of change in 
dividends as a key variable in financial planning. A number of investigations drawing on 
data from several developed markets have reported directors' belief that dividends 
communicate special information to the market (e. g. Baker et al., 1985). While this theory 
remains to be refined and elaborated on, it does suggest that a steady dividend policy 
provides reassurance to shareholders in a dynamic and uncertain environment. A major focus 
of this dissertation is an examination of the extent to which belief in the utility of the 
signalling concept is prevalent among Irish company directors. 
Finally, and closely-related to the signalling argument, is the suggestion that 
shareholders distrust management and fear that retained earnings will be wasted through poor 
investment decisions, leading to excessive management salaries and benefits. Shareholders 
are often assumed to prefer current dividends to future dividends (the-bird-in-the-hand- 
theory) because management is subjected to the scrutiny of the capital markets more often 
than if no dividend is paid (Keane, 1985); this preference is strong enough to pressure 
management to make dividend payments despite the associated tax penalty. Moreover, it 
appears that shareholders are willing to bear the tax burden penalty and the additional funding 
costs, because they are far outweighed by the benefits from a reduction in both monitoring 
(agency) costs and information asymmetries. In this context, the academic literature argues 
that it is hard to understand why there appears to be no pressure for 100% payouts. 
7 
To date, very little is known about the current dividend payout policies of Irish firms. 
The few studies that have been undertaken are either based on small samples or were 
conducted more than 10 years ago. The attitude of Irish managers is of particular 
interest 
given the significant growth in inward investment, particularly from the US to Ireland, over 
the past fifteen years and the changing pattern of foreign investor participation in the Irish 
stock market. Moreover, Irish institutional investors have significantly reduced their exposure 
to Irish equities from an estimated weighting of 90% in the early 1980s to a predicted 12% in 
2003 (Davy, 2003). Irish managers' attitudes to dividend policy may have changed since the 
previous studies were undertaken, given the change to a more globalised shareholder base in 
recent years. 
The central objective of the research in the current thesis is to ascertain whether 
dividends are relevant to Irish share valuations. This study both ascertains the views of Irish 
corporate managers about their firms' dividend policy and investigates how the Irish stock 
market responds to company announcements about dividend payments. It accomplishes these 
goals using a questionnaire survey, interviews and a market-based event study. 
The questionnaire and interviews seek to explain; (i) how Irish firms determine the 
amount of dividends to pay to shareholders, (ii) perceptions about the relationship between 
dividend policy and firm value, in particular whether belief in the effectiveness of the 
`signalling' concept is widely held; and (iii) the role of earnings, risk preferences and tax 
clienteles in determining the payout ratios of Irish companies. The questionnaire survey 
instrument was administered in the autumn of 2001 while the interviews were conducted 
between December 2002 and May 2003. 
The event study spanned a fifteen-year period from 1987 to 2001. Capital market 
regulators require directors of companies to make news releases about earnings, new capital 
expenditure, capital structure, dividend payout, share buy-backs, etc. on a timely basis. When 
8 
such announcements are made, financial analysts and commentators interpret and analyse the 
news releases as signals of the present health of the company and also as indicators of 
its 
future performance. The publishing of information about these decisions is therefore 
analogous to the release of a variety of different signals (sometimes simultaneously), making 
it difficult for investors to decode the complex messages often contained in mixed signals and 
to disentangle relevant information conveyed by the individual decisions. Improvements in 
econometric techniques have made the interpretation of such information less formidable; the 
signalling literature of modem finance increasingly uses advanced statistical models to 
analyse the joint effect of a variety of different signals on the share values of companies. 
The impact of complex signals on share values has been examined in a number of US, 
UK and Australian academic papers. No such analysis has been conducted on Irish data. This 
study addresses that gap. One major problem addressed in this thesis is whether the dividend 
and earnings signals are interactive when announced jointly. Arguing that investors tend to 
give more credence to the consistent signals of dividend and earnings which are released at 
about the same time, academic papers have examined the dependence of the marginal 
information contained in one signal on the content of the other, they have documented 
convincing evidence for the existence of a corroboration effect between jointly announced 
dividend and earnings news. The general flow of information from company management to 
Irish stock market participants provides an excellent opportunity for researchers to test for 
evidence of an interaction between the dividend announcement and the earnings 
announcement because news about Irish dividends is almost invariably published 
simultaneously with information about corporate earnings. 
9 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
In summary, this dissertation investigates corporate Ireland's attitude to dividend 
payments and examines how the Irish stock market reacts to company announcements about 
dividends. Its primary objective is to come to an understanding as to why Irish firms continue 
to distribute profits as dividends despite the shift in the tax regime. The dissertation consists 
of 7 further chapters, which have been organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 describes the Irish economic and investment environment during the time 
period of the study. The chapter: (i) provides a review of the recent performance of the Irish 
economy; (ii) highlights current issues; (iii) discusses likely future trends; (iv) outlines the 
primary characteristics of the Irish equity market; (v) provides a review of the relevant Irish 
taxation regulations during the period of the study; and (vi) sets out the scheme of taxation in 
Ireland as it applies to corporation profits, dividend income and capital gains. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on dividends with a specific focus on the signalling 
debate and the influences of taxation. It begins with the dividend irrelevancy argument 
proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961) and extends the analysis by recognising that 
corporate dividend decisions are relevant to investors in an enviromnent; (a) where there is an 
information asymmetry between company management and the outside investors: and (b) 
where dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. It traces the development of the 
theoretical models and empirical tests from: (i) the simplistic notion of a single dividend 
signal to outside investors to; (ii) a more realistic scenario in which the dividend is just one of 
many items of information which investors consider when valuing shares. This review 
integrates the literature on the information needs of shareholders, on agency theory and on 
taxation policy in an attempt to produce a comprehensive backcloth against which to judge 
the empirical evidence. 
10 
Chapter 4 sets out the research methodology and methods underpinning the present 
study. It identifies the core philosophical assumptions that guided decisions about the 
research approach for the empirical investigation of dividend decisions by Irish companies 
documented in subsequent chapters. In the context of these assumptions the choices of 
primary quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches and the rationale for the 
chronological order of the empirical work are explained. In addition the chapter provides a 
detailed discussion of each of the research methods of the survey design, the event study and 
the interviews. 
Chapter 5 investigates the views of Irish corporate managers regarding dividend 
policy using a questionnaire survey sent to the chief executives of top Irish companies. It 
seeks to explain: (i) how Irish firms determine the amount of dividends to pay to 
shareholders; (ii) perceptions of Irish chief executives about the relationship between 
dividend policy and firm value, in particular the extent of adherence to the effectiveness of 
the `signalling' concept; and (iii) the role of earnings, risk preferences and tax clienteles in an 
Irish context when payout ratios are being determined. The chapter also examines whether 
responses to these topics differ between quoted and unquoted firms, dividend paying and 
non-dividend paying companies and across companies which have recently changed their 
dividend. 
Chapter 6 conducts a wide-ranging study of the dividend announcement effect by 
examining the share return behaviour around the announcement of changes in the payout 
levels of a large sample of quoted Irish companies. The same methodology is also used to 
test for an interaction effect (i. e. whether the stock market reaction to dividend 
announcements differs from one group to another according to the character of the change in 
the reported dividend and earnings figures). Finally, a more formal investigation of the 
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interaction effect between dividend and earnings announcements is investigated using the 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique. 
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of interviews with management and with investor 
surrogates (i. e. leading Dublin brokerage houses). The interviews with management 
compliments and expands the analysis of the survey evidence while the interviews with 
leading Dublin brokerage houses provide an alternative point of view on whether dividends 
influence share prices and compliments the event study results. Central to these interviews is 
an examination of financial directors' perceptions about the relationship between dividend 
policy and firm value; in particular, whether the conclusions reported in Chapters 5 and 6, 
which suggest that dividends may provide a robust signalling mechanism to Irish investors, 
are confirmed. The interviews also sought information about the influence which taxation has 
in determining payout ratios. In keeping with the research approach taken in Chapter 5, the 
analysis of interviews examines whether responses to these topics differ between quoted and 
unquoted firms, dividend paying and non-dividend paying companies and across companies 
which have recently changed their dividend. 
Finally, Chapter 8 of the thesis assesses the different empirical findings and draws 
conclusions. In addition, it highlights the limitations of the work in this thesis by critically 
discussing the research choices made by the author. The chapter makes a number of 
recommendations about what future work might be conducted in this relatively under- 
researched area. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE IRISH INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 
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2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the Irish investment environment during the 
period of the study. It provides a context for the empirical work discussed in the following 
chapters. An explanation of this context is necessary because of the dramatic transformation 
of the Irish economy from a depressed, debt-ridden, discouraging environment in the 1980s 
to a buoyant, low taxation, prosperous sustainable economy by the end of the 1990s. 
Examination of real GDP at constant prices indicates that the Irish economy grew at 
an annually compounded rate of 9.23% between 1986 and 2001. By comparison, the 
equivalent figure for Europe as a whole was 3.38% and for the World was 5.24%. One reason 
for the dramatic expansion of the Irish economy was the significant growth in foreign 
investment in the country since 1986. The number and size of foreign firms trading in Ireland 
increased and foreign investor participation in the Irish stock market rose. The abolition of 
exchange controls in 1988 resulted in Irish investors taking the opportunity to diversify their 
portfolios out of Irish equities -a process that continued throughout the 1990s. In addition 
Ireland's entry into the Euro in 1999 eliminated currency risk for Irish investors investing in 
Euro-zone equities and for European investors investing in Irish equities. These 
developments have resulted in Irish institutional investors significantly reducing their 
exposure to Irish equities from an estimated weighting of 90% in 1986 to a forecasted 12% in 
2003 (Davy, 2003)7 while at the same time foreign participation in the Irish equity market has 
increased. 8 In practical terms these changes have resulted in a more globalised shareholder 
base for Irish equities. Finally, the recent changes in the Irish system of company taxation 
(including the abolition of the imputation system, the introduction of a dividend withholding 
7 Irish equities represented 2% of all Euro-denominated shares at the beginning of 2003 (Davy, 2003). 8 The Irish Stock Exchange has no data on the extent of foreign ownership of Irish quoted firms. However, Murphy (2003) examined the share registers of firms in four different sectors quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange and noted that foreign participation constituted on average 28% of total holdings in Irish quoted firms. 
14 
tax and the new 12.5% rate of Corporation Tax) may have had a profound impact on the way 
in which Irish firms determine dividend policy. Taxation issues are therefore explored in 
detail. 
The current chapter is split into six sections. Section 2.2 provides a review of the 
performance of the Irish economy during the period of the study while Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
discuss current issues and future trends, respectively. Section 2.5 outlines the primary 
characteristics of the Irish equity market and provides a brief review of the empirical work 
published about the performance of shares traded in the market. Section 2.6 provides a review 
of relevant changes to Irish taxation regulations over the period of the study and sets out the 
scheme of taxation in Ireland as it applies to corporations, dividend income and capital gains. 
Section 2.7 concludes the chapter by summarising the previous sections and linking forward 
to the next chapter. 
2.2 A Review of the Recent History of the Irish Economy 
After a long period of protectionism, which began in the 1930s, the Republic of 
Ireland progressed to a small9 open1° economy by the end of the 1960s. O'Grada (1997) 
noted that in the early 1960s protectionism and obstructions to inward investment were 
replaced by subsidies to manufacturers, government grants for foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and the introduction of a tax holiday for exporters of goods manufactured in the 
Republic of Ireland. " These incentives significantly increased the productivity of the Irish 
manufacturing sector and by the end of the 1960s overseas firms accounted for 60% of 
9 "Small" relates to the relatively small size of Irish GDP compared with other economies. For example in 1970 
Irish GDP was ¬2,070 million (CSO National Income and Expenditure Accounts) compared with UK GDP of 
¬60,625 million (Brooman, 1973, p. 25). 
10 "Openness" is defined as the ratio of exports to GDP. In 1960 the ratio of exports to GDP was 32%; in 1965 
the ratio was 35% and by 1970 the ratio was 37% (CSO National Income and Expenditure Accounts). "Andersen (1969) reported that a 0% tax rate on profits applied to exporters of goods manufactured in the 
Republic of Ireland for 15 years and reduced rates for a further 5 years. The incentive expired on 5t' April 1990. 
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industrial output (NESC, 1996). 
However, Sweeney (1998) noted that while exports expanded significantly in the 
1960s and 1970s12 the indigenous sector was unable to survive the removal of tariffs or 
respond to government grant incentives and many firms in traditional sectors 
failed. Kirby 
(1997) reported that the major failing in Ireland's industrial policy of the 1960s and 1970s 
was the lack of linkages between the indigenous sector and the foreign-owned sector. 
Notwithstanding the closure of many indigenous firms during the 1970s economic growth in 
Ireland averaged 4.5% per annum in the ten years period from 1971 to 1980 (NESC, 1996). 
That growth rate was sustained by substantial increases in government spending. The 
increased public expenditure commitments undertaken in the 1970s contributed to an 
unsustainable public debt burden that had carry over effects to the 1990s (Forfas, 1996). 
2.2.1 The Economic Crisis of the 1980s 
The first half of the 1980s saw the Irish economy experience some of its toughest 
times to date. Gross National Product (GNP) grew by only 0.2% per year, on average, over 
the years 1981-1986, compared to the EEC average growth rate of 1.7% per year (NESC, 
1996). Leddin and Walsh (1997) noted that there was a rapid decline in the public finances, 
substantial balance of payments deficits and increased unemployment despite high levels of 
emigration. Two factors in particular contributed to this poor performance. 
Firstly, at the time, the international economy was quite sluggish as European 
governments tightened fiscal policies by cutting public expenditure and increasing taxation 
thus limiting economic growth. 13 A lack of international demand, high levels of domestic 
12Mc Cluskey (1999) noted that the expansion of foreign owned firms, attracted to Ireland by government grants 
together with the tax holiday for exporters of manufactured goods, and Ireland's entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 accelerated exports to Europe and significantly reduced Ireland's 
traditional reliance on the British market. 
13 The United States was the only economy that experienced notable growth during this period (Forfäs, 2001). 
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inflation and the Irish government's commitment to remain within the European Monetary 
System (EMS) resulted in a marked deterioration of Ireland's relative price performance from 
1979 onwards (Forfäs, 1996). 14 Taking price inflation and movements in the Irish pound/punt 
exchange rate together, there was a real appreciation of 17% in the effective (i. e. trade 
weighted) exchange rate of the Irish pound/punt index between 1980 and 1985. Against EMS 
currencies and UK Sterling, the real appreciation was more than 30%. Only the strength of 
the US dollar, which had appreciated by 15% in real terms until 1985, gave Irish exporters 
any kind of competitive advantage in the first five years of the 1980s (Forfäs, 1996). 
Secondly, as a consequence of low growth the Irish public finances deteriorated 
rapidly. The deficit in the public finances required heavy taxation and significant public 
borrowing. Mc Cluskey (1999) reported that excessive government spending during the first 
half of the 1980s resulted in unsustainable levels of government debt and brought the State to 
the brink of insolvency. Leavy and Wilson (1994) observed that political instability and a 
series of weak governments at the time made corrective action difficult. In 1986 the crisis in 
the public finances forced the then coalition Government to propose severe public 
expenditure cuts. That coalition Government collapsed but the minority government 
subsequently elected in 1987 implemented the public expenditure cuts (with the support of 
the main opposition party in the Irish parliament) and introduced reforms to the taxation 
system. These policy changes brought the public finances under control and stabilised the 
national debt. 
14 From the foundation of the Irish State in 1922 until 1979, the Irish currency (Irish pound/punt) was 
exchangeable at full parity with the British pound Sterling. Ireland joined the EMS in 1978 and the formal link 
with Sterling ceased. 
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2.2.1 Economic Recovery from 1987 
Table 2.1 shows key economic statistics for the Irish economy from 1986 to 2003. 
Inspection of the table reveals that from 1987 onwards, the Irish economy began to 
experience an improvement in its fortunes. 
In 1987 important changes occurred in domestic policy that saw the emergence of a 
social-partnership approach to governance and policy formulation. The approach involved 
three-year centralised agreements on employee pay; personal taxation; public expenditure and 
government borrowing, between the government and the `four pillars' of Irish society. 
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O'Donnell and O'Reardon (1996) noted that the same period witnessed a change in Irish 
party politics towards a more consensual and cooperative arrangement rather than the 
previous adversarial approach. In particular, in 1989 the largest political party in the State 
accepted for the first time in its history the principal of coalition rather than single party 
government. All governments since 1989 have been coalition governments. 
The social partnership model has contributed to a reduction in industrial disputes, 
provided moderate wage increases, ensured strict public expenditure discipline, permitted 
significant tax reductions and enhanced overall policy stability. The resulting policy mix 
concentrated on supply-side reforms to the economy, improving the attractiveness of Ireland 
as a location for overseas investment and increasing competitiveness. The 10% Corporation 
Tax rate for manufacturing and international traded service companies, together with 
generous government grants for both fixed capital expenditure and employee training to 
export-oriented multi-national companies and domestic firms, significantly improved the 
climate for business. 
"The four pillars in Irish society include the trades unions, the employers, the farmers and the voluntary sector. 
The present agreement will expire in 2006. 
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Table 2.1 Economic Statistics for the Irish Economy 1986 to 2003 
Fiscal 
Year 
GNP 
Growth 
°/u 
Employment 
Change 
% 
F. D. I 
Change 
°/u 
Government 
Debt / GDP 
°/u 
Government 
Surplus Deficit (-) 
/ GDP 
1986 -0.9 -0.11 16 119 -14.2 
1987 4.4 0.00 -25 119 -10.8 
1988 2.6 -0.18 -24 115 -6.0 
1989 5.4 4.22 -4 100 -3.0 
1990 7.3 0.00 86 98 -2.9 
1991 1.9 0.44 -5 94 -2.6 
1992 2.0 0.62 18 87 -2.7 
1993 3.7 3.14 -26 89 -2.5 
1994 6.3 3.27 13 87 -2.0 
1995 8.2 5.00 53 78 -2.6 
1996 7.8 3.65 6.7 70 -0.6 
1997 J. i . 5.5 i - öu U. a 
1998 7.9 8.30 - 42 2.1 
1999 8.9 6.46 242 41 2.3 
2000 10.2 5.00 155 38 4.5 
2001 3.8 2.74 -270 36 1.7 
2002 2.7 1.95 300 34 -0.4 
2003 5.1 2.61 165 31 1.4 
Note: This table provides details of key economic statistics for the Irish economy over the study period. Prior to 
1997, Forf'as maintained statistics on grant-aided foreign investment. Since 1998 the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) maintains these statistics. The indices are not comparable as the Forfäs figures relate to fixed capital 
flows while the CSO records total flows. 
(Source: Department of Finance Economic Review and Outlook 1986-2005) 
Table 2.1 shows that during the period 1987-1992 the recovery in growth was strong 
and as a result substantial progress was achieved in reducing the fiscal imbalance. The same 
period saw the relative price performance of the country becoming positive with a lower rate 
of inflation and reductions in interest rates. With the balance of payments moving into 
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surplus Ireland's exchange rate commitment to the EMS appeared credible (Forfas, 
1996). 
These positive developments were sustained and Ireland qualified for membership of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
16 In addition, 
substantial transfers to Ireland under the European Structural and Cohesion 
Funds'7 
significantly assisted with the development of the country's infrastructure. 
The policies of offering tax breaks and various grants to industry together with a 
highly educated workforce meant that Ireland has become one of the most favoured foreign 
investment locations in the European Union (EU). In particular, the reduced corporation tax 
rate for manufacturing and financial services firms has enabled Ireland to capture almost 10% 
of total annual US FDI into the EU compared with only 2.5% in the 1980s (Forfäs, 2000). 
The sectors that witnessed the largest investments included the chemical industry, electrical 
and electronic equipment, and manufacturing. 
18 Ireland's market share of FDI projects in 
Europe, including manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, biotechnology, software, 
shared services, financial services and tele-services, amounted to 23% of the total or more 
than 20 times its share of the EU population (Forfäs, 2000). This infusion of capital has had a 
dynamic impact on the Irish economy. It has enabled Irish-based entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of a booming economy which has in turn helped in sustaining high productivity 
projects in both the manufacturing and the services sectors (Forfäs, 2000). 
The economic policies pursued since 1987 have brought about a fundamental 
strengthening of the economy. Over the past eighteen years, exports have grown at an 
average rate of 20% per annum. Much of this economic growth has come from the high- 
technology sector where many subsidiaries of multi-national companies have invested in 
16 With a fiscal deficit of less than 3% of GDP, Ireland qualified in May 1998 as a participant in EMU, along 
with 10 other EU states (ESRI, 1999). 
17 Ireland received almost £12 billion in aid from various European funds from 1988 to 1997 (AlB Bank, 1998). 
18 In 1997, Ireland received over $4 billion of US FDI. Ireland has 7% of the stock of US investment in 
chemicals in the EU; 14% in electrical and electronic equipment; and 10 % in manufacturing (Forfäs, 2000). 
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Ireland. These firms have provided a substantive increase in technology transfer and 
management know-how, together with significant supply-chain opportunities for Irish-owned 
industry. This growth is reflected in the astonishing success of the Irish economy in the seven 
years from 1994 to 2000. Economic growth, measured as GNP, 
19 averaged 8% in each of the 
seven years to 2000; unemployment fell from 14.7% in 1994 to 5.0% in 2000. In particular, 
employment in the Irish services sector increased significantly during this period. For 
example, employment growth in tourism has been remarkable, increasing by almost 40%, 
while total employment in Ireland increased by only 14% (ITIC Report, 1998). 
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Irish national income doubled in real terms between 1987 and 1998 (Sweeney, 1999). 
Demographic trends together with significant immigration produced a bulge in the numbers 
available for work. As a result Ireland has a much smaller economically dependent 
population than in the 1980s (Sweeney, 1998). The policy of providing a very high level of 
state intervention in industry (with development grants and tax allowances) was the key to 
generating this prosperity and in overcoming the country's longstanding problems of high 
unemployment and emigration (Sweeney, 1999). The improvement in the state of the public 
finances, which had been initiated in the late 1980s, has been sustained and by the end of 
2003 the national debt was reduced to 31% of GDP, a massive fall from 1986 when the 
national debt stood at 119% of GDP (see Table 2.1) 21 Since 2003 economic growth has 
continued and by the end of 2004 unemployment stood at an all time low of 4.3% (Forfäs, 
2005). As a result of the increase in employment, average living standards in Ireland now 
exceeds the EU average. 22 
19 A large number of multi-national companies in a small economy can distort the national figures, so the most 
appropriate figure to use is GNP, rather than GDP, because the MNC profit adjustment has been made. 
2 The growth in tourism exports has outpaced that in the indigenous manufacturing sector. Moreover, tourism 
has now out-stripped agriculture as Ireland's second most important industrial sector. (ITIC Report, 1998, p. 17. ) 
21 Ireland now has the second lowest national debt to GDP ratio of all EU states (E. S. R. I., 2005). 
22 GNP per capita was 65% of the EU average in 1995 (Forfäs, 1996) and over 100% in 2003 (E. S. R. I., 2004). 
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In summary, the transformation of the Irish economy from a depressed, debt-ridden, 
discouraging environment in the 1980s to a buoyant, low taxation, prosperous sustainable 
economy has been remarkable. The increase in FDI engendered an entrepreneurial spirit 
amongst the Irish business community; as a result of this investment and a sharing of 
knowledge and competencies, many Irish owned enterprises have established niches for 
themselves in many sectors and are growing to become significant players in the world's 
markets. 
2.3 Current Issues 
In the late 1990s disclosures regarding payments of substantial monies by prominent 
businessmen to politicians (including cabinet members) led to the establishment of two 
tribunals of enquiry: the Moriarty Tribunal and the Mahon Tribunal (formally the Flood 
Tribunal). The present concern of these enquiries is whether such payments might have 
influenced decisions on planning consents, the award of licences for national and local radio 
stations, the granting of certain government contracts, and the process for the award of the 
licence for the operation of the country's second mobile telephone network. A more recent 
enquiry is investigating whether such payments may have influenced certain changes to the 
Irish inheritance tax code. As a result of the enquiries some politicians may face charges of 
corruption. The tribunals are still sitting and it is expected that the investigations will 
continue for a number of years. 
The disclosures at the tribunals have prompted several investigations by the Irish tax 
authorities (the Revenue Commissioners) of tax offences. To date these investigations have 
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led to criminal prosecutions of a former cabinet minister and a senior Dublin City Council 
planning official23 Other named politicians may face criminal prosecutions for tax evasion. 
As a result of parliamentary hearings initiated by the Public Accounts Committee all 
of the clearing banks and some building societies have made substantial settlements with the 
Revenue Commissioners after admitting having facilitated the setting up of bogus non- 
resident bank deposit accounts in order to enable certain depositors to evade income tax, 
capital gains tax, capital acquisitions tax and deposit interest retention tax (Sunday Business 
Post, 2002). Taxpayers who held such bogus non-resident accounts were permitted to settle 
all outstanding taxes due under a Revenue Commissioners incentive scheme. 
24 More recently, 
one clearing bank has been found guilty of deliberately and fraudulently overcharging interest 
and fees to its customers' accounts (Irish Times, 2004; Sunday Business Post, 2004). Arising 
from a report by government appointed inspectors into the management of the bank in 
question the Irish Director of Corporate Enforcement has banned certain senior executives at 
the bank from holding company directorships for life. 
Related investigations have revealed that a substantial number of Irish resident 
taxpayers had funds deposited in offshore and Northern Ireland bank accounts since the late 
1970s25 Taxpayers, with undeclared funds in such offshore accounts, were also permitted to 
regularise their affairs under an incentive scheme26 while in May 2005 the Revenue 
Commissioners announced a separate enquiry into funds placed in single premium life 
23 The former government minister was convicted of tax evasion and he is currently serving a jail term. 
24 Under the arrangements taxpayers who made voluntary disclosures of such funds and paid all tax, interest and 
penalties due by a specified date had their tax, interest and penalties liabilities capped at 100% of the amount of 
funds in such accounts. Taxpayers who availed of the voluntary disclosure scheme were granted immunity from 
prosecution for tax offences and were assured that their names would not be published as having made a 
settlement with the Revenue Commissioners. 
25 In accordance with the Irish Exchange Controls Regulations such funds should have been repatriated in 1979. 
26 Under the arrangements taxpayers who made voluntary disclosures of undeclared offshore funds and paid all 
tax liabilities (including interest and penalties) due on or before 28th May 2004 qualified for reduced penalties, 
immunity from prosecution for tax offences and have been granted assurances that their names will not be 
published as having made a settlement with the Revenue Commissioners. 
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insurance products since 1980.27 Finally, the country's largest bank has admitted 
overcharging its customers for certain foreign exchange transactions and facilitating offshore 
tax avoidance transactions for top executives of the bank. 
Many have suggested that these exposures have proved beneficial for Irish society. 
Specifically, the Revenue Commissioners have been granted extensive new powers of 
investigation under various Finance Acts to ensure compliance with tax regulations. In this 
regard the Revenue Commissioners (2005) have reported that they are satisfied that there is 
now substantial compliance with the tax code by both individuals and businesses. The annual 
Report of the Revenue Commissioners (2004) noted that taxation arrears `have dropped to a 
historic low of 2.5% of gross receipts' (Revenue Commissioners 2004, p. 36) compared to 
37% in 1998. In a recent interview with the Irish Times the Chairman of the Revenue 
Commissioners stated: 
`[The Revenue's] aim is to make voluntary compliance the easy 
and attractive option and to make sure that non-compliance 
does not pay. ' 
Irish Times, Business (2005, p. 2) 
2.4 The Future of the Irish Economy 
Over the coming decades it is anticipated that a number of global changes will impact 
upon Ireland's enterprise sector (Forfäs, 2001). Two forces in particular are expected to have 
27 Specifically, the enquiry will initially focus on certain single premium life products with values in excess of 
620,000 purchased since l' January 1980. Under the arrangements taxpayers who make voluntary disclosures of 
such funds and pay all tax liabilities (including interest and penalties) on or before 22°d July 2005 qualify for 
reduced penalties, immunity from prosecution for tax offences and have been granted assurances that their 
names will not be published as having made a settlement with the Revenue Commissioners. 
24 
a significant impact on its development: international competition and technological 
evolution. A recent report by the Enterprise Strategy Group (2005) concluded that: 
"Ireland's competitive advantage will be defined by demand 
led innovative products and services. Innovation is the 
fundamental requirement for competitive success in the 
services sector as well as in manufacturing. " 
Enterprise Strategy Group Report (2005) 
In that environment the services sector has been identified as the catalyst to sustain 
economic growth and in 2003 services accounted for over 60% of all jobs in Ireland (E. S. R. I., 
2003). Indeed, projections by Sweeney (1999) indicated that the services sector in Ireland has 
the potential to employ almost 1.4 million by 2010 while the Forfäs (1996) report noted that 
an additional 300,000 jobs could be created in the services sector over the period 1997 to 
2011. 
The Forfas (2005) report noted that internationally traded services were the main 
source of export growth in 2004. During 2004 traditional manufacturing sectors continued to 
experience decline while modern sectors with strong export bases continued to prosper and 
enjoy increases in employment and output. This shift was particularly evident in the 
entrepreneurial indigenous firms operating in computer software and food products. In 
addition internationally traded services continued to expand during 2004. The World Trade 
Organisation (2005) estimated that Ireland had 2.2 per cent share of global trade in services in 
2004 with computer services accounting for 35.5% of total services exports while the net 
trade surplus in financial services was ¬4.9 billion. The Forfas (2005) report also noted that in 
2004 Ireland was for the first time in its history a net exporter of FDI. The Forfds chief 
executive in the Forfas (2005) report noted that: 
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"In the future, Ireland will increasingly have to compete on the 
basis of its ability to manage the development, efficient 
production and sale of high value products and services 
tailored to meet global demand. Firms with an eye on long term 
growth in international markets will ensure that they have clear 
plans to introduce higher value products and services, improve 
operating efficiency and build and leverage international sales 
and marketing capability. " 
Although educational attainment is expected to increase among the smaller cohorts 
passing through schools and colleges substantial immigration will be required to sustain 
growth in services as the falling birth rate experienced during the 1980s has reduced the 
number of new entrants to the workforce annually (E. S. R. I., 2002). 
2.5 The Irish Stock Exchange 
One of the main sources of finance for Irish companies is the stock market. This was 
especially true during the late-1990s when initial public offerings (IPOs) increased. This part 
of the chapter presents the primary characteristics of the Dublin Stock Exchange; these 
characteristics are compared with those of the world's largest capital markets; key 
developments in the market during the period of the present study are highlighted and a brief 
review of previous empirical work on the behaviour of prices and returns in the market is 
presented. 
The Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) has been trading for over two hundred years. From 
its modest beginnings in 1793, the ISE has developed significantly and today provides the 
main national market for Irish equities and Irish Government bonds. The exchange also 
provides markets for covered warrants, corporate bonds, investment funds and specialist 
securities. At present, there are over 7,000 securities listed on the ISE with most trading 
activity concentrated in equities and Government bonds. Table 2.2 presents the six basic 
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types of security listed on the ISE alongside a brief description of each type of these 
different 
securities. 
Table 2.2: Types of Security Listed on the Irish Stock Exchange 
Type of Security Description 
Domestic Irish equities Ordinary shares issued by Irish companies. 
Overseas equities Ordinary shares issued by non-Irish companies. 
Securitised derivatives issued by a financial institution over 
an underlying asset such as an equity stock, an index or a 
basket of securities rather than by the issuer of, for 
Covered Warrants example, the equity itself. The term "covered" means that 
when the issuer sells the warrant to an investor, the issuer 
will cover or hedge its exposure, typically, by trading in the 
underlying shares on the market. 
Securities issued by the Irish government to meet its 
Irish Government Bonds 
Exchequer borrowing requirements. They entitle the owner 
to regular interest payments and the repayment of the 
underlying capital sum at a given date in the future. 
Bonds / fixed interest stocks Usually issued by companies or local authorities. 
Collective investment schemes that are established to 
passively invest in a portfolio of investments on the basis of 
UCITS & Investment Funds spreading risk. The Investment Funds are both Irish and 
non-Irish domiciled and may take a number of legal forms 
or investment structures. 
Securities, which because of their nature, are normally 
bought or traded by a limited number of investors who are 
Specialist Securities particularly knowledgeable in investment matters. 
Securities listed include: Asset Backed Debt, Eurobonds, 
Medium Term Notes and Warrants. 
(Source: Irish Stock Exchange Website, Profiles and Functions of the Exchange, 2003). 
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The Irish equity market is comprised of four markets: the principal market (known as 
the Official List) the Developing Companies Market (DCM), the Exploration Securities 
Market (ESM) and ITEQ, the technology market of the ISE. At 31 December 2003 there 
were 66 companies listed on the various markets of the ISE, while the market capitalisation 
of the Official List was ¬157,604 million, the DCM was ¬49 million, the ESM was ¬125 
million and the ITEQ was E840 million. Therefore in total, the Irish equities market had a 
market capitalisation of E158,618 million at 31 December 2003. 
By international standards the market is relatively small. Of the 20 exchanges 
registered with the Federation of European Security Exchanges, Ireland had the eighth lowest 
market capitalisation at 31 December 2003. Table 2.3 presents summary annual statistics for 
the Irish stock exchange for the period of the study 1986 to 2003. 
Inspection of this table reveals that the number of listed firms has not changed 
dramatically over the period of this study. The number of listed firms increased from 73 in 
1986 to 101 in 1999 at the height of the stock market boom. However, since 2000 the 
number of listed firms has fallen as IPOs declined in popularity, a number of firms de-listed 
and various mergers resulted in the combining of several entities. Market capitalisation and 
turnover have also fallen in recent years although the trend in turnover was reversed in 2001. 
The final point to note from Table 2.3 is that a sizeable population of the firms listed on the 
Irish exchange have a dual listing (mainly on the London Stock Exchange); this number has 
remained relatively constant throughout the period. 8 
28 Appendix 2.1 presents a detailed analysis of market capitalisation of each stock listed in each of the four 
categories on the Irish Stock Exchange in 2003. A review of Appendix 2.1 shows that of the 66 companies 
listed on the ISE at 31 December 2003, the top ten companies (Allied Irish Bank, Anglo Irish Bank, Aviva, 
Bank of Ireland, CRH, Diageo, Irish Life & Permanent, Kerry Group, Ryanair Holdings and Tesco) had a 
market capitalisation of ¬131,798 million (i. e. 83% of the total market). 
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Table 2.3: Annual Statistics for the Irish Stock Exchange between 1986 and 2003 
Year Number of 
Firms Listed 
Market Cap. 
Em 
Turnover 
Em 
Number of 
IPOs 
Number of Dual 
Listings 
1986 73 7,651 4,347 4 61 
1987 70 7,209 4,789 1 60 
1988 73 8,112 3,359 4 62 
1989 74 8,812 3,873 2 65 
1990 77 8,714 4,196 3 67 
1991 81 10,252 4,393 2 72 
1992 82 9,411 4,147 0 73 
1993 83 15,652 7,635 0 71 
1994 80 16,518 8,180 1 70 
1995 79 20,467 10,483 1 68 
1996 82 26,304 9,292 1 69 
1997 91 47,098 29,226 10" 71 
1998 93 95,654 74,286 3 69 
1999 101 137,897 93,461 8 89 
2000 96 197,925 31,463 3 85 
2001 87 191,067 51,042 2 76 
2002 76 167,292 70,255 0 66 
2003 3 66 158,618 76,321 0 60 
(Source: Irish Stock Exchange Annual Review: 1986-2003). 
Note: This table provides details of annual statistics for the Irish stock exchange for the period of the study. For 
years prior to 1998 statistics on volume and market capitalisation are only available in respect of domestic 
equities only. From 1998 statistics on volume and market capitalisation relate to both domestic and foreign 
equities traded on the exchange. 
A number of key developments occurred in the market during the period covered by 
the present study. Specifically, the breaking of the link with the London Stock Exchange, the 
29 New entrants to the market in 1997 included four technology firms; Iona Technologies, BCO Technologies, 
Rapid Technologies and ITG Group plc; two manufacturing firms; Qualceram and ILP; an exploration firm 
Providence Resources; a personnel recruitment firm Marlborough International; the low cost airline Ryanair 
Holdings and a former farmers co-operative society, Donegal Creameries. 
30 New entrants to the market included three technology firms; Horizon Technologies, Trinity Biotech and Icon; 
two telecommunications firms Eircom and Esat Telecom; a manufacturing firn; Oakhill; a personnel 
recruitment firm; CPL Resources, and an auctioneering firm; Sherry FitzGerald Group. 
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abolition of Exchange Controls, and the move towards a Single European Market for 
Financial Services all took place. 
First, in 1973, the Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) merged with the UK regional 
exchanges and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (Thomas, 1986). In 1984, the ISE was 
delegated the position of Competent Authority for listings in Ireland under an EC Listings 
Directive and the LSE assumed the same role in the UK (Healy, 1995). As company law in 
both jurisdictions developed differences between the two countries with respect to the 
regulation of their respective stock markets occurred. In the UK, the Financial Services Act 
(1986) delegated to the LSE the responsibility for regulating day-to-day market operations 
and listings. In Ireland, in line with the European Commission Investment Services Directive, 
The Stock Exchange Act (1995) provided for `home country control'. Under this legislation 
the ISE was charged with responsibility for both the regulation of brokers and regulation of 
the market. The Stock Exchange Act (1995) formally broke the link with London. Murdoch 
(1996) reported that the main problem for the Irish Stock Exchange after the break with 
London concerned fund raising - IPOs became much more difficult post 1995.31 In addition, 
market volumes were considerably reduced. 32 
Second, as was mentioned previously, from the foundation of the State in 1922 until 
1979, the Irish currency (Irish pound/punt) was exchangeable at full parity with the British 
pound Sterling. Ireland was part of the Sterling area and the Irish government adopted the 
various Exchange Controls Acts passed by the parliament at Westminster. Ireland joined the 
EMS in 1978 and the formal link with Sterling ceased. For the first time, exchange controls 
operated between Ireland and the UK. The controls placed restrictions on Irish investors 
31 Murdoch (1996) noted that within three months two Irish companies decided against an Irish listing and listed 
in London instead. Packaging company ILP and telecommunications company Stentor, both of whom had been 
planning an IPO in Dublin, opted instead for London's Alternative Investment Market - AIM. 32 The number of transactions carried on by the Irish exchange fell from 106,800 in 1995 to 72,700 in 1996. 
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(including institutional investors) investing overseas (including the UK) and monitored the 
export and repatriation of capital (Exchange Control Acts 1954-1986). In an assessment of 
the controls Thomas (1986) observed that the regulations severely restricted investors from 
exercising the fullest degree of diversification of their portfolios and imposed a significant 
distortion in investment holdings. On 1 January 1988, restrictions on the purchase of medium 
and long-term foreign securities by Irish residents were relaxed and from 1 January 1989 all 
restrictions were removed. In January 1992, all limitations on foreign currency borrowing 
were lifted (Alles and Murray, 2001). Doddy (1992) noted that after Exchange Controls on 
long-term investments were lifted, the investment policies of Irish funds managers changed 
significantly towards markets offering good liquidity and good value. 33 
Finally, the introduction of the Single European Market has influenced the Irish Stock 
Exchange. The free movement of capital has always been a priority for the EU. Although the 
Single Currency has helped the volume of trade both internally and externally to the EU, 
Murray (2001) noted that the former EU competition commissioner, Peter Sutherland, 
observed that further changes were needed. Specifically he noted that unless the legislation 
governing EU equity markets is overhauled European companies might not achieve the 
benefits that a pan-European equity market offers. In May 1999 the European Commission 
published proposals that aimed to remove all barriers to a Single European Market for 
Financial Services by 2005 (The Financial Services Action Plan). The plan was approved at 
the Lisbon European Council meeting in March 2000. To date, 39 of the 42 measures have 
been implemented with the remainder under negotiation. 
33 A notable casualty of the relaxing of exchange controls was the closure of a number of the smaller stockbroker firms in Ireland and the merger of a number of brokerage houses (Murdoch, 1992). 
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2.5.1 Empirical Studies on the Price Behaviour of the Irish Stock Exchange 
Although the Irish Stock Exchange is over two hundred years old, it is relatively 
small; most of the shares are thinly traded, and most quotes typically have large bid-offer 
spreads. However, unlike smaller markets in developing countries, the Irish Exchange is 
highly regulated and the rules for investor protection are similar to those that apply in the 
larger developed Western stock markets. Despite this unusual characteristic, very little is 
known about the performance of shares traded in the market. Most of the published empirical 
work has focused on tests of the weak-form of the EMH. Very few studies have been 
published on the semi-strong form or strong form of EMH and in general those that have 
been conducted have been based on very small samples and provide a partial view of the 
behaviour of the market. This section presents a brief review of the published work in this 
area. 
A considerable amount of empirical work has been published on seasonality, (day-of- 
the-week effect and month-of-the-year-effect) for Irish equities. For example, McKillop and 
Hutchinson (1988) investigated movements in the share prices of 28 companies over the 
period from May 1979 to May 1986. The authors reported the existence of an April effect, 
which they attributed to tax selling strategies by Irish investors. 4 Donnelly (1991) provided 
a further insight into seasonality in the Irish market by investigating both the day-of-the-week 
effect and month-of-the-year effect. The author examined daily returns for Irish equities from 
6 January 1975 to 27 July 1988 and tested the hypothesis that all days of the week had an 
identical distribution of returns. In contrast to most Western markets, he reported that 
Monday had the highest mean return and Tuesday had the lowest mean return of the week. 
34 Prior to 2001 the tax year ended on 5a' April each year. Dublin stockbrokers offer clients discounted 
commission rates on `Bed & Breakfast' transactions whereby the broker will arrange for shares to be sold and 
immediately re-acquired at an identical price facilitating client claims for the annual tax free capital gains tax 
exemption or crystallising capital losses. 
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Donnelly suggested that the settlement system in Dublin distorts the weekend effect 
in the 
Irish market35 and noted that the average Tuesday return on the Irish stock market 
index was 
at least partly attributable to the lag between trading 
in Dublin and transactions in the UK 
market on the previous day. Donnelly also examined the month-of-the-year effect 
by 
reviewing the performance of a monthly index of shares over a 38-year period 
from January 
1951 to December 1988. Using ANOVA to test for the equality of means across different 
months the author rejected the null hypothesis of equal monthly returns. The paper reported 
evidence of both a January and an April effect suggesting that the April effect might 
be tax 
driven while the January effect could be explained by portfolio re-balancing. 
Lucey (1994) examined the daily closing values on the Irish Stock Exchange Index 
(ISEQ) from January 1987 to September 1991 and confirmed Donnelly's (1991) evidence of 
a Tuesday effect. In a later study, Lucey (2000) using a longer time series, from 1 January 
1973 to 31 December 1998 documented no negative Monday or Tuesday returns but, 
somewhat surprisingly, found a midweek effect, combined with specifically persistent and 
positive Wednesday returns 
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Lucey and Whelan (2004) sought to extend the literature in this area by examining 
data over a longer time span. Their study examined the monthly and semi-annual behaviour 
of the Irish equity market over the period from 1934 to 2000. The data was compiled using a 
month-end arithmetic value-weighted index maintained by the Central Statistics Office 
(CSO) up until 1986, and the official stock market index (ISEQ) thereafter. The authors 
3s Donnelly explained that in the Dublin market the year is split into account periods, which commence on a 
Monday and are of a two-week duration. Bargains are settled on the second Monday following that account 
period. As a result, returns in the first few days of the account period tend to be upwardly biased. Donnelly 
confirmed this bias by the result of difference-in-means tests, which revealed - firstly, that the average return on 
the first Monday of the accounting period is greater than that for other Mondays; and secondly that the average 
weekly return for non-account weeks is negative. 
36 The author used two data indices - the Datastream DC-Total Market index and the DC-Financial index. 
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discovered the presence of significant monthly seasonality, in particular a combined 
December-January effect and an April effect. 
Lucey (2004) suggested that the pattern of seasonality in Ireland differed from that 
found elsewhere. Having criticised earlier methodologies the author identified four data sets: 
the official Irish stock market index (ISEQ); a total returns version of the ISEQ price index 
(ISEQR); a financial sector index (ISEFIN); and a general market index (ISEGEN). Patterns 
for these indices were analysed over the ten-year period from January 1989 to December 
1998. In contrast to the international literature, the Irish market was found to have its highest 
mean returns on Wednesdays and the lowest on Mondays. Furthermore, the pattern of returns 
does not seem to be clearly and obviously related to risk patterns. In terms of daily 
seasonality, there was only evidence of Monday seasonality for the ISEQ and ISEFIN. 
The Irish stock market therefore has many features which are typical of emerging 
stock markets: high levels of volatility among prices (Kearney, 1998), a non-normal 
distribution of returns (Lucey, 1994; Hamill, et al., 2000; Stevenson, 2000) and evidence of a 
distinctive seasonality pattern and spill-over effects in returns (Lucey and Whelan, 2004). Yet 
it exhibits many characteristics associated with a developed market. It is an old well- 
established stock exchange with a sizable body of corporate law which protects investors. In 
addition over 80% of the equities have another listing on an exchange in a larger and 
developed market (Appendix 2). Most of these second listings are in London or the US 
indicating that the dividend decisions of Irish companies may be unusual in that they may be 
influenced by factors in foreign markets. 
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2.6 A Review of the Irish Tax Regime 
Recent changes in the Irish tax regime for dividends and capital gains provides an 
opportunity for a comprehensive investigation of the relevance of 
dividend taxes in the Irish 
context. Specifically, the regime has changed from the imputation to the classical system 
while a series of Finance Acts has accelerated the collection of tax liabilities 
for all taxpayers. 
This part of the chapter provides a brief review of the relevant Irish taxation regulations 
in 
force during the period of the study in order to establish the context in which the dividend- 
paying decisions of Irish companies can be evaluated. 
As Section 2.2 explained, the first half of the 1980s was a particularly difficult period 
for the Irish economy. The deficit in the public finances required heavy taxation. In 1986 the 
Government introduced reforms to the taxation system. As part of the reform programme 
both the 1986 and 1987 Finance Acts provided for the introduction of a self-assessment tax 
regime based on the recommendations of the First Report of the Commission for Taxation 
(1982) 37 The self-assessment regime requires all individual taxpayers to pay income tax and 
capital gains tax liabilities for the year on or before 31 October each year and to file tax 
returns within ten months of the end of the tax year. 
From the late 1980s corporation tax rates and dividend income tax credits were 
reduced in tandem. In 1997, the rate of capital gains tax was cut to 20%, while in 1998 a new 
corporation tax rate of 12.5% for trading income was introduced for accounting periods 
beginning after 1st January 2003 with transitional reductions applying in each of the years 
" Prior to the full implementation of the self-assessment system taxpayers were given an interest and penalties 
amnesty to bring their tax affairs up to date. To avail of the amnesty taxpayers had to file all outstanding tax 
returns and pay all outstanding taxes on or before 30"' September 1988 (Finance Act, 1988). The yield from the 
tax amnesty was E 821 million (Central Statistics Office, National Income and Expenditure Accounts). In 
addition the 1993 Finance Act provided a special incentive rate of tax of 15% for all previously undeclared 
income and gains. To avail of the 1993 incentive taxpayers had to file a return of all previously undeclared 
income and gains to a Special Commissioner and pay the 15% tax on or before 15th January 1993 (Finance Act, 
1993). The yield from the 1993 tax amnesty was E380 million (Central Statistics Office, National Income and 
Expenditure Accounts). 
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1998 to 2002 (See Appendix 2.2). The public finances moved into substantial surplus in the 
late-1990s (see Table 2.1), which allowed for significant income tax reductions in 1997 and 
1998; Ireland now has the fourth lowest income tax of all OECD countries (Irish Times, 
2005). In 1999, the imputation system was abolished and a new dividend withholding tax 
(DWT) was introduced from 6th April 1999. 
The introduction of the DWT was a significant change to the taxation regime for 
dividend income. DWT applies to all dividend payments to individual taxpayers. However, 
DWT does not apply where either the dividend recipient is a company resident in Ireland for 
Corporation Tax, or is a non Irish resident person provided that such non residents are 
resident in an EU member state, or are resident in a country with which Ireland has a double 
taxation treaty, or is a company quoted on a recognised stock exchange (Finance Act, 1999). 
The abolition of the imputation system has significantly reduced the yield on dividend 
income for both Irish tax resident individuals and pension funds. Table 2.4 considers the after 
tax dividend yield assuming dividend income received amounting to ¬100 for both types of 
shareholders (i. e. an Irish tax resident individual and a pension fund) in 1987 and 2003. The 
example in the table also assumes that the dividend income arises from a portfolio of shares 
with a market value of ¬1,000 in each year and that an individual taxpayer pays income tax at 
a marginal rate of 50%. The pension fund is exempt from income tax and prior to 1999 was 
entitled to claim a refund of the imputed tax credit on dividend income received. In 1987 the 
imputed tax credit was 53.85% of the cash dividend received. The table shows that as a result 
of the abolition of the imputation system the dividend yield after tax in 2003 had been 
reduced by approximately 14% for an individual and by approximately 26% for a pension 
fund compared with the after tax yield in 1987. 
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Table 2.4: Comparative After Tax Yield on Dividends 1987 and 2003 
Imputation 
Regime 
1987 
Classical 
Regime 
2003 
Imputation 
Regime 
1987 
Classical 
Regime 
2003 
Individual Individual Pension Fund Pension Fund 
Dividend ¬100 16100 ¬100 E100 
Taxable 154* 100 0 0 
Tax@50%/0% 77 50 0 0 
Tax credit (35) - (35) - 
Net Dividend 58 50 135 100 
Dividend yield 5.8% 5.0% 13.5% 10% 
NOTE: * Under the imputation system a taxpayer in receipt of a dividend of £100 in 1987 would have been 
deemed to have received a gross dividend of £154 and a tax credit amounting to 36/650' of the amount of the 
dividend received. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The Irish economy is small, open and highly trade-dependant; the last two decades 
have seen it experience periods of recession, of recovery and of the establishment of a more 
secure growth path. The shape of the economy has been transformed from one that was 
heavily reliant upon agriculture, to one that now relies upon a dependable manufacturing 
sector and an enterprise sector. The enterprise sector includes both Irish owned and foreign 
owned companies located in Ireland that are involved in either the manufacture of goods or 
the provision of services. The changes in the economy and to the tax regime may have had an 
impact on attitudes of Irish companies towards dividend payout policies. Accordingly, a 
comprehensive study of the views of Irish corporate managers regarding dividend policy is 
timely. The conclusions of that research will be complemented by an examination of how the 
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Irish stock market responds to company dividend announcements and the views of Irish 
financial analysts on dividends. 
Although the Irish stock market is small by international standards, unlike smaller 
markets in developing countries it is highly regulated and the rules for investor protection are 
similar to those that apply in the larger developed Western stock markets. In addition, many 
stocks listed on the Irish exchange have dual listings, having both a listing in Dublin and on 
at least one larger market such as London or New York. In this context, the disclosure of 
information and stockbrokers' research analysis is as sophisticated as that which exists on 
larger markets. Prior studies (e. g. Burton et al., 1999) have suggested that the size and 
visibility of firms can have an impact on the market response to signals emanating from 
companies. By studying the relatively small Irish market the role of market and firm size can 
be investigated directly. In that context, the Dublin exchange appears to be ideally suited to a 
meaningful examination of the dividend question. 
The next chapter examines in detail the literature on dividends. It explores the 
conflicting theories that have been put forward regarding whether dividend payments matter 
to valuation and examines the literature on the information content (signalling) effect of the 
dividend announcement and the impact of taxation on dividend policy. The chapter also 
considers the literature on managerial behavioural attitudes to dividend policy. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
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3.1 Introduction 
Lintner's pioneering work on dividends, published in 1956, observed that the payment 
of regular cash dividends to shareholders is a long-established tradition in developed capital 
markets. The author suggested that company managers: (i) believe that shareholders are 
entitled to a fair share of the firm's profits in the form of dividends; (ii) advocate a target 
dividend payout ratio; (iii) perceive that shareholders prefer a steady increase in dividends, so 
that only gradual changes to the dividend are made; and (iv) seek to avoid making changes in 
the payout rate that may have to be reversed within a year or so. As a result managers 
attempt to smooth dividend payments in the short-term to avoid the necessity for frequent 
changes. 
Despite Lintner's observations the question of why companies pay dividends - and 
how such dividend payments are determined - is perhaps the most elusive and controversial 
area of contemporary finance theory (Feldstein and Green, 1983). Black (1976) referred to 
firms' and investors' fixation with regular dividends as a puzzle, asserting that nobody 
actually knows why firms pay dividends. In the course of attempting to resolve this question, 
academics have uncovered many specific aspects of dividend behaviour that lack obvious 
rational explanations. These issues have led to many years of substantive research efforts, but 
`pervasive, time-invariant answers to such questions appear to be lacking' (Frankfurter and 
Wood, 2002, p. 2). Despite the fact that a number of conflicting theories have been proposed 
to explain why firms pay dividends, no one theory appears to be conclusive. 
This chapter reviews the theoretical and prior empirical literature on the dividend 
puzzle and provides the background for the exploration of the dividend question in an Irish 
context. Section 3.2 reviews the classical theoretical perspective of dividend irrelevance; 
discussing the traditional view of dividends, the `bird-in-the-hand' argument and the 
arguments for dividend relevance. Section 3.3 examines the dividend signalling literature and 
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considers the conflicting theories and empirical evidence that explain why dividend payments 
might signal fundamental information to investors. Section 3.4 investigates the role of 
taxation and includes a review of the academic arguments concerning the tax disadvantage of 
dividends relative to capital gains. Section 3.5 summarises the findings of prior survey and 
interview evidence regarding managerial attitudes to dividends before Section 3.6 concludes 
the chapter. 
3.2 Dividend Irrelevance 
The classical theoretical perspective of dividend irrelevance is that a company's 
dividend payment does not influence the market value of its shares. Marsh (1993) noted that 
the origins of the `dividend irrelevance' view date back to the propositions put forward in the 
paper by Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani (MM) "Dividend Policy, Growth and the 
Valuation of Shares" which was published in 1961. In the paper, MM proved that in a world 
without taxes, transaction costs or other market imperfections the sole determinants of a 
company's value were the expected level and risk of its cash flows (Marsh, 1993). 
MM asserted that no relationship exists between a company's dividend policy and the 
wealth of its shareholders. The authors demonstrated that if a dividend was paid, an 
equivalent amount of new equity must be issued to maintain investment levels. Consequently, 
the decline in share values suffered by existing equity holders arising from the distribution of 
part of the firm's assets (i. e. the payment of a cash dividend) exactly matched the value of the 
dividend received by shareholders; total shareholder wealth was unchanged provided that 
dividend income and capital gains were valued equally. If certain shareholders preferred 
more cash income than the dividends paid by the firm, they could obtain such funds by 
selling part of their shareholding in the firm. MM contended, therefore, that in a perfect 
capital market the investor will not pay a premium for any company policy that can be 
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replicated by the investor. The authors concluded that a firm's dividend payout policy was 
irrelevant to security valuation. As Bar-Yosef and Kolodny (1976) noted: 
"As long as a firm's investment decisions are known, the 
capital market will evaluate the firm's shares according to its 
potential profitability. If certain shareholders prefer more cash 
income than dividends paid, they can obtain such by liquidating 
part of their stock holdings. Doing this, these investors would 
realise the same return as those who maintain their original 
stock holdings regardless of the firm 's dividend policy. " 
(Bar-Yosef and Kolodny, 1976, p. 181) 
The traditional view38 is that dividends are relevant to firm valuation. The 
traditionalists argue that at any particular point in time one euro paid out as dividend is more 
valuable than one euro of retained earnings (capital gains), despite the fact that the funds used 
to pay dividends may have been earmarked for profitable investment opportunities. This 
position is referred to in the literature as the `bird-in-the-hand' theory. The traditionalists do 
not accept that manufacturing a dividend - by liquidating part of a shareholding in the market, 
thereby crystallising a capital gain - is a perfect surrogate for a cash distribution. 
Traditionalists agree that if the assumption of perfect capital markets is accepted, the 
dividend irrelevancy argument holds. However, traditionalists argue that once this 
fundamental assumption is removed the dividend issue becomes problematical. Specifically, 
capital market imperfections interfere with the hypothesis of dividend irrelevancy. Therefore, 
the pattern of dividend distributions by the firm is relevant to the firm's valuation. As Lumby 
(1994) pointed out: 
38Lumby (1994) noted that the traditional view is so called because it is the view which is widely held amongst 
both stock market investors and analysts. 
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"capital market imperfections mean that [if an investor] 
cannot [easily] adjust his dividend pattern to fit his preferred 
consumption pattern.......... the pattern of wealth receipts [may 
be] important. " 
(Lumby 1994, p. 548) 
The origins of the "dividend relevance" position date from observations by Graham 
and Dodd (1934) who asserted that the only reason firms exist is to pay dividends to their 
shareholders. Gordon (1959,1963) provided the fundamental valuation model that links the 
market value of a firm's shares to the discounted value of its future dividend payments. 
According to Gordon (1959), regular dividend payments reduce uncertainty in the mind of an 
investor and therefore the risk of his/her future cash flow (i. e. the bird-in-the-hand theory). 
An early cash distribution (i. e. a dividend) might not actually change a company's business 
risk, but it can favourably alter an investor's perception of that risk. Accordingly, current 
dividends are viewed as more valuable than retained earnings because the investor's 
perception of risk is imperfect. 
39 This imperfection may lead investors to undervalue the 
future dividend stream that retained earnings may generate (Gordon, 1959). The investor's 
perception of lower risk reduces the discount factor and increases the market value of the 
share. Therefore traditionalists conclude that dividends are relevant to valuation. 
The next section of this review focuses on two other major challenges to the dividend 
irrelevancy argument: (i) whether the announcement of any change in the dividend conveys 
information (signals) to the market; and (ii) whether taxation has any effect on dividend 
decisions. Both of these issues are of primary interest in this dissertation. 
39 Frankfurter and Lane (1992) observed that dividends are partially a tradition and partially a method to allay 
investor anxiety. 
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3.3 Dividend Signalling 
Arnold (2002) observed that capital markets are imperfect in the sense that 
information is neither costless nor universally available to all shareholders. In that 
environment investors may make many investment decisions based on imperfect or 
incomplete information. For the investor the cash dividend is a free and universally available 
piece of data. In that context Keane (1974,1985) noted that the tangible nature of cash 
dividends means that investors may regard the payment of a dividend as a powerful signal 
about the future performance of the firm. It is against this background that management must 
determine the amount of dividend to pay. 
In order for dividends to convey information, managers must have access to 
knowledge about the firm not available to outsiders, but which can be signalled to the market 
via the dividend payment policy. The dividend signalling hypothesis is that: `dividends 
convey information about future earnings that enables market participants to predict future 
earnings more accurately' (Watts, 1973, p. 191). In reality corporate managers ("insiders") 
and shareholders ("outsiders") do not have the same (symmetric) information; in particular, 
managers will have access to information about their firm over and above the amount of 
information that is disclosed to the company's shareholders and to the market. This creates an 
imbalance between managers and shareholders conventionally known as `informational 
asymmetry' 40 Therefore, dividend signalling models suggest that in a world of information 
asymmetry, changes in dividend levels convey information about future returns; dividend 
increases (decreases) convey favourable (unfavourable) information about the future cash 
flows of the firm. Bernartzi et al. (1997, p. 1,008) suggested that dividends are explicit 
signals about the firm's future earnings sent `intentionally and at some cost to its 
40Brealey et al. (2005) noted that the term `informational asymmetry' is a term indicating that managers know 
more about their companies' prospects, risks and values than do outside investors. 
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shareholders'. 1 Asquith and Mullins (1986a) noted that the use of dividends as signals 
implies that alternative methods of signalling are not perfect substitutes for the signal 
conveyed by dividends while Frankfurter and Wood (2002) suggested that an appropriate 
dividend policy can lead to lower signalling costs than would be the case with alternatives. 
Building on the notion of asymmetric information, the remainder of this part of this 
chapter reviews the dividends literature on each of the following: (i) the information needs of 
shareholders; (ii) the role of agency theory; and (iii) the empirical relationship between 
dividend payments and security prices. 
3.3.1 Dividends in the Context of the Information Needs of Shareholders 
Corporate shareholders suffer all of the uncertainty42 in a business venture and are 
only entitled to share in the residue of the company's net assets (i. e. share capital plus 
accumulated profits or minus accumulated losses). Therefore corporate investors are 
primarily interested in the amount and pattern of the distribution of the firm's net assets (i. e. 
share buy backs, periodic dividend payouts and the final dividend payment). Such payments 
and their pattern are by their very nature uncertain. 
Ryan et al. (2002) noted that the notion of uncertainty in investment decision-making 
first emerged in mainstream financial economics literature. The authors noted that the related 
theories found their way into the field of finance via the investigation of risk measures that 
might assist investors in investment decision-making. In particular, these risk measures 
facilitated the portfolio selection process of investors, given the subjective attitudes of 
investors to risk. Francis and Archer (1979) noted that the concern with uncertainty in the 
4'Bernartzi et al. (1997) identified several signalling costs associated with dividend payments. Specifically, 
these costs include: the cost of issuing new shares; the cost of forgone investment, and, higher income taxes on 
dividends relative to capital gains. 
42The notion that `uncertainty' differs from `risk' is that the latter exists when objective probabilities can be 
assigned to outcomes (Pike and Neale, 2003). 
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context of investment decision-making in a portfolio selection context had its origins in the 
work of Markowitz (1952 and 1959) and is supported by the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
developed by Fama (1965 and 1970). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) noted that shortly after 
the promulgation of this theory, a substantial number of research papers concerned with 
market-determined risk measures appeared in the academic literature (e. g. Beaver et al., 
1970). 
However, despite the concern with market-determined risk measures and efficient 
capital markets Dykeman et al. (1975, p. 90) noted that: `a substantial number of individual 
investors are not well diversified, and there is no a priori reason to assume such behaviour 
irrational, particularly if the world is not adequately reflected by the simplified economic 
models which support the efficient markets hypothesis'. 3 In that context and against the 
background of investor uncertainty, the cash dividend is part of the information set that 
investors may rely on as a reliable source of information. 
3.3.2 Theoretical Models of Dividend Signalling 
Several researchers have observed that management are careful in the selection of 
dividend policy because the information conveyed by the dividend payment is seen by 
investors as a reliable signal of managements' views about future prospects 44 Frankfurter and 
Wood (2002) asserted that the mitigation of information asymmetries between managers and 
shareholders via unexpected changes in dividend policy is the cornerstone of dividend- 
signalling models. The authors noted that the dividend payment acts as a signal of 
management's insider forecast of prospective earnings. The dividend signalling hypothesis is 
43Griff1 (1982, p. 42) argued that `for investors who are not well-diversified information about company 
specific risk is paramount'. 
44For example, Lintner, (1956) observed that company management will only declare an increased dividend if they are convinced that the new dividend level can be sustained into the future. 
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that company management use dividends to signal asymmetric information which 
`induces a 
reassessment of the firm's expected future earnings and a simultaneous adjustment of share 
price' (Manakyan and Carroll, 1990, p. 201) 
45 Pettit (1976) summarised the key points 
regarding the potential of dividends to convey information to the market participants as 
follows: 
"The original rationale for the conveyance of information 
through dividend announcements was that reported earnings 
may not be an accurate reflection of real earnings since they 
are subject to random nonrecurring factors that cannot be 
specifically and exactly identified by the investing public. Since 
management may have greater insight than the rest of the 
market as to the level of present and future earnings power, 
they may use dividend payments as the medium through which 
their expectations are conveyed. " 
(Pettit, 1976, p. 86) 
The underlying assumption of theoretical models of dividend signalling is that outside 
investors understand a dividend increase to represent "good news" about the future 
profitability of the firm, while they identify a dividend cut as "bad news" which signals a less 
profitable future for the firm (e. g. Pettit, 1972; Ghosh and Woolridge, 1991; Lonie et al., 
1996) 46 
45Manakyan and Carroll (1990) examined the relationship between the dividend signal and changes in actual 
short-term earnings performance. Based on a sample of 278 unexpected dividend increases and 453 unexpected 
dividend decreases during the period 1979 to 1983 the authors confirmed that unexpected dividend changes 
precede changes in short-term earnings in a direction consistent with the signal given by the unexpected 
dividend changes. 
'Paradoxically, despite the fact that MM asserted that no relationship exists between a company's dividend 
policy and the wealth of its shareholders, MM's original analysis acknowledged the informational importance of 
dividend payments to shareholders. Specifically, in their paper MM conceded that if a firm adopted a target 
payout ratio, shareholders were likely to interpret a change in that dividend payout rate as a change in 
management's views of future profit prospects for the firm. Although that interpretation may lead to a change in 
the company's share price MM asserted that the dividend change provides the occasion for the price change but 
is not the reason for the price change. The authors reiterated their view that company share prices are not 
determined by the amount of any dividend payout but exclusively by the firm's future earnings prospects. The 
dividend change merely signals management's reassessment of those future earnings prospects. 
47 
In addition to the view that dividend increases convey good news about future profits, 
while dividend cuts tend to signal bad news, a number of theoretical models have been 
developed to show how dividends can act as a signal of the company's future investment 
opportunities. John and Kalay (1982) noted that it is costly for companies with poorer 
investment prospects to mimic a high payout level. The authors concluded that high quality 
firms signal investment opportunities by committing the firm to restricted dividend payments 
and financing new investment opportunities with low-cost retentions. Soter et al. (1996) 
noted that firms that retain funds to finance profitable investments rather than paying 
dividends avoid having to incur transaction costs when issuing new shares. 
A critical assumption of this argument is that issuing new shares is expensive relative 
to using low cost retained earnings. Lintner (1967) noted that a new issue of shares may 
cause an immediate decline in share values by signalling that the company is unable to fund 
its investments by cheaper debt finance. The argument that internal finance costs are 
significantly less than external finance has been extensively documented in the literature (e. g. 
Lintner, 1967) while a number of papers have reported that the marginal cost of external 
finance is higher for financially vulnerable firms (e. g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988). In 
addition several empirical studies have reported evidence of negative reactions by 
shareholders of quoted companies to the announcement about issues of new shares. For 
example, Asquith and Mullins (1986a and 1986b) reported that the announcement of a new 
share issue reduced the market value of a typical firm by approximately 3% and that more 
than 80% of the firms studied experienced share price reductions at the time of equity issue 
announcements. More recently Burton et al. (2003) summarised the essential conclusions of 
several such studies and noted that: 
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"The average two-day market-adjusted return following the 
announcement of an seasoned equity offering has consistently 
been shown to be negative and in the region of -3%; in contrast 
debt issues appear to exert no significant influences on share 
prices whatsoever. In addition there is strong evidence of price 
drift in the months and years following the announcement of the 
share issue. " 
(Burton et al., 2003, p. 24). 
Brealey et al. (2005) noted that asymmetric information affects the choice between 
internal and external financing and between new issues of debt and equity. The authors noted 
that this argument is a facet of the pecking order hypothesis, which predicts that companies 
with many investment opportunities will finance those investments according to the 
perceived lowest costs of alternative funding methods 
47 Such companies prefer a low 
dividend payout to their shareholders thereby increasing their capacity to finance their capital 
expenditures from retained profits rather than by external sources. Lintner (1956) observed 
that management are reluctant to allow dividends to fluctuate and attempt to smooth dividend 
payments in the short-term to avoid the necessity for frequent changes. On the other hand, 
profitability and investment opportunities are unpredictable so retained profits may be 
insufficient to finance investments and external funds may be required. In these 
circumstances Myres (1984) suggested that management issue debt in the first instance and 
new equity as a last resort. The author concluded that a firm's debt to equity ratio reflects its 
cumulative requirements for external finance. 48 
47 Myres and Majluf (1984) noted that the pecking order hypothesis of corporate finance predicts that because 
firms prefer to finance investments with retained profits they adapt their target dividend policies to reflect 
investment opportunities while avoiding sudden changes in dividends. According to the theory there is no 
defined target debt to equity capital structure ratio so external fund raising reflects gaps between retained 
earnings and investment opportunities net of dividends. 
48 The alternative explanation of the debt-equity ratio choice in the literature is trade off theory. Myres (1984) 
noted that the trade off theory of capital structure recognises that target debt-equity ratios may be derived by 
balancing the tax benefits of debt financing with financial distress costs at high gearing levels. Low risk firms 
with significant tangible assets and high tax capacity will have high debt-equity ratios and unprofitable 
companies with risky intangible assets will rely primarily on equity financing. 
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A number of academic researchers have attempted to model the costs associated with 
using dividend changes act as market signals. Bhattacharya (1979) analysed a scenario 
in 
which the reliability of accounting reports about earnings are enhanced by the payment of 
cash dividends. Specifically, if investors have incomplete information about the 
future 
profitability of the firm because of the inadequacies of corporate reports, the payment of 
dividends signals information to investors about the firm's future cash flows. The author 
demonstrated that under appropriate conditions a dissipative signalling equilibrium emerges 
with the level of dividends serving as the signal and the personal tax disadvantage with 
dividend payments as the signalling cost for shareholders. Specifically, the author asserts that 
the extra tax burden on dividend income is the major signalling cost because dividends are 
taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. In a subsequent paper, Bhattacharya (1980) analysed 
the dividend announcement as a non-dissipative signal to investors by using a labour market 
model which the author demonstrated is relevant to the modelling of the information content 
of corporate dividends as an ex ante signal of future earnings. The author noted that company 
management would avoid using the dividend payment to mislead the market because any 
such attempt might result in the termination of their employment contracts with the firm. 
Miller and Rock (1985) developed a dividend information model under asymmetric 
information conditions. The authors noted that the cash dividend provides investors with 
information concerning the firm's current earnings. Their model demonstrated that an 
informational consistent signalling equilibrium exists arising from a decision to change the 
existing level of dividend payout. The dividend announcement enables market participants to 
confirm the firm's current earnings and that these earnings are used to predict future cash 
flows. In their model the dividend announcement effect can be partitioned in two; - the 
dividend surprise itself and an earnings persistence factor. In these circumstances 
management are tempted to pay out higher dividends than the market is expecting (thereby 
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increasing the price of the company's shares) even if that means cutting back on investments. 
Therefore the price of allowing for asymmetric information and the dividend announcement 
effects is the loss of optimal investments by the firm. The authors concluded that 
the 
opportunity cost measured by productive investment forgone is the cost of maintaining the 
49 dividend signal. 
Finally, Keane (1974) observed that a high dividend payout policy requires firms to 
raise fresh funds (either new equity or debt) in the market regularly to finance capital 
expenditure. In contrast a low dividend payout policy may indicate that capital expenditure 
is 
financed through retained earnings. Keane (1974) argued that investors prefer firms to pay 
high dividends and raise new funds in the market on a regular basis because a substantial 
amount of information is usually disclosed about a firm's proposed investments in the 
prospectus when the new funds are raised. In contrast if retained earnings are used to finance 
capital expenditure, uncertainty is greater because most of the information about the proposed 
investment remains undisclosed. Closely related to this argument is the suggestion that 
shareholders distrust management and fear that retained earnings will be wasted through poor 
investment decisions. Easterbrook (1984) suggested that high dividend payments reduce 
shareholder unease with management (i. e. the shareholders' agents) by subjecting the firm's 
investment and financing decisions to the scrutiny of the capital market. The next section 
builds on the notion that a high dividend policy ultimately requires management to raise new 
funds and therefore provides more information to the market than would be the case with a 
low dividend policy. 
49 Miller and Rock (1985) extended their analysis to consider the financing announcement effect and noted that 
the financing announcement effect is merely the dividend announcement effect in reverse. The sign and size of 
the price change following an announcement of new financing will depend on the relation of optimal investment 
to the pre-announcement expectation of earnings. If internal net cash flow had been expected to be positive, 
financing is bad news. The larger-than-expected external financing indicates lower-than-expected cash flows. 
Therefore a decision to increase the level of dividend by either reducing the anticipated level of investment, or 
increasing external financing may indicate to investors that the firm's expected cash flows will be lower. 
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3.3.3 The Role of Agency Theory 
Agency costs result from information asymmetries. Corporate managers are agents of 
shareholders - `a relationship fraught with conflicting interests' (Jensen, 1986, p. 323). 
The 
notion of agency costs is not new; Frankfurter and Wood (2002) observed that differences in 
managerial and shareholder priorities have been recognised for more than three centuries 
while Jensen and Meckling (1976) noted that agency costs inevitably arise when owner- 
managers sell off portions of their firm to outside shareholders who have no day-to-day 
involvement with the firm and no voice in management. Roseff (1982) suggested that the 
discrepancy between the value of the 100% owner-managed firm and the less than 100% 
owner-managed firm is a measure of agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested 
that one way to reduce agency costs is for managers to increase their equity ownership in the 
firm which would better align managers' interests with the interests of shareholders. Jensen 
(1986) noted that shareholders reduce agency costs by incurring monitoring costs (e. g. audit 
fees) while Barnea et al. (1981) observed that that agency costs could be further minimised 
through the use of complex contractual arrangements between management and shareholders. 
In addition the authors noted that although agency costs potentially result in reductions in the 
market value of shares, agency costs are likely to be lower if firms regularly go to the market 
to raise new capital. 
Easterbrook (1984) agreed that since cash dividends paid out to investors force firms 
to raise funds in the capital market more frequently, a high dividend payout policy diminishes 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders; the dividend provides a mechanism 
to monitor managers at relatively low cost. The author observed that the principal value of 
keeping firms constantly in the market for capital is that the contributors of capital are very 
good monitors of the investment and financing decisions of management. Otherwise 
managers may behave in their own interest rather than the interests of investors. 
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Jensen (1986,1988) recommended that companies should adopt a high dividend 
payout policy because such a practice reduces the capacity of management for independent 
decision-making and subjects their investment polices to the scrutiny of the capital market. 
The author noted that the more shareholders are rewarded by cash dividends, (and capital 
expenditures are therefore financed by new issues of shares or debt), the greater the amount 
of external monitoring. This in turn reduces the agency conflict between managers and the 
shareholders of the firm, thereby diminishing the agency cost of equity. Jensen (1986) 
asserted that if managers of firms with substantial free-cash flows have a tendency to over- 
invest by accepting marginal investment projects with negative net present values, a dividend 
increase reduces the extent of over-investment and increases the market value of the firm; a 
decrease in dividend will produce the opposite result. 
Roseff (1982) suggested that the payment of a dividend is a device like a bonding cost 
or an auditing cost which is employed to reduce the agency cost of equity. On the other hand 
firms incur substantial transaction costs by going to the market regularly to raise new capital. 
Roseff (1982) presented a model of optimal dividend payout in which he demonstrated that 
although increased dividends lower agency costs that benefit is offset by the increased 
transaction costs associated with new external funding. The set off of these two opposing 
costs determines an optimal dividend payout S0 In conclusion the author suggested that a 
firm's investment policy influences dividend payment policy in that firms with greater 
investments tend to have have lower dividend payouts. 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) suggested that management select their ownership, 
leverage and dividend structures simultaneously in order to control agency costs. The authors 
so Using data from a sample of 1,000 observations drawn from 64 different unregulated industries Roseff 
(1982) conducted an empirical test of the model and concluded that the dividend payout is a significantly 
negative function of the firm's past and expected future growth rate of sales, a significantly negative function of 
its beta coefficient, a significant negative function of the percentage of stock held by insiders and a significantly 
negative function of the number of the firm's shareholders. 
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identified five firm specific characteristics that proxy for agency costs and examined the 
effect of these characteristics on managerial stock ownership, leverage and 
dividends. " 
Based on a sample of 603 industrial firms during the period 1981-1985 the authors reported 
that increased earnings volatility impacted both managerial ownership and dividends 
positively. 
Moh'd et al. (1995) argued that shareholders are willing to bear the cost of new 
funding that arises from a high dividend payout because the benefits of the reduction in 
information asymmetries far exceed the costs incurred. The study examined agency theory 
across different firms and through time, using annual financial statement data 
for 341 US 
firms for the period 1972 to 1989. The authors reported that dividend policy appeared to be a 
function of firm size, growth rates, operating/financial leverage, intrinsic business risk and 
ownership structure; the findings also indicated that managers of sample firms seem to 
minimise agency cost and transaction costs in a manner consistent with the existence of an 
optimal dividend payout ratio. The authors concluded that `firms adjust their dividend payout 
in response to dynamic shifts in the agency cost/transaction cost structure as changes are 
observed to occur' (Moh'd et al., 1995, p. 383). 
3.3.4 Empirical Evidence on the Relationship between Dividends and Security Prices 
One of the first studies to examine how share prices respond to dividend 
announcements was published by Pettit (1972). That study spawned many subsequent 
academic papers that have investigated the market reaction to the announcement of changes 
st The specific characteristics were: earnings volatility; advertising and research and development expenses; 
flotation costs; firm size; and diversification loss to managers. Sample firms characterised by greater advertising 
and research and development expenditures rely less on debt finance, while managers rely more on outside 
leverage and more on managerial ownership if flotation costs are large. Greater share ownership diversification 
positively affected managers' stock ownership, negatively affected leverage and negatively affected dividends. 
Finally, larger firms were characterised by lower managerial ownership, increased leverage and increased 
dividend payout. 
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in regular dividends (e. g. Charest, 1978; Divecha and Morse, 1983; Marsh, 1993). Virtually 
all of these studies have observed a strong positive relationship between dividend 
announcements and security price movements. 
2 In particular, when dividends are increased 
(or initiated) prices tend to go up, whereas, when dividends are cut (or omitted) prices fall 53 
Pettit (1972) attempted to measure the response of share prices to dividend changes 
announced by US firms using a sample of 698 dividend announcements made by 625 NYSE 
quoted companies over the period January 1964 to June 1968. Sample firms were categorised 
according to dividend and earnings performance; dividend announcements were sub-grouped 
into seven mutually exclusive classes based on their quarter-to-quarter change in dividend 
payments. 54 In an attempt to control for the effect of reported earnings firms were classified 
according to whether actual earnings during the period exceeded or fell short of expected 
earnings (Pettit, 1972). Three conclusions were drawn from the study. First, dividend 
changes convey information to the market; market participants appear to make use of the 
information signalled in dividend announcements. Second, a dividend announcement 
typically conveys considerably more information than an earnings announcement. Thirdly, 
capital markets are not efficient in interpreting the information implicit in dividend change 
announcements. 
Charest (1978) examined the effects of dividend announcements by US firms over the 
period 1947-1968. Based on a sample of 177 dividend increases and 49 dividend decreases 
the study reported evidence of significant abnormal returns on the day of the announcement 
SZ Most of the extensive related literature has its origins on investigating the empirical relationship between 
dividends and share prices. Specifically, these studies have examined the issue of whether the returns earned by 
a firm at the time of change in its dividend policy is associated with the sign and / or magnitude of the dividend 
change. Other studies have examined the dividend announcement effect in other contexts, for example, by 
studying trading volume patterns around dividend announcements (e. g. Richardson et at, 1986). 33 Benartzi et al. (1997) noted that there appears to be considerable evidence that the market treats changes in 
dividends as conveying important information. 
'" The sub-groups were: dividend omissions, reductions, initial payments, no change, less than 10 percent 
increase, 10 percent to less than 25 percent increase, and 25 percent or greater increase. 
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which were generally in the same direction as the change in the dividend (the average 
abnormal return for dividend increasing companies on the day of the announcement was 
1.00% and for dividend decreasing companies was -3.18%). 
Divecha and Morse (1983) examined returns surrounding the announcement day 
performance of US firms that increased their dividends. A sample consisting of all non- 
regulated and non-bank firms on the NYSE for the period May 1977 to February 1979 was 
employed. Dividend increases were found to be associated with an average abnormal return 
of 0.84% on the day of announcement. Moreover, the abnormal returns observed during this 
period were directly related to the proportional change in the dividend. 
Fehrs et al. (1988) studied US stock price reactions to announcements of dividend 
changes using daily returns data for the period 1980-1984. A sample of 1080 dividend 
changes comprised of 1015 increases and 65 decreases was compiled" and a significant 
positive share price reaction (averaging 0.8%) for sample firms that increased the dividend 
and a negative reaction (averaging 2.8%) for dividend decreasing firms was reported. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between dividends and future 
earnings. Watts' (1973) hypothesis was that dividends provided information about future 
earnings streams. Using earnings, dividend and share returns data for a sample of 310 US 
firms during the period 1946 to 1967, Watts regressed earnings for the following year on the 
dividend for the current year. The results revealed that while the average coefficients across 
firms were positive, the average t statistics were very low; the author concluded that: (i) the 
relationship between current dividends and future earnings was, on average, positive but 
relatively weak; 56 (ii) the relationship between the unexpected change in dividends and the 
ss Firms that made dividend and earnings announcements within seven days of each other were eliminated from 
the analysis to avoid any complexity in interpreting the results. 
56 A later study by Gonedes (1978) also observed that in the time-series forecasts of future earnings, current and 
past dividends appear to have little predictive power over and above current and past earnings. Penman (1983) 
also reported that knowledge of future dividends is of little value in predicting future earnings. 
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change in future earnings was generally positive, but again weak; (iii) the relationship 
between the sign of an unexpected change in dividends and the sign of an accompanying 
unexpected change in future earnings was positive but trivial; and (iv) the relationship 
between unexpected dividend changes and monthly share prices was insignificant. 
Bernartzi et al. (1997) investigated the information content of dividends with respect 
to future earnings. The authors examined 1,025 NYSE and AMEX firms who made at least 
two dividend announcements in the period 1979-1991 which provided a sample of 7,186 
observations. Consistent with Watts' (1973) findings, the authors were unable to find any 
evidence to support the view that changes in dividends have information content about future 
earnings changes. They noted that: 
"... there is a strong past and concurrent link between earnings 
and dividend changes; the predictive value of changes in 
dividends seems minimal. Indeed the only strong predictive 
power we can find is that dividend cuts reliably signal an 
increase in future earnings. " 
(Bemartzi et al., 1997, p. 1031). 
However, the authors reported that firms that increased their dividend were less likely to have 
subsequent earnings decreases than firms that do not change their dividends despite similar 
earnings growth and that dividend changes appeared to provide a signal about the present 
earnings figure, in that the current increase in earnings is, `permanent rather than transitory' 
(Bernartzi et al., 1997, p. 1032). From this analysis the authors concluded that Lintner's 
(1956) model of dividends remains the best description of the dividend setting process. 
A number of investigations have examined the influence of firm size on the dividend 
decision and noted that smaller firms typically have lower payout ratio than larger firms. For 
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example, Fox and Green's (1992) UK study revealed that between 1984 and 1990 the 
dividend payout ratios of the FTSE companies in their sample were approximately 50% on 
average, whereas the comparable ratios for USM companies57 - which had much smaller 
capitalisations - were on average approximately 30%. In an Irish context Goodbody (2003) 
reported that the smaller Irish quoted companies typically pay lower dividends compared to 
the larger Irish quoted firms. Several studies have reported that announcements of dividend 
changes by small firms appear to contain greater surprise value than those of large firms 
(Eddy and Seifert, 1988; Marsh, 1993) and that small firms are more likely than large firms to 
cut dividends (Chowdhury and Miles, 1987; Lonie et al., 1996). 
A range of US studies have investigated differences in dividend policies across 
industries. For example, Michel (1979) studied US data from 13 industries during the period 
1967-1976 with 13 firms randomly selected from each (except for paper and paper products 
where only 12 firms were selected). The findings demonstrated that industry classification is 
a direct determinant of dividend policy. The sample was further divided into equal size 
categories to determine whether the differences within the industries could have contributed 
to the results, but no such variation was identifiable. However, later research suggested that 
`a firm's industry type has little influence on the views that managers have on ...... 
dividend 
policy' (Baker and Powell, 1999, p. 32). These findings contrasted sharply with the earlier 
evidence of Baker et al. (1985). In the latter study the authors reported evidence that the 
dividend decisions of regulated utility firms differ from manufacturing firms and 
wholesale/retail firms in substantive ways. Baker et al. (1985, p. 83) concluded `managers of 
regulated firms have a somewhat different view of the world than managers operating in a 
S' The Unlisted Securities Market (USM) was established in November 1980 as a second tier stock market in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. The London Stock Exchange regulated the market. Access to the market was 
made considerably cheaper for smaller companies by a number of relaxations of the main market's requirements (Touche Ross, 1986); In June 1995 the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) replaced the USM in the UK. The 
market was closed in Ireland after The Stock Exchange Act (1995) was introduced (see Chapter 2). 
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competitive environment'. However, Soter et al. (1996) noted that the economic environment 
had changed since the mid-1980s in that utilities found themselves increasingly subject 
to 
competition. 
3.3.4.1 Dividend Initiations, Cuts and Omissions 
Several researchers have analysed the market response to the announcement of major 
changes in a firm's dividend policy such as a dividend initiation or omission. 
58 The findings 
of these studies are consistent with the proposition that changes in existing dividend levels 
are both preceded and followed by distinctive earnings patterns. 
Michaely et al. (1995, p. 573) asserted `when a firm initiates the payment of a cash 
dividend, or omits such a payment, the firm is making an extremely visible and qualitative 
change in corporate policy' while Asquith and Mullins (1983) noted that dividend initiations 
or resumption provide an ideal opportunity to tackle the problem of modelling the market's 
expectations about dividend news. Asquith and Mullins (1983) examined US listed firms that 
either paid their first dividend ever or initiated dividends after a hiatus of ten-years or more to 
investigate the impact of dividends on shareholders' wealth. Based on a sample of 168 firms 
during the period 1963 to 1980 the authors reported that announcement date abnormal returns 
were on average +3.7% and that the returns were positively related to the size of the initial 
dividend. The authors concluded that investor behaviour supports the view that dividends 
convey important information to shareholders. Benesh et al. (1984) agreed that dividends 
convey important news to the market, but asserted that initial dividends are generally 
unexpected and therefore convey much more relevant information than other potentially 
s$ A common assumption in the studies documented in this section is that the dividend changes made by firths 
are essentially unexpected and that the majority of studies have adopted the naive dividend expectation model 
(Ofer and Siegel, 1987). However, Woolridge (1982) noted that where the market expects a dividend change the 
actual announcement does not provide any additional information. 
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favourable announcements. A study by Aharony and Swary (1980) found that earnings 
continued to increase for at least four quarters after the dividend change while 
for a sample of 
35 firms which increased their dividends by more than 20%, Brickley (1983) reported a 
significant earnings increase in the year of the dividend increase and the year after the 
dividend increase. 
Healy and Palepu (1988) noted that most of the dividend-initiating firms in their 
sample of 131 observations between 1969 and 1980 experienced earnings growth 
for at least 
one year prior to the dividend announcement; this growth continued throughout the year of 
the dividend initiation and went on for two subsequent years. In contrast, for the 172 firms in 
their sample that omitted the dividend, the authors noted a significant decline in earnings two 
years before the omission and also in the year of omission, but this decline was reversed in 
subsequent Years. 
9 
Studies by De Angelo and De Angelo (1990) and De Angelo et al. (1992) have 
established a link between persistent poor earnings (or losses) and dividend reductions. For 
example, the analysis of factors responsible for dividend reductions in the former study 
revealed that declining earnings and losses were the most influential firm-specific factors in 
managers' decisions to reduce existing levels of dividends. The authors also noted that 
corporate managers were more inclined to reduce dividends than simply omit them; 60 that the 
propensity to reduce dividends increases with any current year loss and future earnings 
59 These results confirmed the earlier findings of Wansley and Lane (1987) who also found that their sample of 
dividend-initiating US firms experienced a significant increase in profitability prior to the dividend initiation 
(which lasted for four years rather than two years) and that changes in liquidity were not a significant 
determining factor for US companies in their decision to initiate dividends payments. In this context the authors 
suggested that the initial dividend decision did not appear to be a means of disposing of excess cash despite the 
fact that companies in their sample experienced a significant reduction in long-term debt and interest expenses 
prior to the initiation of the dividend payment. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) found that the larger public corporations responded to financial distress with 
rapid and aggressive dividend reductions. 
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difficulties and that managers of firms which have a long history of paying dividends 
appeared to be especially averse to dividend omissions. 
1 
Ghosh and Woolridge (1991) examined US firms that made successive dividend 
omissions in the period 1962 to 1984. Based on a sample of 358 first omissions, 160 second 
omissions, 72 third omissions, 29 fourth omissions and 55 fifth or higher omissions, the 
authors reported that management appeared to use dividend omissions to convey negative 
news and that in most cases dividend omissions are followed by lower earnings 
announcements or trading losses. Moreover, it appeared that an initial dividend omission 
announcement is typically associated with a large share price loss, but subsequent omission 
announcements are not 
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Michaely et al. (1995) studied dividend initiations and omissions by NYSE and 
AMEX companies in the twenty-five years period from 1964 to 1988. The study was based 
on a sample of 561 firms that initiated dividends and 887 firms that omitted the dividend. The 
authors computed excess returns for the year before the initiation (omission) and during the 
three-day window around the dividend initiation event (the day before the event to the day 
after the event). The average performance of portfolios for the 561 firms in their sample that 
initiated dividends was significantly better than the benchmark portfolios (non initiation 
61 De Angelo et al. (1992) noted that more than half of the sample of financially distressed NYSE companies 
examined in the study faced binding debt covenants in the years where dividends were reduced. The authors 
also suggested that some dividend reductions are strategically motivated to facilitate favourable outcomes such 
as enhanced bargaining powers against trades unions. One condition that appeared to lead to dividend cuts for 
firms with stable earnings and dividends histories was an annual loss. However, a loss does not necessarily 
result in a dividend reduction; for example, DeAngelo et al. (1992) reported that only 50.9% of the 167 NYSE 
firms that made losses during 1980-1985 reduced dividends. 
62 A number of researchers have also analysed share return behaviour for periods greater than a year for 
dividend announcing firms. For example a recent study by Gunasekarage and Power (2002) analysed the long- 
term financial performance of firms that announced simultaneous dividend and earnings changes during the five 
years period 1989 to 1993. Based on a sample of 1,787 announcements which were sub-divided into six 
categories, depending on the direction of changes in dividends and earnings, the authors noted that companies 
that announced increased dividends coupled with increased earnings (good news companies) suffered a decline 
in profitability in the five years after the announcement. On the other hand the performance of companies that 
announced reduced dividends and profitability (bad news companies) were noted to have increased their 
profitability by a substantial amount in the five years following the announcement. 
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firms) experiencing an excess return of +15.1% in the year before the dividend 
initiation. 
During the three-day announcement (event) period dividend initiation portfolios experienced 
a significant additional excess return of +3.4%. In contrast, for the 887 firms 
in their sample 
that omitted the dividend, the authors noted a significant decline in excess returns for the year 
before the omission and during the three-day window around that event. The average 
performance of portfolios that omitted dividends was significantly worse than the benchmark 
portfolios (non omitting firms) experiencing an excess return of -31.8% in the year before 
omission. During the three-day announcement (event) period dividend omitting firms 
experienced a significant excess return of -7.0%. The authors concluded that average short- 
term performance of portfolios that initiated dividends in that period was significantly better 
than benchmark portfolios while the average short term performance of portfolios that 
omitted dividends in the period was significantly worse than the benchmark portfolios. 
Dyl and Weigand (1998) reported that dividend announcements convey information 
about the level of the firm's risk to the market. The authors examined 240 NYSE and AMEX 
firms that initiated dividend payments between 1972 and 1993, and observed that both a 
firm's total risk and systematic risk is significantly reduced in the year following the initial 
dividend announcement; the decrease in total risk was more pronounced for the larger firms 
in the sample, while for smaller firms the decrease in systematic risk was more pronounced. 
Howe and Shen (1998) considered the intra-industry effects of announcements of dividend 
initiations. The authors examined 613 firms that initiated dividends between 1973 and 1990 
and concluded that: (a) dividend initiations are firm-specific; (b) dividend initiation 
announcements do not affect industry rivals' stock prices; and (c) dividend initiations do not 
encourage analysts to revise their earnings forecasts for competitor firms which do not 
announce the initiation of dividend payments. 
A separate strand of this literature argues that dividend cuts may, in fact, signal good 
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news, since they indicate that a firm is retaining funds to finance profitable investments rather 
than disbursing cash and subsequently having to incur transaction costs when issuing new 
shares (Woolridge and Ghosh, 1985; Soter et al., 1996). Alternatively, several authors have 
suggested that the response to a dividend cut should be positive, since it usually signals a 
turnaround in the future performance of the firm (Johnson and Jensen, 1997). According to 
this hypothesis, dividend increases may signal reduced investment opportunities and lower 
future earnings, while dividend cuts might be interpreted as a sign of increased investment 
opportunities and higher potential future earnings. 
Woolridge and Ghosh (1985) examined the circumstances in which managers 
convinced the market that dividends were being reduced to provide funds for new projects 
that might not otherwise be undertaken. The authors analysed the performance of dividend- 
cutting companies by considering the stock market response to the announcement of dividend 
cuts and omissions made during the period 1971-1982 by large NYSE companies. 63 Based on 
a sample of 408 dividend cuts the authors reported that although all the groups in the sample 
earned negative market adjusted returns in pre-announcement periods, during the year 
following the dividend cut all companies in the sample outperformed the market. 
In summary, the findings of the studies highlighted in this section are consistent with 
the proposition that changes in dividends are proceeded by and followed by distinctive 
earnings patterns. The next section of the chapter considers the impact of confounding events 
on share returns which is additional to that associated with the dividend announcement. 
63 The authors divided their sample into three main categories as follows: (i) firms for which the dividend cut is 
accompanied by a simultaneous announcement of an earnings decline or a loss; (ii) firms which announced a 
dividend cut after an earnings decline or loss had been reported; and (iii) firms for which the dividend cut was 
accompanied either by an announcement of higher earnings and/or a statement by management that significant 
future opportunities for profitable investment and growth existed. 64 In addition, companies that announced a dividend cut accompanied either by an announcement of higher 
earnings and/or a statement by management that significant future opportunities for profitable investment and 
growth existed, outperformed the market in the quarter following the announcement of the cut. 
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3.3.4.2 Dividends in a Complex Signalling Setting 
Although many studies have reported that dividends convey information to capital 
markets, the issue may not be clear cut because of the simultaneous release of earnings data, 
earnings forecasts, capital expenditure announcements, etc. The occurrence of confounding 
events around firm-specific announcements is a particular problem with event studies in 
general. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) reported that the relationship between share 
price returns and dividend yield is non-linear, implying that the relationship is not solely 
attributable to the information content of dividends 
65 Venkatesh (1989) examined the 
quarterly dividends of a sample of US firms for the years 1972-1983 and reported that 
earnings and dividend announcements were partial, but not perfect, information substitutes. 
In circumstances where firms make their dividend and earnings announcements either 
simultaneously or within a few days of each other, the unexpected effects of dividend 
announcements on share prices may not be solely attributable to the dividend announcement 
alone. For example, Eddy and Seifert (1992) demonstrated that when dividends and earnings 
announcements occur simultaneously, the share price reaction is significantly greater in 
magnitude than the reaction to a single announcement 66 
Kane et al. (1984) argued that in view of the corroborative effect associated with 
simultaneous earnings and dividend announcements, investors are interested in the extent of 
consistency among these signals. In a study of US data the authors examined a sample of 352 
observations of US manufacturing firms that announced quarterly dividend and earnings that 
as Divecha and Morse (1983) examined the joint signal effects of dividend and earnings increases. Based on a 
sample of 1,039 US firms that increased their dividends between 1977 and 1979, they noted that both dividends 
and earnings announcements influence abnormal returns and that earnings have a significant influence on the 
manner in which investors interpret a dividend increase. 
" However, Aharony and Swary (1980) demonstrated that the effects of a dividend announcement are the same 
regardless of whether it precedes or follows earnings news. The authors also reported that the US stock price 
reaction to unanticipated changes in earnings and dividends is invariant with respect to the announcement 
pattern; the concurrent announcement of earnings and dividends did not have any greater impact on shares 
prices than two separate announcements with similar content. 
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occurred within 10 days of one another between the fourth quarter of 
1979 and second 
quarter of 1981. Their interaction regression model took the following form: 
CAR=bo+b1D° +b2E°+b3I(-, 0)+b4I(-, +)+b5 I(+, -)+b6I(+, 0)+b71(+, +) [3.1] 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return , D° 
is the unexpected dividend, E° is the 
unexpected earnings, I (+, -) is an interactive dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
earnings surprise is positive and the dividend surprise is negative and 0 otherwise, the other 
dummy variables are defined analogously. The authors reported that unexpected earnings and 
dividend announcements appeared to induce abnormal returns and that when both dividends 
and earnings increase, the stock market reaction is more favourable than when only one 
variable increases in isolation, although the dividend signal appeared to dominate. The paper 
also reported that company shareholders appeared to give more credit to unexpected dividend 
increases or decreases when earnings are also higher or lower than anticipated and that the 
interaction or corroborative effect was statistically significant. 
In a study of Australian data Easton (1991) also examined the interaction between 
dividends and earnings announcements on share returns. The author's sample was drawn 
from 339 Australian industrial firms quoted on the Melbourne Stock Exchange that 
announced half yearly dividend and earnings announcements that occurred simultaneously 
between December 1975 and December 1981. A total of 896 announcements (525 first half 
announcements and 371 second half announcements) were considered. Using the same 
interaction regression model specified by Kane et al. (1984) the author concluded that the 
results strongly support the existence of an interaction effect. 
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Lonie et al. (1996) carried out a similar study on UK data. The authors employed a 
sample of 620 simultaneous announcements of dividends and earnings made in the UK 
during 1990 and 1991 again using the same interaction regression model specified by Kane et 
al. (1984). The authors reported that when dividends and earnings are both increased the 
stock market reaction is more favourable than when only one of the variables increase, 
although earnings were shown to dominate. A more recent UK study by Green and McAree 
(2003) found an interaction effect between earnings and dividends with respect to raw 
returns. 
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Chang and Chen (1991) re-examined the hypothesis proposed by Kane et al. (1984) 
using a more recent sample of announcements, and found no evidence to support the 
existence of a corroboratory signal. The authors' sample consisted of 1,334 pairs of dividend 
and earnings announcements during the five years period January 1981 to 'December 1984. 
While Kane et at. (1984) considered quarterly dividend and earnings announcements that 
occurred within 10 days of one another Chang and Chen (1991) analysed dividend and 
earnings announcements that occurred within 1 day, 2-5 days, 2-5 days, 6-10 days, 11-15 
days, 16-20, and 20 plus days one another. Using the same interaction regression model 
specified by Kane et al. (1984) and a nonparametric test of the interaction effect the authors 
concluded that the results support the existence of an interaction effect. However their 
empirical results also indicated that the interaction effect is very sensitive to both the length 
of the announcement interval between the two signals and the period over which abnormal 
returns surrounding the announcements are cumulated. The results suggested that the 
interaction becomes less obvious for a short event window, but is significant when daily 
abnormal returns are aggregated for long windows. 
67 An earlier study by Green and McAree (2001) on Irish data found an interaction effect between earnings and 
dividends that acted as a signal of future earnings. 
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In summary, the empirical evidence to date has suggested that dividend 
announcements cannot be fully understood without considering other news releases that 
occur concurrently or otherwise. Identifying the independent effects of the dividend 
component of the joint signal can be difficult. The problem is particularly acute when 
investigating markets such as Ireland because the dividend and earnings announcements are 
nearly always made simultaneously. 
3.4 Tax Considerations 
The payment of dividends imposes a substantial tax liability on shareholders each 
year. 68 This income tax penalty potentially interferes with the value equivalence between 
dividends and retained earnings suggested by MM (1961) 69 For example, many shareholders 
may prefer `home-made' dividends (generated through liquidating part of their shareholding) 
to cash dividends as the rate of capital gains tax in most countries is lower than the top 
income tax rate. 0 In contrast if shareholders are partially or totally exempt from income tax 
they may prefer cash payouts because their marginal tax rate is either zero or lower than the 
capital gains rate. 
Farrar and Selwyn (1967) were the first to extend MM's analysis to allow for more 
complex tax structures, simultaneously encompassing personal taxation, capital gains 
taxation and corporate taxation. The study reported that when all three taxes are taken into 
account, a firm's financial policies appeared to affect share values. In particular, the authors 
68 In Ireland the yield from dividend withholding tax for 2003 was 6196 million (Irish Revenue Commissioners 
Annual Report, 2004). The estimated income tax paid on dividend income in the US was $10 billion in 2002 
(Frankfuter and Woods, 2002). 
9 Brittain (1966) observed that for the period 1920 to 1960 dividend payments varied inversely with the 
differential between the taxation rates on dividend income and capital gain. More recently, Lasfer, (1996, p. 456) 
noted that `corporate and personal taxes affect a firm's dividend payout ratios, its subsequent share price 
movements and the composition of its shareholders. ' 
70 For details of recent changes to the US tax regime see Brealey et al. (2005). The authors noted that in 2004 
the top US rate of tax both on capital gains and on dividends was 15%. 
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concluded that it is always optimal for a company to use residual earnings for share re- 
purchases rather than pay dividends, provided that each shareholder's marginal tax rate on 
dividends is greater than their marginal tax rate on capital gains. ' Brennan (1970) argued 
that some of the criteria employed by Farrar and Selwyn (1967) were limited because they 
concentrated on the net income received by investors at given rates of tax. The author 
derived an after-tax CAPM that accounted for the differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains and for a progressive income tax scheme. Although Brennan's model made no 
allowance for clienteles, short-term capital gains, transaction costs or tax arbitrage, the tests 
indicated that there was a positive relationship between after-tax dividend yield and risk- 
adjusted returns. 
In view of Brennan's observations many authors have argued that the income tax 
liability on dividends raises shareholders' required pre-tax returns on higher dividend-paying 
shares, thereby causing them to sell at a discount relative to lower dividend-paying shares. 
Black and Scholes (1974) attempted to measure the impact of different dividend yield 
strategies on the expected returns. Using monthly data on dividends, prices and returns for 
every firm listed on the NYSE from 1926 to 1966, the authors introduced a dividend yield 
variable into a CAPM-based model and noted that the dividend yield variable was 
insignificantly different from zero. The authors' results therefore did not support the 
hypothesis that the market demands higher pre-tax returns on dividend-paying shares to 
compensate for the increased income tax liability on dividend income compared to the lower 
tax liability on capital gains. Black and Scholes (1974) concluded that it was not possible to 
demonstrate that the expected returns on high dividend-paying shares differed from the 
expected returns on low dividend-paying shares either before or after taxes. Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) criticised Black and Scholes' (1974) analysis on the grounds that the 
71 The study also found that lower income investors prefer corporate leverage to private leverage. 
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latter had used average values of ex post dividend yields as a surrogate for the expected 
dividend yield. The authors argued that Black and Scholes' (1974) study understated the 
expected dividend yield in ex-dividend months and overstated it in those months when shares 
are priced cum-dividend. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) addressed the problem 
by 
using yield variables that distinguish between ex-dividend months and non ex-dividend 
months; they substituted the ex post dividend yield for the expected dividend yield for ex- 
dividend months and set the expected yield to zero for the other months. The study also 
derived an after-tax version of the CAPM. Based on a sample of the 504 months period from 
1936-1977, the results indicated a strong positive relationship between before-tax expected 
returns and the dividend yields. The authors reported that a 1% increase in dividends yield 
required an additional 0.23% in expected pre-tax returns and concluded that investors' tax 
brackets do influence their portfolio choices. 
Kalay and Michaely (2000) provided a resolution to the conflicting results of Black 
and Scholes (1974) and Litzenberger and Ramasawamy (1979). The authors argued that the 
difference between the results of both previous studies was due to methodological issues and 
the distinction between time-series and cross-sectional return variations. Specifically, Kalay 
and Michaely (2000) demonstrated that the different results obtained in both studies were due 
to the use of different time horizons to define and measure the dividend period. The authors 
replicated the study by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and concluded that the 
significant dividend yield coefficient documented in that study was a result of time-series 
return variations, i. e. higher risk-adjusted returns during ex-dividend periods and that the 
excess returns were concentrated in the ex-dividend week. Kalay and Michaely (2000) noted 
that each of the earlier studies found long run risk-adjusted returns to be uncorrelated with 
dividend yield; this `evidence [was] inconsistent with Brennan's (1970) model, but not with 
the tax hypothesis' (Kalay and Michaely, 2000, p. 73). 
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Elton and Gruber (1970) found evidence of a statistical relationship between the 
dividend policy of firms and the tax bracket of their shareholders - shareholders with higher 
income tax brackets were associated with low dividend shares and those with lower income 
tax brackets were associated with high dividend shares. The authors demonstrated that when 
dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gain, ex-div day share prices drop by less 
than the amount of the dividend and that the drop-off ratio reflects the tax differential 
between dividends and capital gain. 72 In this context, Miller (1977) hypothesised the 
existence of different dividend clienteles, arguing that investors in high income tax brackets 
will tend to hold low dividend yielding shares while investors in low income tax brackets will 
prefer high dividend yielding shares. 
73 Miller's hypothesis is that a firm's dividend policy is 
independent of the tax position of its shareholders and that for a given set of dividend 
policies, investors are expected to hold portfolios chosen on the basis of their after-tax rates 
of return. It follows that ex-div day prices of high yield securities should not decrease by less 
than the amount of the dividend as such securities are likely to be held by low-tax-paying 
investors. However, Modigliani (1982) examined a sample of US firms and reported that the 
clientele effect is only responsible for insignificant alterations to portfolio composition, rather 
than the major differences predicted by Miller (1977). Hess (1982) attempted to clarify the 
controversy on dividend related clientele effects. The author defined ten clienteles on the 
basis of average dividend yield and examined a sample of 439 daily return observations from 
1962-1979, divided into ten sub-periods. The paper's findings were inconsistent with the 
clientele-effect model but suggested an important association between dividend yield and 
72 However, in a subsequent paper, Elton et al. (1984) argued that the observed ex-div day drop may understate 
the size of the tax effect because the magnitude of the price decline may be capped by the transaction costs 
involved in short-term trading. 
"A model by Masulis and Trueman (1988) predicted that heterogeneity in tax status lead investors to differ in 
terms of their idealised dividend policy. In particular, as the tax liability on dividends increases, the dividend 
payment is predicted to decrease while earnings reinvestment increases. Differences are maximised by 
segregation of investors into clienteles. 
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stock returns. The author concluded that the clientele effect model is rejected as evidence of 
the across security dividend yield effect. 
Miller and Scholes (1978,1982) advanced the strategy that shareholders purchase 
dividend-paying stocks while simultaneously borrowing funds to invest in tax-free securities. 
The authors concluded that the extensive number of tax shelters, gradual reductions in 
marginal income tax rates and the increasing domination of the market by tax-exempt 
institutional investors, combine to neutralise any potential tax disadvantage of dividend 
payments 74 Lasfer (1996) noted that the Elton and Gruber (1970) hypothesis is difficult to 
test because of possible simultaneous short-term trading effects. Lasfer (1996) in a study of 
UK data did not find any evidence of a tax-induced dividend clientele. Based on a sample of 
550 ex-div day dividend yields for the period 1973 to 1983 the author reported that ex-div 
day share prices decreased on average by 64% of the gross dividend. However inconsistent 
with the tax-induced dividend clientele hypothesis, the highest dividend yield group's 
average drop-off was 36.5% 75 
Poterba and Summers (1984) were the first to examine the effects of dividend taxes 
on investors' relative valuation of dividends and capital gains in the context of changes in the 
taxation treatment of dividend income and capital gains. The authors asserted that British data 
offered an excellent opportunity to investigate the extent to which the impact of dividends on 
equity returns is affected by tax regimes. The authors noted two radical changes (and several 
74 However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) contended that the tax shelter strategy was not sufficient to induce 
positive dividend payments at equilibrium, and noted that any given firm is likely to be indifferent to dividend 
policies when dividend-specific tax shelters (for example the annual personal dividend exclusion) are 
introduced. 
's Booth and Johnston (1984) examined the ex-dividend day price ratio for Canadian firms quoted on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange for each year from 1970 to 1980. Based on a sample of 144 firms the authors reported 
that the ex-dividend day price ratio was significantly different from zero or one. The authors concluded that 
Canadian investors appeared to prefer capital gains to dividend income and that the ex-dividend day price ratios 
did not provide much evidence in support of dividend tax clienteles. 
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minor reforms) in British dividend tax policy during the 30 years prior to their study. 
76 ne 
study suggested that examination of the changes that occur in the relationship between 
dividends and stock prices when tax regimes alter represent an ideal controlled environment 
for assessing the effects of taxes on investors' valuation of dividends. Based on a sample of 
16 large UK firms and daily share price data for non ex-dividend days and ex-dividend days 
from 1955 and 1981 the authors demonstrated that taxes do affect the equilibrium 
relationship between dividend yield and market returns. The authors concluded that their 
evidence supports the view that taxes are important determinants of security market 
equilibrium. 
The introduction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) in the US offered a similar 
opportunity to test the effects of taxation changes on dividend policy. The Act reduced the 
difference between the tax treatment of realised long-term capital gains and dividend income 
in 1987, and by 1988 the differential was largely eliminated for most investors. Michaely 
(1991) analysed the behaviour of stock prices around ex-dividend days during the period 
1986-1989. Based on a sample of 4,306 observations in 1986,4,499 observations in 1987, 
4,785 observations in 1988 and 4,799 observations in 1989, the study reported no evidence of 
a negative tax effect, either before or after the TRA. The author's conclusion was that "a 
change in the individual investor's tax rates has no significant effect on ex-dividend day 
prices" (Michealy, 1991, p. 857). Moreover, the evidence suggested that it was mainly short- 
term and corporate traders who favour dividend income over capital gains sufficiently to 
influence the ex-dividend price. 77 
76 The first radical change in British dividend tax occurred in 1965, when capital gains tax at a statutory rate of 
30% was introduced. The second major reform occurred in 1973, when the corporation tax regime was amended 
to provide income tax relief for shareholders through the provision of tax credits to reflect the underlying 
Corporation tax paid by companies (i. e. the imputation system). The amendment reduced the dividend tax rate 
on personal and corporate investors and provided a refundable tax credit to exempt institutions. 77 Robin (1991) found that the TRA 1986 resulted in a decline in ex-day abnormal returns, implying that the 
TRA 1986 caused the tax premium to decrease. 
72 
In summary, taxation is a serious challenge to the "dividend irrelevance" argument 
proposed by MM. Differential rates of personal income tax, a taxation distinction between 
income and capital gains, and the general instability of tax regimes represent serious capital 
market imperfections. In addition, the fact that a company might have private, institutional 
and corporate shareholder groups that are taxed under different tax rules adds a further 
complication. In response, those who support the MM position argue that the dominance of 
the market by tax exempt institutions, the availability of tax shelters and recent substantial 
reductions and convergence in both income tax and capital gains tax rates have combined to 
neutralise any potential tax disadvantage of dividend payments 78 However the general 
conclusions that appear to emerge from the literature in this area is that taxation matters - the 
net of tax amount of the dividend payment does in practice affect the level of returns and, 
therefore, share prices. 
The research in this dissertation plays close attention to the tax related factors outlined 
in this section. Although the general conclusion in the literature is that taxation does affect 
the value attached to dividend payments, most of the studies focus on larger markets. To date, 
very little is known about how the taxation issue affects the dividend policies of firms in 
smaller developed markets such as Ireland and so both Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis explore 
the taxation issue in detail. 
3.5 The Dividend Behaviour of Management 
From a managerial perspective, the dividend decision is essentially a problem of 
allocation; management must decide how the company's reported profits should be divided 
between dividend payments to shareholders and retentions for reinvestment. Most managers 
'g In the UK individual taxpayers now pay marginal income tax rates on both dividend income and capital gains. 
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appear to believe in the virtue of regular dividend payments to investors, but as Warren 
Buffett (1984) pointed out in a letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., `Dividend 
policy is often reported to shareholders, but seldom explained' (Arnold, 2005, p. 1,015) 
To date, researchers have mainly attempted to explain and model the dividend 
behaviour of corporate managers by seeking their views through survey questionnaires and 
face-to-face interviews. Lintner (1956) developed the first of these models based on 
discussions with 28 financial directors of US firms and noted that "the level of current 
earnings was almost invariably the starting point in management's consideration.. . 
in 
determining the amount of any change in dividend"(p. 102). Lintner (1956) also observed that 
when firms experience increased profits they tend to increase dividends only after a time lag 
and then not by the full amount of the increased profits. Conversely, even if profits fall firms 
are reluctant to reduce dividends. The author continued that `further increases in the current 
dividends are to be expected even in years when profits suffer some decline whenever 
substantial earlier increases in earnings have not yet been fully reflected in dividends' 
(Lintner 1956, p. 103). 
Despite these observations Lintner (1956) noted that the relationship between the 
firm's existing dividend pay-out ratio and its target pay-out ratio was a more significant 
factor in a firm's dividend decision than the current change in profits. Green et at. (1993) 
expressed Lintner's observations concerning the inter-temporal behaviour of dividend levels, 
given that a firm's target dividend level in year t (Dt*) is related to the earnings in that year 
(Et) via a target payout ratio (r), as follows: 
D1* =r Et [3.2] 
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The authors observed that as firms only partially adjust towards the target dividend level for 
the year the extent of the adjustment in the current year's dividend from the previous year's 
dividend is represented by the speed of adjustment factor (c), and is a function of . 
management's confidence with the new target dividend level. Hence, Lintner (1956) 
specified the actual change in dividends from period t-1 to t by the following equation: 
Dt-Dc-t=a+c(Dc*-Dc-t)+Uc [3.3] 
The constant term in the equation79 is introduced to encapsulate the reluctance of 
management to reduce dividends; Ut is an error term. Substituting equation (3.2) into 
equation (3.3) produces Lintner's (1956) familiar equation cited in most corporate finance 
textbooks: 
ADt. t. 1=a+crEt-cDt. 1+Ut [3.4] 
In summary, Lintner's model asserted that the change in dividends is a function of the target 
dividend payout less last year's dividend multiplied by the speed of adjustment factor. The 
target dividend payout is a function of the current year's profits. 
" Lintner (1956, p. 107) noted that ` the constant term will be zero for some companies but will generally be 
positive to reflect the greater reluctance to reduce than raise dividends' 
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In addition to earnings Lintner (1956) also identified the availability of cash as an 
important determinant of a firm's capacity to pay dividends and noted that dividend stability 
was achieved on the basis that firms were flexible in the management of working capital to 
facilitate the payment of a cash dividend 80 Brittain (1966) in a study of dividends from 1920 
to 1960 reported that net earnings was an invalid measure of the ability of corporations to pay 
dividends and that cash flows explained corporate dividends behaviour significantly better 
than earnings. However, a later study by Fama and Babiak (1968) concluded that earnings 
were a better predictor of dividend behaviour than cash flows. Subsequent studies of dividend 
behaviour have been based largely on questionnaire surveys and have confirmed that 
managers appear to determine dividend payments on the basis of the following factors: 
anticipated future earnings; patterns of past dividends; the availability of cash; and 
maintenance of the existing stock price (Fama and Babiak, 1968; Turnovsky, 1967; Baker et 
al., 1985; Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; DeAngelo et al., 1992). In a similar vein, Jose and 
Stevens (1989) found that investors value steady growth in dividends per share rather than 
stable payout ratios. The main features of some of the more recent and more important of 
these studies are displayed in Table 3.1. 
80 Linter (1956, p. 105) observed that, "in general, management's standards with respect to its current liquidity 
position appeared to be very much more flexible that its standards with respect to dividend policy, and this flexibility frequently provided the buffer between reasonably definite dividend requirements in line with 
established policy and especially rich current investment opportunities" 
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Table 3.1: Studies Of Managerial Attitudes Towards Dividend Policy 
Study Sample Year Country Main Conclusions 
Baker et al. (1985) 318 1983 USA Explanatory power of 
Lintner's model remains high; 
respondents concerned with dividend continuity; 
dividend payments affect share values; respondents 
aware of signalling and clientele effects. 
partington (1985) 93 1983 Australia Dividend policy supports share prices; dividend policy 
is not residually determined; Australian company 
directors attach considerable importance to meeting 
shareholders' requirements for income and maintaining 
shareholder loyalty; dividend payments provide an 
important signal about management's views regarding 
future profitability. 
Allen (1992) 67 1988 UK Results indicate that the majority of respondent 
companies use target payout ratios, and dividend 
payments provide an important signalling mechanism. 
Green et al. (1993) 35 1989 Ireland Dividend decisions by listed Irish companies appear to 
be taken by `reference to the exogenous factor of 
dividend stability, but consideration is also given to 
investment and/or financing decisions' (p. 74). 
Baker & Powell (1999) 198 1997 USA Explanatory power of Lintner's model high; 
respondents displayed highest level of agreement with 
statements about signalling; respondents uncertain 
about tax preferences and bird-in-the-hand explanations 
of dividend behaviour. 
Dhanani &Edgley (2002) 164 2001 UK Managers believe that firms should design their 
corporate dividend policies to maximise shareholder 
value; shareholder requirements are rated as the most 
important factor in determining dividend policy, 
followed by signalling implications. 
Baker et al. (2002) 630 1996/ USA Dividend policy matters to the valuation of the 
1997 company's shares and there is an optimal payout ratio; 
strongest support for statements on signalling; 
respondents not supportive on tax preferences and 
agency cost theory. 
Frankfurter et at. (2002) 420 2001 Germany Investors are thought to be interested in increases in 
dividends that can be maintained in the future. 
Frankfurter et al. (2004) 1,206 2001/ USA Insignificant differences noted between the three 
2002 Germany countries USA, Germany and UK on statements 
UK concerned with dividend continuity and long-term 
Hong Kong maintenance of a dividend increase. For other counties Turkey there is no clear majority of perceptions. 
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A number of points emerge from an analysis of the table. First, the surveys that 
have 
been conducted vary in terms of sample size and geographic location. Four 
have been 
undertaken in the US, three in the UK, two 
in Germany and one each in Australia and Ireland. 
The samples employed range in size from 35 in Green et al. (1993) to 1,206 
in Frankfurter et 
al. (2004). 
Second, despite these differences, the findings of the various surveys have been 
proved to be remarkably consistent; most 
indicate that managers perceive the dividend 
decision to be important primarily because they believe that shareholders view such payments 
as signals about the future. In this respect, the findings of virtually all of the surveys confirm 
Lintner's early conclusion that managers will only raise the dividend if they can maintain the 
payment at the new level, not least because they fear the consequences of having to make a 
subsequent cut. For example, Baker et al. (1985) compared the determinants of company 
dividend policy in the early 1980s with Lintner's behavioural model of the mid-1950s and 
concluded that the major determinants of dividend payments in the early 1980s were similar 
to those pertaining 30 years earlier. In a later US study, Baker and Powell (1999) confirmed 
the existence of managerial beliefs about the relationship between dividend policy and firm 
value and concluded that managers' views regarding dividend payments were fundamentally 
the same in the late 1990s as those reported by Lintner in the 1950s; irrespective of time 
period, managers appeared to be extremely reluctant to make major alterations to dividend 
levels because of the danger that they might have to be reversed at a later date. A more recent 
US study by Baker et al. (2002) surveyed managers of 630 NASDAQ firms that paid 
consecutive quarterly dividends over the two-year period 1996-1997; the responses concurred 
strongly with Lintner's (1956) findings, with the maintenance of dividend levels thought to 
be a particularly important influence on the choice of payout policy. The most recent study in 
this area by Frankfurter et al. (2004) surveyed managers in five different countries during 
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2001 and 2002. That study also concurred with Lintner's (1956) findings in that dividend 
continuity and the maintenance of dividend increases were regarded as particularly important 
factors in the determination of dividend policy in all countries. 81 
Third, all studies reported managerial agreement that dividend policy can affect share 
prices via a signalling mechanism. The Baker et al. (1985) study provided evidence that 
managers are aware of the signalling effects of dividend policy while Baker and Powell 
(1999) in a study of 198 US firms found similar evidence of managerial belief in a 
relationship between share value and dividend policy. Baker et al. (2002) reported that 
managers believed that dividend policy affects share prices and asserted that: (i) an optimal 
dividend payout ratio exists, and, (ii) consistent with other research, managers expressed the 
strongest support for the signalling explanation for paying dividends. The study by Dhanani 
and Edgley (2002) analysed the responses from 164 senior executives in UK quoted 
companies and reported that shareholder requirements were rated as the most important 
determinant of payout ratio, followed by concerns about the signalling impact of any changes 
to that dividend payout ratio. Partington (1985) surveyed senior executives in 93 large 
Australian companies and found that managers perceived dividends to be important in 
signalling their views about future company profitability. The study also reported that senior 
managers of Australian companies attached considerable importance to meeting 
shareholders' requirements for income and maintaining shareholder loyalty; considered 
dividend increases to be associated with share price rises; the author's overall conclusion 
81 Several quantitative studies have undertaken examinations of the dividend-paying characteristics of 
companies. For example, Chowdhury and Miles' (1987) extensive analysis of 653 companies between 1969 and 
1984 revealed that smoothing of dividend payments was a common phenomenon in the UK in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Comparing the dividend payout ratio with a measure of rate of return, the latter study noted that in 
years when profits were high the payout ratio had fallen, and in years when profits had been low the payout ratio 
had risen. The authors suggested that this evidence was consistent with Lintner's notion that shareholders prefer 
a smooth path of dividend payments. Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also detected continued support for Lintner's 
model. 
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was, therefore, that managers had clear motives for believing that dividend payouts should be 
seen as something more than mere residuals. 
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Fourth, as regards tax clientele effects, Baker et al. (1985) reported that managers 
agreed with the notion of investors having alternative perceptions of the risk of dividends and 
retained earnings and are, therefore, not neutral as to whether they receive returns in the form 
of dividends or capital gains. Respondents in the same survey were however, unequivocal in 
their responses to statements that: (i) shareholders are attracted to firms with dividend 
policies that best suit their tax status; and (ii) management should be responsive to 
stockholders' dividend preferences. Dhanani and Edgley (2002) for UK data and Partington 
(1985) for Australian data reported similar findings. However, the Baker et at. (2002) study 
was not supportive of the tax preference and agency cost theories. 
Fifth, most surveys highlighted the importance of liquidity. For example Baker et al. 
(1985) reported that US managers in the utility, manufacturing and wholesale/retail industries 
cited the availability of cash as the third most important determinant of their firms' dividend 
decisions. Similar results have been obtained in countries outside the US. For example, 
Allen's (1992) questionnaire survey of UK and Australian companies found "an 
overwhelming concern with the availability of liquid funds" among Australian respondents, 
which provided corroborative evidence for the findings of an earlier Australian dividend 
study by Partington (1989). However, Allen's (1992) study of 67 UK listed firms detected a 
much lower emphasis on liquidity among UK managers. 
Finally, several investigations have highlighted that dividend decisions are often 
related to other important areas of company policy. For example, Green et al. (1993) 
provided evidence from a survey of financial directors in 1989 that Irish companies appeared 
82 In the US, managers believe that the motivation for changing dividend policy should be adequately disclosed 
to investors (Baker et al., 1985). 
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to subscribe to the view that dividend policy is not established in isolation, but rather that a 
degree of interdependency exists between dividend, investment and financing decisions. 
However, the empirical evidence contained in the Green et al. study related to only 35 
useable responses from a questionnaire survey of companies listed on the Irish Stock Market 
in 1989. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The almost universal corporate policy of paying substantial dividends represents one 
of the longest standing puzzles in the modern corporate finance literature. In many 
jurisdictions dividends are taxed at higher rates of tax, while there is no concurrent tax 
liability on retained earnings. The rise in market value that results from retained earnings is 
taxed only when the stock is sold, and even then a substantial part of the gain may be 
untaxed. In spite of this tax penalty, companies continue to distribute a significant proportion 
of their earnings, but by paying dividends, companies effectively impose a tax liability on 
their shareholders. As this chapter has demonstrated, several possible explanations of the 
dividend puzzle have been advanced and tested in the literature and yet the results, largely 
based on US data, raise almost as many questions as they answer. However, in terms of 
overall conclusions four themes can be identified from the literature. 
First, since the early 1930s, the literature has identified a desire on the part of 
investors for a steady stream of income with which to finance consumption. Although the 
same level of consumption might be financed in a more tax efficient manner by selling 
shares, the transaction costs and the psychology of dipping into `principal' to finance 
consumption is a deterrent to that course. In these circumstances, shareholders may prefer 
companies to supply them with a dividend pattern that matches their consumption pattern, 
thereby relieving them of having to adjust their cash inflow for themselves. In this context, 
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the company may appeal to a clientele of shareholders whose consumption pattern accords 
with its dividend pattern although examination of the literature suggests that further work is 
required in this area to permit a definite and robust conclusion. 
Second, the chapter has highlighted the voluminous nature of the empirical literature 
that examines the. impact of dividends on share prices and returns. While these studies 
essentially represent tests of MM's original 1961 proposition of dividend irrelevance, the 
evidence overwhelmingly points to a robust link. While the effects of taxation and the impact 
of dividend cuts in response to losses or reduced growth opportunities is not entirely 
conclusive, it does appear that dividends have a direct and measurable impact on equity 
returns. 
Third, dividends are normally required because of the separation of ownership and 
management. In particular, dividends are a reliable signal of the sustainability of corporate 
profits and the value of a firm's investment opportunity set. Management therefore selects a 
dividend policy to communicate the level of (and growth in) profits because conventional 
accounting reports may not be (or may not be accepted by the market as) entirely adequate 
guides to current profits and future prospects. Since the mid-1950s the published literature 
has indicated that most companies follow a policy in which dividend reductions are anathema 
and an increased dividend will only be declared if management are convinced that the new 
dividend level can be maintained. In this context, management may view the level and rate of 
change of dividend as key variables in financial planning. As this chapter has noted, a 
number of investigations - drawing on data from several developed markets - have reported 
directors' belief that dividends communicate special information to the market. While this 
theory remains to be refined and elaborated on, it does suggest that a steady dividend policy 
provides reassurance to shareholders in a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
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Finally, and closely-related to the signalling argument, is the suggestion that 
shareholders distrust management and fear that retained earnings will be wasted through poor 
investment decisions, leading to excessive management salaries and benefits. Shareholders 
are often assumed to prefer current dividends to future dividends (the bird-in-the-hand- 
theory) because management is subjected to the scrutiny of the capital markets more often 
than would be the case if no dividend was paid; the literature suggests that this preference can 
be strong enough to pressure management to make dividend payments, despite any associated 
tax penalty. Moreover, shareholders may be willing to bear the tax burden and the additional 
funding costs as the benefits from a reduction in both agency costs and information 
asymmetries far exceed these penalties. In this context, the literature argues that it is hard to 
understand why there appears to be no pressure for 100% payouts. 
These are some of the key issues that are addressed and examined, in an Irish setting, 
in the remaining chapters of this thesis. By using modem Irish data it is hoped: (i) that 
contemporary findings will emerge that can be compared with empirical results from earlier 
periods; and (ii) to establish the extent to which prior evidence regarding large developed 
markets such as the UK and US can be generalised to smaller markets. By focusing on a 
small but well regulated market, such as Ireland, it is hoped that meaningful comparisons can 
be made without the problems associated with the political and severe financial risks existing 
in many small markets. The next chapter sets out the research methodology and methods 
underpinning the research approach for that empirical investigation. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
84 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the Irish investment environment during the period from 1986 to 
2003. It provided a review of the performance of the Irish economy, outlined the primary 
characteristics of the Irish equity market and 
highlighted the relevant changes to Irish 
taxation regulations during the period of the study. Chapter 3 reviewed the theoretical and 
prior empirical literature on the dividend question and noted that academics 
have uncovered 
many specific aspects of dividend behaviour that lack obvious rational explanations. 
Based 
on the review of this literature it seems that despite the fact that a number of conflicting 
theories have been proposed to explain why firms pay dividends, no one theory appears to be 
conclusive. Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provided the essential background for 
understanding and exploring the dividend question in an Irish context. 
This chapter sets out the research methodology and methods that are fundamental to 
the present study. It identifies the philosophical assumptions that guided decisions about the 
research approach for the empirical investigation of dividend decisions by Irish companies 
documented in subsequent chapters. In the context of these assumptions the choices of 
quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches and the rationale for the 
chronological order of the empirical work are explained. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
philosophical assumptions that underpin any research project and identifies and explains the 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches. Section 4.3 
considers research traditions in the field of finance while Section 4.4 addresses the objectives 
of the current study. Section 4.5 provides an outline of the assumptions underpinning the 
choice of methodologies in the current study before Section 4.6 outlines the chronological 
order of the empirical work. Section 4.7 sets out the research methods employed and provides 
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a description of each method. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter by outlining how the research 
will progress in the context of the triangulation involved in using a questionnaire survey, a 
market-based event study and interviews. 
4.2 Philosophical Assumptions 
Ryan et al., (2002, p. 7) noted that `research is a process of intellectual discovery, 
which has the potential to transform our knowledge and understanding of the world around 
us'. Certain fundamental assumptions underpin all research activity and a review of the 
literature associates these assumptions with methodological approaches. For example Taylor 
and Bogdan (1984) contended that debates over methodology are essentially arguments about 
assumptions while Gill and Johnson (1997) agreed that decisions on how to study phenomena 
require that certain assumptions be made about the research question. Ryan et al. (2002) 
observed that the selection of the most appropriate research methodology depends on the 
nature of the phenomenon being researched; they continued: 
"... the assumptions which the researcher holds regarding the 
nature of the phenomenon's reality (ontology), will affect the 
way in which knowledge can be gained about the phenomenon 
(epistemology), and in turn affects the process through which 
research can be conducted (methodology). Consequently, the 
selection of an appropriate research methodology cannot be 
done in isolation of a consideration of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions which underpin the research. 83" 
(Ryan et al., 2002, p. 35). 
83 Denzin and Lincoln (1994) claimed that highly abstract principals guide all research. These principals 
combine beliefs about ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the relationship between the researcher 
and the known) and methodology (how the researcher gains knowledge of the world). Ryan et al. (2002, p. 36) 
noted that `methodology is concerned with the process of doing research and as such it has both ontological and 
epistemological dimensions.... and that it is important to distinguish methodology from methods... the latter 
being particular techniques used in research'. Collis and Hussey (2003, p. 55) made this distinction in starker 
terms when noting that `methodology refers to the overall approach to the research process from the theoretical 
underpinning to the collection and analysis of data..... methods, on the other hand, refer only to the various 
means by which data can be collected and /or analysed'. 
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Two main research paradigms or philosophies are now generally thought to exist. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) label these as `positivistic' and `phenomenological' 
but note that 
many authors use other equivalent terms, the most common of which are quantitative and 
qualitative. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argued that the interrelated ontological and 
epistemological sets of assumptions 
have implications for any choice of methodological 
approaches. The authors characterised the choice of methodological approaches against 
the 
backdrop of `ideographic' and `nomothetic' approaches to social science. An ideographic 
approach is based on the view that knowledge 
is something that has to be personally 
experienced rather than being known without 
being acquired. 84 The nomothetic approach 
uses research methods applied by the natural sciences 
85 The authors noted that the 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the nomothetic approaches are positivistic while 
the epistemological assumptions underpinning ideographic approaches are anti-positivistic 
(i. e. phenomenological). 
86 Ideographic and nomothetic approaches do not represent strict 
dichotomies, but merely extreme choices of methodologies. Such methodologies may or may 
not influence the form of enquiry into the research question and neither exists in an 
unadulterated form. 
84 In this context, Burrell and Morgan (1979) contended that the reality of the social world is considered to relate 
to the individual's consciousness or perception of the world. Knowledge is assumed to be subjective. Given that 
assumption, the philosophical orientation of inquiry is on qualitative approaches that attempt to understand 
social phenomena from the individual's point of view. 
" The focus of inquiry is on the formulation of objective scientific tests or quantitative methods to test 
hypothetical observations. Nomothetic approaches deny the importance of subjectivity and the world is assumed 
to be `external to the individual' (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 2). 
86 Positivistic approaches are grounded in empirical data concerned with explanation and prediction. Such 
approaches avoid value judgements and theoretical speculations. Phenomenological approaches are concerned 
with prescription and require the interpretation of data in an attempt to encapsulate the value judgements of 
respondents. Watts and Zimmerman (1986), in a discussion concerning approaches to accounting theory, argued 
that such research can only be concerned with `what is questions', it cannot be used to answer `what ought 
questions'. In the context of the present study, positivistic approaches can be used to predict stock market 
reactions to dividends announcements but cannot prescribe what dividend ought to be paid or what factors 
should be considered in the determination of the amount of the dividend to be paid. Such speculations can only 
be determined by phenomenological approaches. 
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In addition to identifying the two extreme choices of methodologies, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) outlined two opposing views, illustrated on a continuum, concerning the 
nature of society and sociology, namely: "the sociology of regulation" and "the sociology of 
radical change. " The authors viewed the sociology of regulation as an environment wherein 
current configurations in modem society are characterised as idyllic. The alternative view 
(the sociology of radical change) characterises modern society as looking for alternatives to 
current configurations. The latter alternative considers existing societal structures as less than 
optimal, damaging rather than supporting human development. In the context of both 
extremes, the authors created a two-by-two matrix that produced four paradigms, each 
providing a distinct view of the social environment reflecting the different assumptions made 
regarding the nature of society and social science. The authors specified these paradigms as: 
radical humanist; radical structuralist; interpretive and functionalist and viewed these as 
mutually exclusive in that the researcher's acceptance of the assumptions of one paradigm is 
considered a rejection of the assumptions of all others. 
Chua (1986) in a critique of traditional mainstream approaches to research in 
accounting and finance noted that the dominant focus of the research approach in both topics 
has emphasised `hypothetico-deductivism and technical control' (Chua, 1986, p. 601). The 
author noted that the philosophical assumptions underpinning mainstream accounting and 
finance research draw heavily on an objectivist approach and largely utilise quantitative 
methods of data analysis. She pointed out that such traditional approaches do not attempt to 
evaluate institutional structures; have largely neglected developments which offer new 
insights into the power effects of accounting within organisations and societies; and have 
demonstrated a lack of awareness within the philosophy of social science of controversies 
which have questioned realism and the empirical testability of theories. Chua (1986) 
observed that in the early 1980s academics proposed the classification of accounting 
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literature relying on Burrell and Morgan's (1979) classification concerning the nature of 
society and social science. The author rejected that classification on the basis that 
`transplanting an unmodified framework from sociology [into accounting thought] implies 
some equivalence between the two disciplines' (Chua, 1986, p. 603). In the absence of any 
detailed exposition of such commonalities the author criticised the suggestion of mutually 
exclusive dichotomies suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979); instead she set out three sets 
of assumptions concerning research: - beliefs about knowledge, beliefs about physical and 
social reality and beliefs about the relationship between theory and practice87 and noted that 
`these assumptions were chosen because they reflect dominant themes currently being 
debated in the social sciences' (Chua, 1986, p. 605). In the context of these beliefs she 
suggested alternative approaches to research in accounting and finance - the interpretative 
perspective and the critical perspective. These perspectives stress the worth of employing 
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies to research in accounting and finance. The 
fundamental assumptions of both the interpretative and critical perspectives are a continuum 
and neither categorise social perspectives into permanent classifications and do not employ 
mutually exclusive dichotomies. 
Laughlin (1995) noted that there is no comprehensive approach to understanding the 
empirical world and that all methodological choices are contestable. However the author 
criticises the bipolar dualism of Burrell and Morgan (1979) as being too simplistic and 
contended that Burrell and Morgan's (1979) continuum limits choice in research approaches. 
The author expressed Burrell and Morgan's (1979) five part schema as three bands: theory, 
methodology and change, and noted that before undertaking empirical work the researcher 
87 Chua (1986) divided beliefs about knowledge into two related sets of epistemological and methodological 
assumptions. The author noted that epistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth by 
specifying the criteria and process of assessing truth claims. Methodological assumptions indicate the research 
methods deemed appropriate for the gathering of valid evidence. The author specified three assumptions 
concerning beliefs about physical and social reality: - ontology, human intention and social order. 
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must make choices within these three bands. The theory dimension refers to the level of 
theorisation prior to the research; methodology is concerned with assumptions about the 
nature of social science while change is concerned with assumptions about the nature of 
society. 88 The author viewed each of the three choices on continuums ranging from low to 
high89 and presented an argument for choosing the middle point on each (i. e. middle range 
thinking). Laughlin (1995) noted that middle range thinkers are more strategic in their 
attitude to change; open to investigating aspects of current functioning (i. e. the status quo) but 
also open to challenging the status quo. The approach supports ontological beliefs that 
generalised convictions about reality are acceptable, but require empirical work to 
substantiate such self-assurance and inculcate understandings. While the methodology 
recognises the importance of investigating the reality of the social world in the process of 
intellectual discovery, it also acknowledges the possibility of amendment and refinement 
during the conduct of empirical work to take account of changed circumstances in view of 
experience. The methodologies permit both quantitative analysis and qualitative approaches; 
as such they represent a conditional approach that implies that researchers examine the 
current functioning (i. e. the status quo), but be open to the possibility of carefully planned 
change 90 
In summary, the debate concerning the choice of research methods revolves around 
the choice between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Quantitative methodology is 
88 Laughlin (1995) noted that the choice relating to assumptions about the nature of society requires a position to 
be taken on whether empirical work is focused on achieving change in the phenomenon being investigated. 
"Laughlin (1995) asserted that the descriptors of high, medium and low are not precise, definable or 
measurable. Ryan et al. (2002) noted that Laughlin (1995) regarded high levels as indicative of a world that has 
been well researched allowing generalisations. On the other hand with low levels it is inappropriate to derive 
insights from previous studies and generalisations are difficult. 
90 Laughlin (1995, p. 84) noted that "Habermas, with his complex theoretical and methodological model, provides 
the most complete example of `middle range thinking' to empirical research in not only accounting but also 
other social dimensions. It has a more balanced approach to the social world maintaining that current 
configurations are not all inappropriate with the supply of various models to allow some judgements on this 
issue to be made. Already the literature in the accounting area is starting to use and adapt Habermas' insights in 
empirical research in accounting but this literature has only scratched the surface of this important endeavour". 
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based on the nomothetic approach to research that emphasises the measurement and analysis 
of causal relationships between variables of interest. This is a positivist perspective and 
typically uses methods such as questionnaires or time series data sets that produce 
information which facilitates statistical analysis, mathematical modelling and graphs. Patton 
(1990) noted that quantitative research methodologies provide a broad generalised set of 
findings as distinct from qualitative approaches where the focus is on increasing the 
understanding of phenomena. Typically, the qualitative approach provides findings with 
reduced generalisability and is based on the ideographic approach to research. Collis and 
Hussey (2003) highlighted that the qualitative approach emphasises the subjective aspects of 
human activity by focusing on the meaning rather than the measurement of social 
phenomena. As such, qualitative approaches are subjective in nature and involve considering 
and thoughtfully analysing the perceptions of others in order to gain an understanding of 
social behaviour or activities. Collis and Hussey (2003) noted that Van Maasen (1983, p. 9) 
observed that `the research methods used in this approach are an array of interpretative 
techniques which seek to describe, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, 
not the frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world'. 
Such interpretative techniques include obtaining data by surveillance or conducting 
interviews. Qualitative research is perceived as permitting the development of concepts, 
insights and understandings by tracing and critically assessing patterns and consistencies in 
data. It provides for an understanding of other people's views and attitudes rather than a 
search for definitive prescriptive findings. 
Despite the fact that quantitative and qualitative methods constitute alternative 
strategies for research they are not viewed as mutually exclusive, but as two extremes of a 
continuum (Chua 1986; Patton, 1990; Laughlin, 1995). Quantitative data provides breath to a 
study while qualitative methods provide depth. Both types of data are used in this thesis. The 
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next section considers traditions of research approaches in finance while the following 
sections address the objectives of the current study, outline the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning this thesis and specify the methodological choices made. 
4.3 Traditional Approaches to Research in Finance 
Since the early 1930s, corporate finance related topics have generated a wealth of 
research. However, Ryan et al. (2002, p. 52) in Research Methods and Methodology in 
Finance and Accounting, observed that `while the successes of research in finance are many 
there are still interesting problems to be resolved'. One such problem is the puzzle as to why 
companies choose to pay dividends to their shareholders. The current thesis addresses this 
puzzle in an Irish context. 
As was noted in Chapter 3, much of the finance research literature has its origins in 
neoclassical economics. Thus, finance research is based on a capital markets perspective 
where all decision-makers (investors) are assumed to behave in a rational fashion. This 
rationality manifests itself in what Van Home (1972) termed `the formulation of axioms' 
regarding the behaviour of investors when making investment decisions 91 Based on these 
axioms of an investor's decision-making behaviour, a utility function can be formulated 
which can be used as the basis for specifying a model about an investor's attitude towards 
risk. In this context Ryan et al. (2002) noted `individual investor behaviour is aggregated up 
to a market level to develop stock market pricing relationships and it is through this 
aggregation process that the rationality assumption,... manifests and reinforces itself (Ryan 
et al., 2002, p. 52). 
91 Investors are assumed to act rationally and consistently. Specifically, investors are assumed: to choose 
between alternatives by ranking them in some order of merit; that any such ranking of alternatives is transitive; 
that investors do not differentiate between alternatives which have the same degree of risk; and that investors are 
able to specify for any investment whose returns are uncertain, an exactly equivalent alternative which would be 
equally preferred, but which would involve a certain return. 
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The notion of risk measures in investment decision-making and the portfolio selection 
process had its origin in the work of Markowitz (1952,1959). Ryan et al. 
(2002, p. 55) noted 
that it was through Markowitz's work that the concept of portfolio diversification became 
`operationalised in terms of portfolio variances and covariances between constituent 
securities'. Subsequently, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1964) developed the capital asset 
pricing model noting that the only risk that is priced at equilibrium in the capital market 
is 
covariance or systematic risk as measured by beta. These studies spawned several market- 
based tests of the value relevance of different elements of financial statements, including 
earnings and dividends announcements. Underpinning these tests was the concept that the 
stock market is one in which prices react quickly and in an unbiased manner to the public 
release of new information (i. e. semi-strong form market efficiency). As was identified in 
Chapter 3, one area in which such techniques proved particularly useful was in the analysis of 
the ability of the dividend signal to encapsulate management views about the firm's future 
prospects and to signal those views to investors (e. g. Pettit, 1972; Watts, 1973). 
However, Ryan et al. (2002) noted that despite the existence of substantial evidence in 
support of semi-strong form market efficiency, a considerable number of academic papers 
have documented results that are apparently inconsistent with its central tenets. The authors 
highlighted papers by Basu (1977) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985) to illustrate this 
observation. Basu (1977) analysed price earnings (P/E) ratios and reported that a profitable 
investment strategy can be achieved using the mechanical rule of buying and holding shares 
with a low P/E ratio (low rated stocks) and selling short shares with a high P/E ratio (high 
rated stocks). DeBondt and Thaler (1985) provided empirical evidence in support of the 
overreaction hypothesis and reported that in the long term stock prices overreact to economic 
news. Specifically, the authors noted that strongly performing shares in one period 
experienced lower returns in a subsequent period while poorly performing shares in one 
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period experienced higher returns in a subsequent period. The authors put forward a 
behavioural rationale for the phenomenon suggesting `that investors were poor Bayesians in 
the sense that they over-weighted sample information relative to priors' (Ryan et al., 2002, 
p. 66). 
Burton et al. (2003) observed that since the mid-1990s a substantial number of 
research papers concerned with behavioural research methodological approaches in finance 
have appeared in the academic literature. The authors highlighted studies by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1995), Schleifer (1999), Statman (1999) and Olsen (2000) and noted that these 
research approaches seek to explain a number of apparent `puzzles' unresolved by the 
mainstream finance approach outlined above. The authors identified these puzzles to include: 
the behaviour of corporate management and investors when assessing risk (Helliar et al., 
2001); investor reaction to poorly performing investments (Wilson and Zhang, 1997); 
investor over-confidence (Daniel et al., 1998) and stock market excesses such as price 
herding (Eguiluz and Zimmerman, 2000). Burton et al. (2003) noted that: 
"The important advance provided by behavioural research 
...... is to indicate that..... irrational behaviour is sometimes 
quite normal when actions of human beings are involved. In 
particular, individuals are prone to biases whereby loss 
aversion, stereotyping, over-confidence and a tendency to 
adjust to new information very slowly are common. " 
(Burton et al., 2003, p. 10) 
Most dividend theories and hypotheses to date are based on the assumption of the 
`existence of the economically rational human being' (Frankfurter et al., 2004, p. 75). 
Frankfurter et al. (2004) recommended that researchers should think carefully about the 
ontology and epistemology of the dividend phenomena. Specifically, the authors noted that 
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the scale and sophistication of complex econometric models imported into the field of finance 
from neo-classical economics in order to test the dividend phenomenon might no longer be 
appropriate. 92 Specifically, the authors highlighted an empirical test of the taxation effects of 
dividend payments by Kalay and Michaely (2000) in which they hinted that increasing model 
complexity `might show results one wants to finds, that is, the verification of rational 
behaviour' (Frankfurter et al., 2004, p. 77). For the purposes of their analysis, Frankfurter et 
al. (2004) set out the axioms of dividend behaviour as follows: dividends evolved over the 
existence of the modem corporation; dividend policies of firms change over time, given 
economic conditions; the availability of worthwhile investment opportunities, and other 
factors. The authors asserted that no academic model of dividends accounts for the evolution 
of the dividend phenomena; because of its evolution (and because of cultural influences) the 
perceptions of dividends will not be universal. The authors concluded that: 
"... dividend research must take a different route than the one 
it has been travelling for much too long; that is choose a path 
better oriented to what is generally called behavioural 
economics ". 
(Frankfurter et al., 2004, p. 75) 
The next section considers the objectives of the current study while the following 
section outlines the philosophical assumptions underpinning this thesis and specifies the 
methodological choices made. In both sections, an attempt is made to respond to the 
92 Frankfurter et aL (2004) noted that dividend theories and hypotheses can be grouped into six distinct classes: (1) the bird in the hand theory; (2) tax effects both for corporations and for individuals; (3) clientele effects; (4) 
signalling with dividends; (5) agency theory and free cash flows; and (6) Sociological and psychological 
theories. The authors noted that the first five classes of theories assume rational behaviour while class (6) is 
based on dissimilar rationalities. 
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expectations of academics discussed in recent literature for a broader investigation into the 
dividend puzzle i. e. one which adopts a behavioural perspective. 
4.4 Research Objectives 
A review of the prior empirical literature on the dividend question revealed that the 
dividend decision is one of the most elusive and controversial areas within the field of 
finance. Despite the fact that a number of conflicting theories have been proposed to explain 
why firms pay dividends, no single theory appears to be conclusive. Lumby (1994, p. 541) 
stated the position in starker terms commenting that `the theory in this area [of fmance] is the 
least evolved and least complete'. 
A number of potential perspectives on the dividend puzzle were discussed in Chapter 
3. From an academic perspective, the fundamental issue relating to the study of dividends is 
whether the pattern of dividend payouts affects equity share valuations, and if it does, 
whether a particular pattern of payout maximises equity share prices. Based on a review of 
the literature since the 1960s, the consensus amongst academics suggests that dividend 
payments themselves act as signals and affect share valuations but it is the earnings number 
that ultimately matters. Marsh (1993) summarised the present theoretical perspective as 
follows: 
"Although dividend policy remains a controversial issue there is 
now substantial agreement within the academic community that 
a company's value is not affected by its dividend [payout 
pattern] policy, i. e. that there is no systematic exploitable 
relationship between a firm's dividend policy and the value of its 
shares. The latter is instead governed by the company's 
earnings....... and hence future cash flows. " 
(Marsh, 1993, p. 3) 
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From a managerial perspective, the dividend decision primarily represents a choice 
between allocating funds to make dividends payments and/or retaining funds for 
reinvestment. In that context, any empirical findings on whether an observable pattern of 
dividend payouts affects equity share valuations are of equal importance. However, as was 
noted in Chapter 3, the relatively small number of survey and interview based studies 
suggested that most managers try to have a stable dividend policy and only increase 
dividends when they are confident that the new dividend level can be sustained. 
The core objectives of this dissertation are to consider both managerial and investor 
perspectives on dividend payments in an Irish setting. Specifically, the thesis seeks to 
ascertain the perceptions and motivations of Irish corporate managers concerning dividend 
policy and to examine whether the pattern of dividends paid by Irish companies affects share 
valuations. The objectives and methodological choices made in the current study necessitated 
the use of both quantitative and qualitative research techniques. In particular three strands of 
empirical work are involved: 
1. A study of questionnaire survey responses which seeks to explain: (i) how 
Irish firms determine the amount of dividends to pay to shareholders; (ii) the 
perceptions of Irish managers about the relationship between dividend policy and firm 
value, in particular whether belief in the `signalling' concept is widely held; and (iii) 
the role of earnings, risk preferences and tax clienteles in an Irish context when 
payout ratios are being determined. 
2. An empirical investigation of the value of the dividend announcement as a 
signal of future prospects. This approach involves capital-market research in a 
conventional event study setting. As such, the approach draws on prior market-based 
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accounting research literature that examines the predictive ability of certain variables 
in financial statements that are of potential interest to investors, e. g. future cash flows. 
Because of the difficulty in estimating future cash flows these studies typically 
examine the relationship between earnings, investment and dividend announcements 
and current share prices. 
3 
3. An analysis of interviews with management and with investor surrogates (i. e. 
leading Dublin brokerage houses). The interviews with management compliments and 
expands the analysis of the survey evidence while the interviews with leading Dublin 
brokerage houses provide an alternative point of view on whether dividends influence 
share prices and compliment the event study results. 
4.5 Philosophical Assumptions of the Thesis 
This section discusses the philosophical assumptions underpinning the current 
dissertation in view of the research objectives outlined in Section 4.4. It explains the 
researcher's perceptions regarding the nature of society and the nature of social science. 
Specifically, the section sets out the ontological and epistemological assumptions that provide 
the justification for using both the quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches 
adopted in the thesis. 
The views of Burrell and Morgan (1979) concerning the nature of society and 
sociology - "the sociology of regulation" and "the sociology of radical change"- are 
understood. It is accepted that Irish society is an ordered cohesive entity. However it is also 
93 Gordon's (1959) fundamental valuation model noted that current share prices are assumed to be a surrogate 
for the summation of the expected future dividend stream discounted to present value. 
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accepted that Irish society is capable of change in view of the history of conflict 
in its 
underlying structures. Given the changing nature of the social, economic and technological 
environment in Ireland this conflict is on-going. 
4 Therefore, although in the first instance 
this thesis investigates the status quo, the research reflects the inevitability of change during 
the empirical investigation process and as such the views of Laughlin (1995) are accepted. 
Therefore, while the simplistic nature of bipolar dualism and the descriptive paradigms put 
forward by Burrell and Morgan (1979) are recognised, the mutually exclusivity of these 
paradigms is not accepted. 
Given the assumptions made regarding Irish society, the ontological assumptions do 
not perceive Irish society as external to the individual or that empirical research in an Irish 
context should focus exclusively on the causal relationships between various components of 
the Irish environment to test hypothetical deductive generalisations. While the investigation 
of causal relationships in Ireland is accepted as a starting point in understanding phenomena, 
such generalisations about reality in Irish society are overly simplistic and can only be 
viewed in the context of the role that individuals play in constructing that reality. 
Accordingly, the way in which knowledge can be gained about Irish phenomena 
(epistemological understanding) can come both from considering the perspectives of 
individuals involved in particular activities and from studying events, which are by definition, 
external to the perceptions of individuals. Therefore, in this thesis knowledge is attained in 
the first instance by searching for causal relationships and secondly considering the 
perspective of individuals involved in shaping those relationships. This position inevitably 
leads to the conclusion that both quantitative and qualitative approaches are required in any 
empirical study of the dividend phenomena in an Irish context neither of which are based 
necessarily on the assumption of the existence of economically rational human beings. 
94 Chapter 2 highlighted the changing nature of the Irish environment during the period of this study. 
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To summarise, the methodological approach in this thesis recognises the requirement 
to investigate the status quo in Ireland but also recognises the importance of the researcher 
being open to the possibility of amendment and refinement during the conduct of empirical 
work to take account of changed circumstances in light of experience. Accordingly, 
the 
empirical work in this thesis will progress on the basis that the Irish environment 
is external 
to the individual but is open to the suggestion that the social world in Ireland may be the 
product of an individual's consciousness. Thus, the methodologies in this thesis will 
be 
quantitative while allowing for some qualitative analysis. As such the approach 
is a 
conditional approach implying an investigation of the status quo but openness to the 
possibility of carefully considered refinement during the conduct of empirical work. 
4.6 Chronological Order of the Empirical Work 
The core objective of this thesis is to consider whether dividends are relevant to Irish 
share valuations from both the investor and managerial perspectives. As Section 4.5 
explained, the methodological approach adopted means that the status quo has to be 
investigated but in the context of the researcher being open to the possibility of amending and 
refining the approach during the conduct of the empirical work, as experience develops. This 
methodological choice necessitates the use of both quantitative and qualitative research 
techniques; accordingly in this thesis knowledge of the dividend phenomenon in Ireland is 
examined using a number of empirical approaches. 
The next section of the chapter describes the three research methods used in the 
present study in detail. The methods used are: (i) a large-scale questionnaire survey sent to 
the managers of the 1000 largest Irish companies; (ii) an event study of the stock market's 
reaction to dividend announcements made by 50 Irish firms over a recent 15-year period; and 
(iii) a series of interviews with 20 Irish company managers and 4 major investors regarding 
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their views of dividends in an Irish context. The three pieces of empirical work were 
deliberately conducted in the chronological order set out above. It was considered sensible to 
begin with a questionnaire survey as this allowed for the largest sample of firms to be studied 
and provided the researcher with a useful gauge of overall thinking regarding the nature and 
impact of dividend payouts. The event study then provided the opportunity to focus on some 
of the more notable findings from the survey, in particular regarding the role of the dividend 
as a signalling mechanism and the complexity caused by the tendency for Irish firms to make 
a simultaneous announcement of their earnings figure. The interviews were then conducted as 
the final piece of empirical work. These facilitated an open-ended discussion of the issues 
emerging from the questionnaire and the event study and allowed the researcher to further 
explore the inconsistencies identified in the postal survey and the complexities noted in the 
event study. For example, the interviews considered whether the impression conveyed (by 
both the postal survey and the event study) that dividends in isolation may not provide a 
robust signalling mechanism to Irish investors was re-examined and discussed with the 
participants. As such, the interviews sought to examine financial directors' perceptions about 
the relationship between dividend policy and firm value and compliment and expand on the 
survey evidence. The interviews with leading Dublin brokerage houses provided an 
alternative point of view on whether dividends influence share prices, and complimented the 
event study results in a useful way by focusing on whether dividends are relevant to share 
values and provide signals of future prospects. 
In summary therefore, the study identifies Irish attitudes to key traditional dividend 
issues, investigates how the Irish stock market responds to company announcements about 
dividend payments and ascertains the views of Irish corporate managers about Irish dividend 
policy. This approach contributes to an understanding of the dividend decisions in Irish 
companies given the background findings (or lack of findings) of any causal relationships 
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between dividend changes and share price changes. For this purpose, data are drawn from 
quoted and unquoted companies; dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying companies; and 
from firms which have recently changed their dividend payout policy and those which have 
not. The next section provides details of the research methods used to achieve the research 
objectives. 
4.7 Details on the Research Methods 
The central objective of the research in the current thesis is to ascertain whether 
dividends are relevant to Irish share valuations. The methodological choices outlined in 
Section 4.5 suggest that both quantitative and qualitative strategies can usefully be applied to 
this investigation while Section 4.6 sets out the chronological order of the empirical work in 
the context of using open-ended techniques of a questionnaire survey, a market-based event 
study and interviews. A full description of each method is provided in the following sections. 
4.7.1 The Questionnaire Survey 
Questionnaires have become a very popular method of gathering information in social 
science research (Howard and Sharp, 1983). This popularity arises mainly from the relatively 
large sample of a population that can be consulted about their views on a particular issue and 
the ease with which a questionnaire can be distributed. As a result, generalisations can be 
made from a relatively high response rate, with statistical tests performed to allow robust 
inferences to be drawn. However, despite these advantages, Chapter 3 of the current thesis 
reported that dividend related questionnaires `fall into a scant minority of research efforts on 
this topic' (Frankfurter et al., 2004, p. 74). In order to gain insight into corporate managers' 
understanding of dividends Frankfurter et al. (2004) analysed the results of a survey that was 
administered in five countries on five continents. 
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The attitude of company executives and investors to dividend policy in Ireland has not 
been reported in the academic literature in a systematic fashion. As noted in Chapter 3, a 
number of small surveys on the topic have been undertaken but the results are relatively old 
and the sample sizes limited. Given the inadequacy of Irish dividend surveys, it was decided 
that a postal questionnaire survey should be used to seek the views of managers of the largest 
1,000 companies operating in Ireland about various aspects of the dividend decision. 5 
The present study differs from previous investigations of the Irish market in three 
main respects. First, the sample of firms employed in the present study is larger than that used 
in previous analyses and should provide better grounds for comparison with previous large- 
scale US investigations. Also, such a large-scale survey should enable the researcher to 
generalise from the findings with a greater degree of confidence. Second, data are drawn 
from both quoted and unquoted companies, to facilitate a comparative analysis of the views 
of managers in both types of firm. Finally, the study provides a direct comparison of the 
views of Irish managers in: (i) dividend-paying and non dividend-paying companies; and (ii) 
firms which have recently changed their dividend payout policy and those which have not. 
No such analysis has been performed in the previous Irish investigations of the topic that 
were discussed in Chapter 3. 
There is substantial guidance in the literature on postal surveys for researchers 
attempting to achieve the best possible response rate to a questionnaire. Sekaran (2000) has 
identified the actions to be taken to reduce possible problems with a questionnaire and 
minimise any resulting bias in the research. Specifically, the language in the questionnaire 
should be understandable, while the questions included should be short; long questions tend 
to discourage respondents from completing the survey instrument. The aim of the 
95 This information was obtained from the Business and Finance Top 1,000 Companies (2001) in the Republic of Ireland. 
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questionnaire is to ascertain the perceptions and motivations of Irish corporate managers 
concerning dividend policy and to reduce any ambiguity in the questions. To achieve the 
latter Saunders et al. (1997) suggested using closed-end questions, because such an approach 
encourages respondents to reply and helps with the coding of the information for analytical 
purposes. Howard and Sharp (1983) argued that lengthy questionnaires are likely to reduce 
the percentage response rate and should be avoided, while Dillman (1978) asserted that 
sensitive questions should not be asked as respondents might react by ignoring the document. 
Finally, Jobber and O'Reilly (1995) suggested that response rates in questionnaires are 
improved considerably by offering an incentive to all recipients who complete the survey. 
Accordingly, the design of the questionnaire in this study took the following issues 
into consideration: 
(i) The questions were worded in such a way as to make it easy for the respondents to 
understand the questions and answer in a clear fashion; 
(ii) The questions were kept as short as possible to ensure that the document was not time 
consuming to complete; 
(iii) The number of questions was kept to a minimum to reduce the length of the 
questionnaire with the hope of improving the response rate; 
(iv) The respondents were given the chance to make quick decisions by ensuring that most 
of the questions were closed-end. Respondents were required to choose among five 
available alternatives, by ticking one of five boxes: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, 
disagree and strongly disagree. Only three questions, one at the end of each of the three 
sections of the questionnaire, were open-ended to allow the participants to add any 
comments if they wished; 
(v) Sensitive questions were avoided and questions requiring specific details about 
respondent firms were asked only to facilitate the categorisation of respondents into 
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several sub-groups and to allow for an examination of whether, based on answers to 
questions for the various groupings, identifiable differences existed; 
(vi) It was decided that the questionnaire should not take more than fifteen minutes to 
complete and would be no more than four A4 pages in length. A freepost reply 
envelope was provided to ensure that the respondents would not incur any mailing 
expenses; 
(vii) All respondents were included in a free draw for a case of champagne if the completed 
questionnaire was returned by a fixed date. 
An initial draft of the questionnaire was prepared drawing heavily upon the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3. Some of the original questions were adapted from: US surveys 
by 
Baker et al. (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999); an Australian survey by Partington (1989); 
and Allen's (1992) questionnaire survey of UK and Australian companies. Previous survey 
research on the Irish Stock Market by Green et al. (1993) also helped to frame many of the 
questions for inclusion in the final version of the research instrument. 
4.7.1.1 Administration of the Survey 
In addition to incorporating the previous literature, extensive consultation took place 
regarding the content of the statements to be included in the questionnaire and on the overall 
layout of the document. A pilot study was undertaken whereby an early version of the 
questionnaire was posted to 40 major Irish fund managers and stockbrokers licensed by the 
Central Bank of Ireland, and to 10 full-time academic staff at Dublin City University 
Business School. Some 32 responses to the pilot were received. The pilot respondents 
confirmed that the average time taken to complete the questionnaire was 11 minutes. Where 
respondents indicated that a specific question lacked clarity, this was subsequently rephrased 
to eliminate any ambiguities. 
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It was thought that individuals might be more inclined to reply to the questionnaire if 
the survey was conducted in conjunction with a well-known finance house and the Irish 
Stock 
Exchange. Both a leading firm of stockbrokers in Dublin, Davy Stockbrokers, and the Irish 
Stock Exchange agreed to support the survey. Davy Stockbrokers permitted the use of their 
logo in correspondence associated with the questionnaire while the Irish Stock Exchange 
allowed the inclusion of a paragraph in the covering letter referring to the Exchange's support 
for the survey. In addition, the head of research at Davy signed the covering letter. 
The final version of the questionnaire (which is included in Appendix 5.3 together 
with the covering letter shown in Appendix 5.1) was divided into four main sections. Section 
1 comprised 10 closed-end questions and one open-ended question seeking the views of 
respondents about the factors that a firm should consider when setting its dividend level. 
Section 2 asked respondents about whether dividends act as a signal and how the market 
responds to dividend announcements; this section included 13 closed-end questions and one 
open-ended question. Section 3, which comprised nine closed-end questions and one open- 
ended question, sought views of respondents on taxation issues. Section 4 obtained 
background information regarding respondents and their firms (for example: the respondent's 
role within the firm; whether the firm was quoted or unquoted; the firm's main activity, etc. ). 
Section 4 also sought details about whether the firm currently paid a dividend, whether the 
level of dividends had changed since the previous year, whether respondents believed that the 
reasons for dividend payments should be explained to investors and how such information 
could best be conveyed to the market. The responses in Section 4 facilitated the 
categorisation of respondents into several sub-groups and an examination of whether 
identifiable differences existed, based on answers to earlier questions. 
The questionnaires, along with an explanatory covering letter, were sent to the chief 
executive officer of each of the top 1,000 Irish companies on the 7th of September 2001. After 
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one month, a second letter, together with another copy of the questionnaire, was sent to non- 
respondents (see Appendix 5.2). 
4.7.2 The Event Study 
The thesis also employs a conventional event-study methodology. An event study is 
an empirical investigation of the relationship between security prices and economic events. 
The focus of most papers in this field is `testing whether the stochastic behaviour of share 
prices is affected by the disclosure of fine-specific events' (Strong, 1992, p. 533). The present 
thesis examines the stock market reaction to the firm-specific news of a dividend 
announcement. The analysis requires the actual share return to be compared with the 
expected share return around the period of the dividend announcement date in order to 
determine whether or not any stock market reaction has occurred. 96 If the flow of information 
to the market ensures that the announcement of a change in dividend does not come as a total 
surprise to the market, there will not be a statistically significant abnormal share return 
generated during the announcement period. According to this methodology, a statistically 
significant abnormal share return generated during the announcement period clearly indicates 
that the dividend announcement has not been fully anticipated and consequently, conveys 
important additional information to the market. An observation of small and statistically 
insignificant post-announcement abnormal returns indicates that the market is information- 
efficient in the semi-strong sense, reacting quickly to new information releases, impounding 
that information into share prices rapidly and leaving no opportunity to earn above-average 
returns using publicly available information. If post-announcement abnormal returns are 
96 Although a number of event studies have investigated trading volume reaction to announcement events (e. g. 
Beaver, 1968; Morse 1981) in the Irish context reliable volume data did not become available until 1999 
(Gallagher, 2004). Accordingly the focus of this thesis is on stock prices. 
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positive and statistically significant 
it may indicate that the market takes time to evaluate the 
news implicit in the announcement, with share prices reacting slowly as a result. 
Strong's (1992) seminal paper sets out the basic structure of the standard form of 
event study as follows: 
(i) Identify event dates for a sample of firms subject to the disclosure of interest 
(dividend announcements in the present study) and group observations into a common 
event time. 
(ii) Within the overall test period of interest calculate the abnormal return for each firm 
and for each period around the announcement date. 
(iii) Compute the mean abnormal return across firms in the sample (possibly cumulated) 
over the test period and examine whether the mean abnormal return is non-zero. 
Strong's paper analysed alternative abnormal return metrics and provided guidance 
on: the calculation of returns; measurement intervals; alternative specifications of the 
benchmark expected return; the choice of estimation and test periods; and the choice of 
market index. The author noted two methods of calculating returns: - discrete returns and 
logarithmic returns and suggested two reasons why logarithmic returns are preferable: 
"Theoretically logarithmic returns are more tractable when 
linking together sub period returns to form returns over longer 
intervals (simply add up the sub period returns) [and] 
empirically..... are more likely to be normally distributed and so 
conform to the assumptions of standard statistical techniques. " 
(Strong, 1992, p. 535) 
Accordingly, Strong recommends that share returns be estimated according to the following 
identity: 
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R;, t = Ln (Pit + D1, t / Pi, c-t) [4.1 ] 
where, R1, t is the actual return on share i on day t, Pit is the price of share i on day t, D; t is the 
dividend paid during period t and P;, t. l is the price of share i on day t-1. 
As regards the measurement interval, Strong (1992) observed that Brown and Warner 
(1985) noted that daily return data were more powerful than weekly or monthly return data in 
detecting statistically significant abnormal returns and concluded that the influence of 
confounding events was less pronounced over the shorter time horizon. 97 Brown and Warner 
also asserted that although daily security returns and daily abnormal returns typically deviate 
from normality, the mean abnormal return across a large sample of shares converges on 
normality, enabling the researcher to use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and t-statistics with a 
reasonable degree of confidence. Finally, Strong (1992) noted that Brown and Warner's 
findings confirm the earlier results of Dyckman et al. (1984), which suggested that any 
skewness in daily abnormal returns had little effect on event study tests. 98 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, daily return data are used to detect the 
presence or absence of abnormal share performance in a 41-day event window surrounding 
the dividend announcement day. 99 This relatively lengthy event window was selected to 
allow an examination of whether: (i) there was any market reaction to a leakage of the news 
beforehand; or (ii) the market instead required a number of periods to respond to the news 
97 As noted in Chapter 3, a confounding event is an event that occurs around the same time as the dividend 
announcement that might cause share prices to change. 
98 Morse (1984) analysed the econometric trade off between using monthly or daily data, noting that shorter 
measurement intervals are more efficient in detecting information effects. 
99 Kane et al. (1984) have noted that some authors have reported that abnormal returns persist for longer periods 
after the earnings and dividend announcements (e. g. Marsh, 1993) but even in those studies most of the 
abnormal returns occurred within a few days surrounding the announcement. The authors highlighted dividend 
studies by Aharony and Swary (1980) and Divecha and Morse (1983) noting that the effect of the dividend 
announcement was impounded into stock prices within the 20-day period surrounding the announcement. 
Rendleman et al. (1982) noted that more than two-thirds of cumulative abnormal returns typically appeared 
within 20 days surrounding the earnings announcement. 
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contained in the dividend announcement. 
Day t is designated as the announcement date, where t is the precise day on which the 
dividend announcement was published in the Extel card records or Bloomberg. 
'°° If the 
signalling hypothesis is correct, the 
day t abnormal return should be significantly different 
from zero. The hypothesis predicts that: (i) the shares of those companies which announce 
dividend increases should, on average, earn positive abnormal returns; (ii) the shares of those 
companies which disclose dividend 
decreases should, on average, earn negative abnormal 
returns; and (iii) the shares of companies which 
do not alter their dividend should, on 
average, earn normal returns. 
Daily share price data were obtained from Datastream, Davy Stockbrokers and the 
Irish Stock Exchange101 and daily share returns estimated according to the following identity: 
R;, t = Ln (Pit/Pi, t_1) [4.2] 
where, R1, t is the actual return on share i on day t, Pit is the price of share i on day t and Pit., 
is the price of share i on day t-1.102, °3 
Strong (1992) noted a number of alternative specifications of benchmark expected 
returns used in the literature, including: mean adjusted returns; market adjusted returns; the 
100 The dates of the dividend announcements were checked with several sources to ensure that correct dates were 
employed. Specifically, archived information at the library of University College Dublin and newspaper 
archives at Dublin City Council's business library were examined to confirm dividend announcement dates. 
101 Care was taken to adjust for stock splits, rights issues and capital reorganisations, some of which Datastream 
had not recorded. Nine adjustments had to be made by the author following visual inspection of the data. 
pox All ex-dividend dates were recorded. A review of these dates revealed that none fell in the 41-day event 
window surrounding the dividend announcement. 
103 In calculating returns according to equation [4.2] dividends were not included for a number of reasons. First, 
it was believed that only two return observations might have been affected -on the date of the interim and final 
payment. Second, this decision was taken to maintain comparability with other UK studies in the area e. g. Lonie 
et al., (1996). Finally, interim dividends were omitted because reliable interim payments dates were not readily 
available to the author. 
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capital asset pricing model; the matched / control portfolio benchmark; and the market model 
benchmark. The author observed that the most popular benchmark method employed in 
calculating abnormal returns in event studies is the market model benchmark. The market 
model does not make any assumptions about how equilibrium prices are established, but 
assumes instead that returns are generated according to the following mechanism: 
E (Ri, t) = a+ AR [4.31 
where, E (R;, t) is the expected return on the stock i, Rm, t is the return on the market portfolio 
(proxied for in this study by the ISEQ Index), and c and A are market model parameters. 
Equation 4.3 partitions the return on a security into a systematic component which is linearly 
related to the return on the market and an unsystematic component; eit is uncorrelated with the 
return on the market. Strong (1992) pointed out that the effect of firm specific events is fully 
captured in the unsystematic component assuming that the information signal and the return 
on the market are independent. Both c and ß; are estimated via regression analysis, resulting 
in a predicted abnormal return of: 
AR,, t = R,, t - (a+ ßA Rn,, t) = ej, t [4.4] 
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where AR;, t is the return on the stock i, Rm, t 
is the return on the market portfolio (proxied for 
in this study by the ISEQ Index), q and (3; are market model parameters and e; t is the random 
error term 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were computed as follows: 
T+20 
CARI, t* _E AR1, t T-20 
where, t* is t+20 to t-20. 
[4.51 
Beaver (1981) noted that the market model produces smaller correlations across security 
abnormal returns giving closer conformity to standard statistical tests, while Strong (1992) 
observed that the market model results in smaller variances of abnormal returns relative to 
raw returns. 
Strong (1992) noted that there have been a number of simulation studies of the 
various event study methodologies. Specifically, the author highlighted the work of Brown 
and Warner (1980) who demonstrated that a simple methodology based on the market model 
performs well under a wide variety of conditions. Strong (1992) also pointed out that both 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Dyckman et al. (1984) find that daily data result in more 
powerful test statistics than do monthly data and concluded that identifying announcement 
dates and concentrating on abnormal returns in a small event window results in much more 
powerful hypothesis tests. 
A number of studies have detected that share betas are non-stationary over time. 
Blume (1975), in a study of betas and their regression tendencies, noted that a key factor in 
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obtaining reliable estimates of beta is that the surrogate used for the theoretical market 
equilibrium portfolio should approximate that portfolio. Roll (1977) in a critique of the 
capital asset pricing model noted that the divergence between the theoretical market portfolio 
and empirically observed surrogates for it are considerable. 
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In addition, Blume (1975) has identified problems of instability in beta estimates. The 
author noted that instability arises from errors in both equations and in variables. A number 
of event studies which examined aspects of market overreaction (Chan, 1988; Ball and 
Kothari, 1982) have documented evidence from US data that beta can alter dramatically 
between successive test periods. Strong (1992) observed that numerous event studies have 
shown that the explanatory power of the market model regression equations and the mean 
cross-sectional value of beta rise as the measurement interval increases. Dimson (1979) has 
identified that serious bias arises where beta estimates are calculated for shares that are 
infrequently traded. The author identified the major source of bias as the tendency for prices 
recorded at the end of a time period to represent the outcome of a transaction that occurred 
prior to the period in question. Therefore, such share price data are an average of the 
temporally ordered underlying share values; as a consequence positive serial correlation is 
introduced into returns and the estimated variance of returns is biased downwards. Dimson 
(1979) reported that the estimated betas of infrequently traded UK shares rise as the interval 
increases, while to a lesser extent, the opposite holds for frequently traded shares. Thus, 
infrequently traded shares have a beta estimate which is biased downwards, while the 
measure for frequently traded shares is biased upwards. 
A number of methods of correcting for thin trading bias have been proposed in the 
104 In theory the market portfolio contains all marketable assets but since no theoretical market portfolio exists 
completely valid empirical tests of capital market theory are unavailable. However, both Sharpe (1964) and 
Frankfurter et al. (1976) in performance evaluations of single index models concluded that their superior 
performance vis a vis a Markowitz full covariance model were too appealing to disregard so the use of single index models have become prevalent in estimating beta factors for particular stocks. 
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literature. Scholes-Williams' (1977) beta estimator assumes that although trades are non- 
synchronous, a transaction takes place in every measurement interval and price-adjustment 
delays arise only through non-synchronous trading; an observed transaction price is therefore 
the true price at the time of the transaction. The beta estimator suggested by the authors is a 
simple regression of the return on the security against the return on the market. Dimson 
(1979) suggested an aggregate coefficient estimator, which does not require that a trade 
occurs in every return interval and advocates running multiple regressions of share returns 
against lagged, matching and leading values of the market index. A consistent estimate is 
obtained by aggregating the slope coefficients in the estimated regression. 
Despite the recognition of the thin trading effect on beta estimates, some authors (e. g. 
Lavely et al., 1980; Hawawini and Vora, 1983) have rejected the argument that betas need to 
be adjusted, on the basis that there is significant loss in the predictive value of betas if 
inappropriate techniques are used. These authors suggest that simple, no change, unadjusted 
betas be used. Strong (1992) has noted that both Brown and Warner (1985) and Dyckman et 
al. (1984) have reported results for the impact of thin trading corrections on simulated event 
studies using daily data. Brown and Warner reported that using either Scholes-Williams' 
(1977) beta estimator or Dimson's (1979) aggregate coefficient estimator results in a 
reduction in the bias but `results in no improvement in either the specification or power of 
event study tests' (Strong, 1992, p. 544). Dyckman et al. performed an event study simulation 
separately on low, medium and high trading volume shares using both Scholes-Williams' and 
Dimson's estimators and found that they fail to `increase the ability to detect abnormal 
performance on daily returns for thinly traded securities' (Strong, 1992, p. 544). Strong (1992) 
concluded that: 
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" Although the OLS market model abnormal return may be 
biased for an individual security, in an event study, the bias in 
conditional abnormal returns may average out to zero in the 
sample ". 
(Strong, 1992, p. 544) 
To summarise, when share trading is infrequent, attempts to calculate ß may be biased 
because many of the returns have a value of zero. Prior attempts to deal with thin trading 
include the use of lead adjustments for the most frequently traded shares and lag adjustments 
for the most infrequently traded shares. However, Strong (1992) concluded that the 
performance of such approaches has not significantly improved the power of event study tests 
and that obtaining accurate event dates is more important than sophistication in modelling or 
statistical techniques. 
In the specific circumstances of Ireland the limited published empirical evidence on 
attempts to calculate ß for Irish stocks have concluded that many Irish beta estimates are 
biased because many of the returns have a value of zero due either to thin trading or non- 
existent trading (McKillop and Hutchinson, 1987; McCluskey, 1990; Murray, 1997). In 
addition, these studies have concluded that the use of lead adjustments for the most 
frequently traded shares and lag adjustments for the most infrequently traded shares does not 
significantly improve the stability of beta estimates for Irish shares. However, a notable 
observation in all of these studies is that applying lead adjustments to the most frequently 
traded shares and lag adjustments to the most infrequently traded shares does move beta 
estimates of Irish shares closer to unity. Accordingly, in this study, to provide a check on the 
market model findings, market adjusted returns (imposing a unitary beta) for each share in 
the sample during the test period were calculated and all empirical tests were also performed 
on the basis of assuming the expected return to simply be the return earned by the market 
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portfolio-105 The market adjusted return model (i. e. the zero-one model) assumes that ex-ante 
expected returns are the same for all securities and therefore equal in any period to the 
expected market return in that period i. e.: 
E (Ri) =E (Rm) [4.61 
The ex post market adjusted return ('excess' return) on a security i in period t that controls 
for market affects is given by: 
ui, t = Rit - Rmt, [4.71 
where, u1, t is the excess return and the marginal expected return on a security i in period t is 
conditioned on the realisation of the market return in period t. 
The number of daily observations used in estimating the parameters of the market 
model varies widely in the literature. For example, Lambert and Larcker (1985) used as few 
as 60 observations in their study, while Dodd et al. (1984) used 600 values when estimating 
their model. Strong (1992) noted that in practice, there is a trade-off between increasing the 
105 McKillop and Hutchinson (1987) used monthly prices data from a sample of 27 stocks during the period 
1979 to 1984 and a Dublin stockbrokers' index (the J+E Davy index) and reported that the Dimson adjustment 
moved the beta estimates of Irish shares closer to one in the majority of sample cases. In a follow up study 
applying the same methodology, McCluskey (1990) used weekly price data from a sample of 41 stocks during 
the period 1984 to 1989 and noted that the Dimson adjusted betas measured approximately one in the majority 
of cases. Murray (1997) used daily price data on 79 companies quoted on both the official list and the unlisted 
securities market over the period 1987 to 1996. The author calculated ordinary unadjusted beta estimates and 
compared these with estimates using two adjustment techniques -a generalised form proposed by Cohen et al. 
(1983) and a specific adjustment technique proposed by Vasicek (1973). The author reported that when an 
adjustment technique is used, beta values for stocks in the Irish market clearly move toward one but concluded 
that there was `no justification for using a large number of leads and lags as any potential benefit may be lost 
because of estimation noise ' (Murray, 1997, p. 15). In the light of the reported studies on Irish data, which 
cover over two-thirds of the event study sample period employed in this thesis, and in view of Strong's (1992) 
observation that various simulated event studies using either Scholes-Williams' (1977) beta estimator or 
Dimson's (1979) aggregate coefficient estimator results in no improvement in either the specification or power 
of event study tests, a decision was taken to use the zero-one model to complement the market-model results. 
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number of observations to improve the statistical accuracy of the estimated a and 
0 and not 
going too far back from the test period in case the parameters of the model change across 
time. 
For the purpose of this study, 180 observations were used to estimate the market 
model parameters, using OLS. Specifically, the time from day t-200 to day t-21 was used as 
the estimation period for each dividend announcement. 
106 The daily abnormal returns were 
then averaged across the portfolio of firms, which increased, decreased or did not change 
their dividend level: 
n 
URS,, = (ii) EMi, t 
i=i 
[4.8] 
where, URp, t is the equally weighted average portfolio abnormal or excess return and p= DI 
for dividend-increasing firms, DD for dividend-decreasing firms and DNC for dividend no- 
change firms. The information content hypothesis (H1 on p. 157) predicts that the UR for 
shares in those sample companies that increase dividends will be positive, the UR for shares 
in those sample companies that decrease dividends will be negative and the UR for shares in 
those sample companies that do not change dividends will be zero. For the purpose of testing 
the hypotheses stated on page 157 the mean abnormal returns (and mean excess returns) for 
the sample firms for 41 days around the dividend announcement date (Day t) were computed. 
Standard deviations were also computed and a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis that the 
mean is equal to zero at the 5% level was also performed (p-values). The t-test statistic is: 
106 The decision to use 180 days was taken to maintain comparability with other UK studies in the area (e. g. 
Lonie et al., 1996). 
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t= (MEAN- 0) / (SD / yfi) [4.9] 
where, MEAN is the mean of the abnormal returns or the excess returns data, 0 is the 
hypothesized population mean specified in this one-sample t-test , SD 
is the sample standard 
deviation, and n is the sample size. 
To date, most research into the stock market response to dividend announcements has 
focused on large developed markets such as those in the US and the UK. In the US, dividend 
news is generally conveyed to investors as an isolated event, enabling researchers to 
investigate a "unique" dividend announcement effect (Aharony and Swary, 1980). However, 
in Ireland (and the UK where the same conditions occur) the identification of a "unique" 
dividend information announcement effect is particularly difficult, because dividends are 
rarely disclosed in isolation; their disclosure usually accompanies the announcement of 
company earnings, often along with the other events that may generate a certain amount of 
market noise. As was noted in Chapter 3 the occurrence of such confounding events around 
firm-specific announcements is a problem for event studies in general. The problem poses a 
particular difficulty for Irish studies given that dividend news is not disclosed in isolation, but 
is published at the same time as other data such as earnings. 107 Specifically, the companies in 
the sample employed in Chapter 6 announced their annual dividends and earnings on the 
same day resulting in the problem of separating the dividend announcement event from 
reported earnings. This contemporaneous release of both dividends and earnings news 
requires the interaction between dividend and earnings announcements to be analysed in 
order to observe the influence of different combinations of dividend and earnings 
107 One of the few studies to examine dividend signals in isolation was a US investigation by Aharony and 
Swary (1980), which identified 149 firms that made no earnings announcements for 10 days either side of the 
dividend news. Such cases are unusual, however, in countries such as Australia, Ireland and the UK. For 
example, in an analysis of 1787 dividend announcements made by UK companies between 1989 and 1993, 
Gunasekarage and Power (2002) detected fewer than ten instances where a company announced its dividend per 
share separately from its earnings per share. 
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announcements on share values. 
Disentangling the importance of the dividend component of the joint signal can be 
difficult (Kane et al., 1984; Easton 1991, Lonie et al., 1996; Gunasekarage and Power, 2002). 
Previous attempts at disentangling the news in a joint signal have focused on: (i) examining 
the abnormal returns for different dividend-earnings categories; and (ii) regression-based 
analysis where the interaction of the dividend-earnings news is modelled using dummy 
variables. Results from these investigations have been unanimous in their conclusion that 
both dividends and earnings information appear to convey important news to the stock 
market. However, empirical findings about which of the two signals is the more dominant 
have been less than conclusive and do not permit robust conclusions to be drawn about which 
of the two components of the joint signal is most important. For example, as was noted in 
Chapter 3, Chang and Chen (1991) re-examined the interaction regression model specified by 
Kane et al. (1984) and noted that the interaction effect was very sensitive to both the length of 
the announcement interval between the two signals and the period over which abnormal 
returns surrounding the announcements are cumulated. Chang and Chen's (1991) results 
suggested that the interaction becomes less obvious for a short event window, but is 
significant when daily abnormal returns are aggregated for long windows. 
In view of the fact that both dividends and earnings news is released 
contemporaneously in Ireland there is no event window between the dividend announcement 
and the earnings announcement in the sample employed in this study. Therefore, it was 
decided to deal with the interaction of the dividend-earnings news issue in the current study 
in two ways. First, in keeping with the approach used by Kane et al. (1984) (and applied by 
Easton (1991) for Australian data and Lonie et al., (1996) for UK data) the companies in this 
sample were divided into six classes, grouped according to various combinations of trends in 
dividends and earnings. The share returns of the groups of companies that exhibited the 
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different types of dividend-earnings combinations were examined to observe the influence of 
different combinations of dividend and earnings announcements on Irish share values. 
Second, empirical findings about which of the two signals is the more dominant is 
investigated using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) where the abnormal return on the 
announcement day is investigated in terms of company and signal characteristics. 
' 08 The 
ANOVA approach is different from the dummy-variable method employed by Kane et al. 
(1984). Specifically, it allows for more levels in the data (i. e. high, median and low) rather 
than the binary approach adopted with the dummy variables method. In addition it enables 
different variables (firm, sector, size) to be considered and interactions between more 
variables to be accounted for in the analysis. As a result, the ANOVA approach is adopted in 
this thesis. 
Finally, Strong (1992) identified a particular problem with event studies where sample 
firms have contemporaneous event dates in calendar time (e. g. circumstances where all 
sample firms make earnings announcements on the same day or in the same week). Strong 
(1992, p. 546) noted that `cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns in an event study] 
is likely to induce spurious inferences in particular samples'. Specifically, Strong (1992) 
asserted that where the event of interest is not spread diffusely over a long period in calendar 
time for different securities, averaging the abnormal returns across securities might distort 
any residual price variation that is unrelated to the particular type of event interest. The 
problem may be exacerbated when the event studies are clustered along industrial or size 
dimensions. Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 shows that event-date clustering was not evident in the 
current study. The reported dates for dividend and earnings news were spread diffusely over a 
long period in each year of the study. 
tos The ANOVA technique separates the total variation present in samples into separate independent variables (e. g. firm, sector, size, etc. ). Hayslett (1986) noted that it is a very powerful technique for researchers. 
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To summarise, a clean, previously un-examined extensive database of Irish equity 
prices, announcement dates of dividends and earnings was constructed in order to examine 
how Irish investors react to dividend announcements. The objective of this market-based 
event study is to seek an understanding of how Irish investors react to dividend 
announcements and whether or not the earnings announcement supplies corroborative 
evidence to the dividend announcement. Chapter 6 sets out the results of the study. 
4.7.3 The Interviews 
This section outlines how interviews were employed to investigate the complexity of 
the findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6 and to clarify inconsistencies in the postal survey 
responses. The process of selecting the interviewees and the decisions taken about the 
conduct of the interviews are detailed in this section. 
This part of the study involved interviews with 20 financial directors to explore the 
question of how firms determine the amount of dividends to pay to shareholders, and to 
examine financial directors' perceptions about the relationship between dividend policy and 
firm value. Because of recent changes to the corporate taxation framework in Ireland, (see 
Chapter 2), the interviews also enquired about the influences which taxation has in 
determining payout ratios. In keeping with the research approach taken in the postal survey, 
the interviews considered whether responses to these topics differed between quoted and 
unquoted companies and across dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying firms. Finally, to 
obtain an alternative point of view, and to compliment the rest of the analysis, 4 financial 
analysts from leading Dublin stockbroker firms were interviewed. 
The interviews took place between December 2002 and May 2003. The interviews 
were based on the postal survey questionnaire (see Appendix 5.3), but in a semi-structured 
form. Collis and Hussey (2003) noted that the advantage of using a semi-structured 
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questionnaire format in the interview process 
is that it ensures that the interviewer focuses on 
certain key questions but allows interviewees to build on their replies thereby enhancing 
discussion about the questions raised. Although this approach may appear to impose a rigid 
structure on the interview the questions raised were sufficiently open-ended to allow 
the 
interviewees to participate in conversation. In accordance with the recommendations of 
Saunders et al. (1997) multiple questions were avoided to prevent confusion and uncertainty 
among the interviewees. 
In this thesis the semi-structured questionnaire was the basis of the interview guide 
(i. e. a list of questions/issues that were to be explored in the course of each interview). Patton 
(1990) noted that an interview guide ensures that essentially the same material is addressed 
during each interview; that comparable information is obtained; and that the process of 
interviewing a large number of people is made more systematic and comprehensive. The 
questions included in the guide were specifically shaped by a review of the literature 
documented in Chapter 3 together with the results of the survey questionnaire. The interview 
guide is shown in Appendix 7.2. The open-ended nature of the interview guide allowed for 
better exploration of replies; spontaneous commentary by interviewees; and facilitated 
additional questions that might enhance particular perspectives relating to specific areas of 
dividend policy. Although the same key questions were covered in each interview, given the 
open-ended nature of the discussions, the sequence in which the questions were asked 
inevitably varied as the order of questions essentially depended upon interviewee responses. 
This approach facilitated conversation within a particular dividend topic; did not restrict other 
related topics from emerging during the course of the interviews; and allowed for the 
introduction of topics and questions in a spontaneous manner. As a consequence the rapport 
established with each interviewee was excellent. 
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4.7.3.1 Sample Selection 
Finance directors in Irish companies from a range of sectors together with fmancial 
analysts from leading Dublin brokerage houses were selected for the interviews. There were a 
number of reasons for selections made. First, just over half of the financial directors selected 
for interview worked for companies that formed part of the sample of the chief executives of 
companies circulated in the postal survey conducted in September 2001.109 The interviews 
allowed the interviewer to follow up and probe further the responses obtained in the postal 
survey and to explore issues covered therein in greater depth. Second, financial directors, 
given their education, practical training and experience, could be expected to deal easily with 
questions concerning the formulation of dividend policy for their companies. Third, the 
interviews with financial analysts could be expected to compliment the discussions with 
finance directors by focussing on whether dividends are relevant to share values and provide 
signals of future prospects; these discussions took place in the context of the event study 
results. 
The interviewees were personal contacts and former colleagues in the accountancy 
profession now working in industry or brokerage inns. Both listed and unlisted firms were 
targeted to focus on any substantive differences in attitudes to dividends between the two, in 
terms of the assumed relationship between dividend policy and firm value, as well as 
signalling, specific tax-related issues and more general perceptions. In keeping with the 
research approach adopted in the postal survey the views of Irish finance directors in: (i) 
dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying companies; and (ii) companies which have 
recently changed their dividend payout policy and those which have not, were obtained. 
109 There were 9 interviewees who worked for companies not included in the questionnaire sample in Chapter S. 
Thus, 11 of the interviewees' firms had participated in the postal survey. An inspection of the comments from 
the two groupings revealed no major differences in responses; thus, chapter 7 does not report their views 
separately. 
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Telephone calls were made to each of the 20 financial directors selected requesting 
interviews and the heads of research at 4 major Dublin stockbroker firms. The telephone 
conversations provided an outline of the research topic and highlighted in a broad sense the 
types of questions to be raised. All interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality. A number 
of interviewees were concerned that because their companies never pay dividends they might 
have nothing relevant to discuss. These interviewees were assured that the very fact that their 
fines did not pay dividends made their views on dividends particularly relevant to the 
research project. Two interviewees requested a copy of some prior Irish research work 
undertaken in the dividend area. A copy of the paper presented by the researcher at the Irish 
Accounting and Finance Association 2002 annual conference at NUI Galway reporting the 
results of the postal survey was forwarded to both. 
Follow up e-mails confirmed the date, time and venue for each meeting and reminded 
the interviewees that the interview would be tape recorded, but that this would not occur if 
the interviewee was uncomfortable with the tape or did not give permission (see Appendix 
7.1). All interviewees displayed a great willingness to participate and all meetings were 
conducted at their corporate headquarters. 
4.7.3.2 Conduct of the Interviews 
In preparation for each interview background information concerning market 
capitalisation (for quoted companies); capital structure; industry sector; turnover; 110 
profitability; dividends paid; number of shareholders (for unquoted companies) and numbers 
employed'' was collected for all of the companies in the sample. In addition, the most recent 
110 Given the nature of the financial services sector, no data could be used as a comparable measure of turnover. 111 For the larger companies in the sample this information was obtained from the Business and Finance (2002) 
Top 1,000 list of companies. For the smaller companies the details were obtained from the Irish Companies 
Office where available and where the information was not available in the Companies Office the details were 
recorded at the interview. 
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annual reports together with recent financial press commentary for each company were 
scrutinised in order to come to an understanding of the current problems/issues confronting 
the interviewees. 112 This preparatory work facilitated introductions and helped to develop a 
rapport with each interviewee. At the commencement of each interview the guarantee of 
confidentiality was re-iterated and interviewees were assured that no prior academic or 
theoretical knowledge of the dividends phenomenon was required, nor was any specific 
taxation knowledge expected. It was emphasised that the objective was to ascertain the 
personal perspective of each interviewee on the dividend phenomenon. The approach adopted 
established a cordial and very relaxed atmosphere during each interview and all of the 
interviewees indicated that they were willing to provide further help if required! 13 
The interview meetings ranged from one hour and fifteen minutes to one hour and 
fifty minutes in duration, and explored the perspectives of interviewees relating to the three 
broad areas identified in the interview guide i. e.: (i) the determination of dividend policy; (ii) 
the role of dividend signalling; and (iii) the effects of taxation on dividend payouts. The use 
of the tape recorder increased the accuracy of the data collection process and allowed the 
interviewer to be more attentive to the interviewee. For the ten interviewees who did not 
wish to be tape-recorded manuscript notes were taken during each meeting. All interviewees 
allowed the researcher time to remain at their corporate offices immediately after the 
interviews to facilitate the interviewer in documenting the notes taken during each meeting. 
The manuscript notes written up at that point facilitated the identification of the key 
responses and ensured accurate documentary summaries of data and the recording of the 
interviewer's general observations of the meeting. 
112 Annual reports for all listed companies are maintained in the Dublin City University library. For each 
unlisted company the company file at the Irish Companies office was reviewed where available. 113 Subsequent to the interviews two of the interviewees e-mailed details of dividend elections by shareholders 
on various issues such as those electing for scrip dividends and those electing for high and low tax credit dividends. 
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4.7.3.3 Post Interviews Process 
Following each tape-recorded interview the tape was played in the interviewer's car 
while travelling back to the interviewer's office. 
"4 On return the tape was transcribed 
immediately and while the transcription process was being undertaken notes identifying 
recurring replies from the interviews were separately recorded. Every interviewee was given 
a specific alphabetic code for ease of reference (see Table 7.1) and each of the transcripts 
were read in conjunction with the notes taken during and after each interview. All transcripts 
together with the manuscript notes taken at each meeting were then scrutinised to ensure 
complete knowledge of the data. 
The first reading of each interview transcript was undertaken with the tape of the 
interview running. The key points that emerged from that review were summarised and 
recorded under the relevant sections of the interview guide. Saunders et al. (1997) noted that 
such an approach allows the researcher to formulate the data into thematic categories; a 
process that assists the later recovery of data categorised under the same theme. A further 
reading of all transcripts was undertaken, again with each tape running, in order to ascertain 
if any new perspectives or apparent contradictions in the replies from interviewees on 
specific issues could be established. ' 15 There were no additional perspectives identified and 
no conflicts with the data that had been documented at the earlier stage of the process were 
apparent. This second reading facilitated the preparation of detailed data summaries that 
highlighted emerging core views on various dividend issues amongst interviewees. 
After eight separate interview transcriptions were read in depth repetition in the 
replies of interviewees became apparent. Despite that observation the identification of new 
114 The data analysis for the 10 interviews where no tape recording took place was similar except that those 
steps involving listening to tapes were omitted. 
115Miles (1979) noted that searches for "negative evidence" provide substantial protection against the 
presentation of unreliable or invalid evidence. 
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perspectives on the data during the analysis of the remaining interviews was not prejudiced 
and care was taken to ensure that there was no attempt to make the data fit the perspectives 
that were previously observed. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that after each interview is transcribed, matrices 
summarising the essential replies identified in each interview should be drawn up in order to 
highlight core findings. The authors noted that matrix presentations facilitate the 
identification of predominant views and patterns in the interview data and assist the research 
process by distinguishing the relative incidence of different perspectives. In this thesis, the 
preparation of simple manuscript matrices for each interview displaying the predominant 
views emerging provided a means of interacting with the data. The process also sustained the 
search for the identification of apparent contradictions in the predominant views emanating 
from the data. Although the matrices were excessively detailed initially, they were reduced 
gradually, systematically and progressively into essential findings, by splitting the interview 
data according to the three potentially influential categories (i. e. dividend determination; 
signalling issues; taxation aspects). This process provided the first draft of reportable 
findings. 116 
In September 2003 all of the transcripts were read again and the matrices reviewed 
and a final draft of reportable findings was prepared independently of the earlier draft. Both 
drafts were compared to ascertain if any new insights had been ascertained. These were then 
again reduced gradually and combined into prominent observations in order to collapse the 
data into manageable data sets. The prominent observations that emerged formed the basis of 
116 At that stage these preliminary findings were presented by the researcher in a conference paper at The Irish 
Accounting and Finance Association 2003 annual conference at the Institute of Technology, Tallaght, Dublin. 
Considerable comment and feedback was obtained from conference participants. The comments and suggestions 
made were immediately documented and placed in the transcripts file. 
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the findings reported and discussed (with relevant quotations) in the analysis presented in 
Chapter 7. 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter set out the research methodology and methods underpinning the present 
study. It identified the core philosophical assumptions that guided decisions about the 
research approach for the empirical investigation of dividend decisions by Irish companies. 
Several academics have recently argued that research into the dividend puzzle should take a 
different course than the capital market based approaches of the past. In particular, these 
authors have noted that the use of complex econometric models to test the dividend 
phenomenon may no longer be appropriate. Specifically, the authors recommend that it is 
important to augment quantitative studies of the dividend phenomenon with different 
empirical approaches. Typically, such approaches offer insights into the behavioural aspects 
of dividends research and permit the triangulation and validation of capital market based 
studies. This thesis responds to these expectations and adopts both a capital market based 
approach and a behavioural perspective to the empirical investigation of dividend decisions 
by Irish companies. In this context the empirical work focuses on the triangulation involved 
in using a questionnaire survey in Chapter 5, a market-based event study in Chapter 6, and 
interviews in Chapter 7. 
128 
CHAPTER 5: SURVEY EVIDENCE: IRISH MANAGERS' VIEWS ABOUT 
DIVIDEND POLICY 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the views of Irish corporate managers regarding dividend 
policy using a questionnaire survey sent to the chief executives of 
Irish companies. It seeks to 
explain: (i) how Irish firms determine the amount of 
dividends to pay to shareholders; (ii) 
perceptions of Irish managers about the relationship 
between dividend policy and firm value, 
in particular whether belief in the `signalling' concept is widely held; and 
(iii) the role of 
earnings, risk preferences and tax clienteles 
in an Irish context when payout ratios are being 
determined. The chapter also examines whether responses to these topics differ between 
quoted and unquoted firms, dividend paying and non-dividend paying companies and across 
companies which have changed their dividend. The central objective of the survey 
is to 
ascertain whether Irish corporate managers believe that dividends are relevant to share 
valuation. 
Data were obtained from a mail survey sent to the chief executives of the top 1,000 
Irish companies. Based on 269 usable responses, the empirical results highlight several clear 
patterns in the general attitudes of Irish firms to dividend policy as well as a number of areas 
where specific differences in perceptions exist across the respondent groups. 
The approach in this chapter surveys managers of Irish companies and thereby 
directly gauging their perceptions regarding the factors that determine dividend levels. To 
date, very little is known about the dividend payout policies of Irish firms. The few studies 
that have been undertaken are either based on small samples or were conducted more than 10 
years ago. 117 As Chapter 2 indicated there has been significant growth in inward investment 
117 As was explained in Chapter 3, the published empirical evidence is consistent with Irish companies having a 
policy of dividend stability. Stewart (1987), Barrett and Cotter (1990) and Green and Mcllkenny (1991) provide 
evidence from an analysis of published financial data - at both the aggregate and individual firm level - which 
supports the contention that the Lintner (1956) model is descriptive of the dividend policies pursued by Irish 
companies. Green and Mcllkenny (1991) found the constant term in the model to be statistically insignificant, 
whilst Barrett and Cotter (1990) suggested that there appeared to be a strong tendency for Irish companies to 
maintain dividends at constant levels. 
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in Ireland over the past decade and Irish institutional investors have reduced their exposure to 
Irish equities during that period. In such an environment, the attitude of Irish managers 
is of 
particular interest given the changed pattern of foreign 
investor participation in the Irish stock 
market. Irish managers' attitudes to dividend policy may have changed since the previous 
studies were undertaken, given the change to a more globalised shareholder base 
in recent 
years. Finally, the recent changes in the Irish system of company taxation (including the 
introduction of the dividend withholding tax and the new 12.5% rate of Corporation Tax) 
may have had a profound impact on the way in which Irish firms determine dividend policy 
and so the taxation issue is also explored. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 5.2 sets out 
an analysis the survey responses while Section 5.3 provides a test for non-response bias. 
Section 5.4 presents the research findings and compares these findings with prior empirical 
evidence. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises the main conclusions. 
5.2 Analysis of Survey Responses 
The survey yielded a total of 285 replies of which 269 were usable (a 26.9% response 
rate). Table 5.1 provides an analysis of all the usable responses, supplies a breakdown of the 
sample by sector and shows that respondents were drawn from companies with a range of 
different characteristics and operating across a large variety of industrial sectors. 
The table shows that a similar number of quoted and unquoted firms responded (132 
and 137 respectively). A majority (66%) of these firms pay dividends and most of these had 
changed their dividend level in the financial year prior to the survey. A particular feature of 
the results presented in the table is the high number of companies that do not pay dividends; 
91 (or 34.0%) of the respondents had a payout ratio of zero. This finding may not be 
surprising in view of the unprecedented high growth levels achieved by Irish industry 
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throughout the period which may have encouraged firms to retain cash for investment rather 
than to pay out funds to investors. 
' is 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Questionnaire Respondents 
Sector Tota Quoted Unquoted Dividend Dividend Dividend Dividend 
I Paid Unpaid Changed Unchanged 
Building/ Construction 
24 7 17 15 8 15 8 
Energy 
9 2 7 5 4 5 3 
Banking/Financial 
Services 33 21 12 24 9 21 9 
Communication/ IT 
30 12 18 13 17 13 13 
Manufacturing/ 
Packs in 52 33 19 39 13 37 14 
Storage/ Transport 
10 4 6 6 4 1 9 
Healthcare/ Medical 
21 16 5 14 7 14 6 
Retail/ Distribution 
43 13 30 28 15 26 14 
FooWUrmLV rignouwuiwb 
35 20 15 27 8 19 15 
Tourism/Leisure 
10 3 7 5 5 3 6 
Other 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 269 132 137 177 91 155 98 
Note: The table provides details about the 269 usable responses to the questionnaire survey. The disaggregated 
totals do not always add up to 269 because the required information was omitted by some of the respondents. 
The quoted/unquoted characteristic was determined by responses to the question `Is your company quoted on a 
stock exchange? '; the dividend paid/dividend unpaid characteristic was based on responses to the question 
`Does your company pay an annual dividend? ', while the dividend changed/dividend unchanged characteristic 
was determined by responses to the question `Has the level of the dividend changed recently? ' 
An analysis of Table 5.1 reveals that firms from most key industrial sectors are 
represented in the sample. The "Manufacturing and Packaging" sector provided the highest 
number of respondents (52 replies) while the "Wholesale, Retail and Distribution" and "Food 
Drink and Agribusiness" sectors were next with 43 and 35 respondents respectively. The 
1e This figure is however, considerably lower than the 79.2% of US firms reported not to pay a dividend in 
1999 by Fama and French (2001). Chowdhury and Miles (1987) report that only 0.9% of UK firms failed to pay 
a dividend in 1978, whereas six years later the figure had risen to almost 10%. The authors suggested that such a 
rise might have resulted from the UK Government's decision to abolish dividend controls in 1979. The rise may 
also have been associated with the severe economic recession in the UK during the early 1980s. 
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"Banking and Financial Services" sector provided 33 respondents while the "Healthcare and 
Medical" sector provided 21 respondents. The sectors that provided the lowest number of 
usable responses were "Energy" with nine and "Others" with two. Overall, the range of 
sectors represented in the sample suggests that the results of this study are based on responses 
from a wide cross-section of Irish industries. 
Examination of the respondent numbers reveals several trends across and between the 
various sectors. For example, other than the "Banking and Financial Services", 
"Manufacturing and Packaging", "Healthcare and Medical" and "Food, Drink and 
Agribusiness" industries, a majority of respondents from every sector work in unquoted 
firms. In addition, with the exception of the "Communications and IT" and "Tourism" 
sectors, a majority of firms in every sector paid a dividend. Finally, in 7 out of the 11 sectors 
a majority of firms reported changing their dividend in the past. 
5.3 A Test of Non-Response Bias 
The research methodology literature on survey samples noted that researchers must 
exercise caution when drawing inferences from the results of mail questionnaires in 
circumstances where a large proportion of those in the survey sample do not reply to the mail 
questionnaire, or where those who do reply fail to complete all the questions in returned 
questionnaires. A low response rate may lead to substantially biased interpretations of the 
findings of survey samples. The presence of non-response bias, if it exists, suggests that the 
viewpoints of non-respondents are significantly different from those of respondents (Wallace 
and Mellor, 1988). Section 5.2 noted that the usable response rate in this research is 26.9%. 
However, in the research methodology literature there is no consensus on what type of 
response rate is "proper" or "satisfactory". For example, a return of 25% to 30% of the 
distributed questionnaires is considered large enough in Saunders et al. (1997). However, 
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Wallace and Mellor (1988, p. 132) note that it not unusual to find low response rates and 
researchers `normally content themselves with returns as low as 30% to 50%'. As far as the 
response rate of the current survey is concerned, it meets the average proposed in the research 
methodology literature and is above the average for similar type studies. 
The conventional method for testing non-response bias is to compare mean responses 
for one or more variables of interest returned by respondents in later weeks with those of a 
random sample of respondents drawn from the returns of the earlier weeks, to identify if there 
exists any significant difference between the two sets. Wallace and Mellor (1988) suggested 
that such an analysis is necessary because `it has been found that respondents who send in 
their questionnaires very late are roughly similar to non-respondents' (Oppenheim, 1966, 
p. 34). Therefore, the responses to the questionnaire in this study were divided into two 
groups: those replies received within the first month (i. e. on or before 7th October 2001) were 
placed in the first group, while the remaining questionnaires were included in the second 
group. The first group consisted of 156 usable responses while the second group comprised 
of 113 usable responses. 
Table 5.2 provides details of the test for non-response bias. The table summarises the 
responses between those received on or before 7th October 2001 (Early) and those received 
after that date (Late). Each group is analysed between: (i) quoted and unquoted companies; 
(ii) dividend-paying and non dividend-paying companies; and (iii) firms which have recently 
changed their dividend payout policy and those which have not. A chi-squared test was 
performed for responses received early and late for those questions based on the categorical 
scale; i. e. whether the firm was quoted or unquoted; whether the firm currently paid a 
dividend; whether the level of dividends had changed since the previous year. 
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Table 5.2: Results of Non-Response Bias Tests 
Question I Answer I Early I Late I Total I x2 
Is your company or parent company Yes 79 52 131 
0.817 
quoted on the stock exchange? No 76 61 137 (0.366) 
Total 155 1 113 1 268 
Does your company or parent yes 113 64 177 6.799 
company pay a dividend on ordinary 
shares each year? No 43 48 91 (0.009) 
Total 156 112 268 
Has the level of dividend paid yes 96 49 155 1.629 
changed since the previous year? 
No 53 45 98 (0.202) 
Total 
149 94 253 
Note: The table provides details about the 269 usable responses to the questionnaire survey analysing the 
responses between those received on or before 7th October 2001 (Early) and those received after that date 
(Late). Each group is analysed between: (i) quoted and unquoted companies; (ii) dividend-paying and non 
dividend-paying companies; and (iii) firms which have recently changed their dividend payout policy and those 
which have not. The disaggregated totals do not always add up to 269 because the required information was 
omitted by some of the respondents. 
From the test results there was no difference at the 5% level of significance between 
the two sets of responses for quoted/unquoted companies or for those firms where the level of 
dividend paid changed since the previous year. However for dividend paying companies, the 
difference was significant. Intuitively, given the subject of the survey, it was expected that 
dividend-paying companies would be the most likely to return the completed questionnaires 
quickly. Furthermore, it may be that potential respondents in non-dividend paying firms may 
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have taken the view that as their firm does not pay dividends, the questionnaire survey was 
not relevant to their circumstances. Indeed, five of the unusable replies received were 
returned blank with covering letters or statements stating that their 
firms did not pay 
dividends and for that reason they could not complete the questionnaire. This pattern in 
responses needs to be borne in mind when the results are discussed later in the chapter. 
A further test of non-response bias was performed on the basis of splitting respondent 
firms (except banking and finance companies) on the basis of sales turnover. Quartiles were 
identified and responses analysed between those responses received early and those received 
late. The details of this analysis are presented in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Results of Non-Response Bias Tests for Non Financial Firms 
Firm Size Early Late Total 
Largest quartile 1 47 1 19 1 66 
2° g st quartile 1 30 1 27 1 57 
lazgest quartile 1 39 1 23 1 62 
quartile 1 23 1 28 1 51 
Total 1 139 1 97 1 236 
Note: This table provides details about usable responses to the questionnaire surv ey (except banking and finance 
companies) splitting respondent firms on the basis of sales turnover. Quartiles were identified and responses 
analysed between those responses received on or before 7th October 2001 (Early) and those received after that 
date (Late). 
The results in Table 5.3 show that the Chi-Square test of the numbers in this table 
indicated that there was no significant difference between early and late responses (x2 = 
5.080, p-value = 0.166) on the basis of firm size. Hence, in view of the findings presented in 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 it was felt that confidence in the results from the empirical analysis would 
be high. 
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5.4 Empirical Findings 
The mean response and the standard deviation of the response from the five-point 
Likert scale are presented in Tables 5.4,5.5 and 5.6. The five possible responses to each 
statement were "strongly agree" (assigned a value of 1 
for the analysis of the results), "agree" 
(2), "uncertain" (3), "disagree" (4) and "strongly disagree" (5). The assigned values indicate 
that the lower the mean score, the stronger the level of agreement with the statement in 
question. This information is supplied for the whole sample and for the different groupings of 
quoted and unquoted firms, dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying companies as well as 
dividend-changing and dividend-unchanging firms. For the different pairs of groupings a p- 
value is shown which tests the null hypothesis that the mean responses are equal. 
' 19 
5.4.1 Determinants Of Dividend Payments 
Table 5.4 shows the results from Section 1 of the questionnaire where respondents 
were asked about the factors that influenced their dividend decision. A number of points 
emerge from a visual inspection of this table. 
First, when the responses are analysed for the whole group, those replying displayed 
the highest level of agreement with the statement that firms should base current dividends on 
cash flow considerations. This statement had the lowest mean score of 2.02 and the lowest 
119 The extent to which the results of the independent samples t-tests in tables 5.4,5.5 and 5.6 depend on the 
assumption of normality of the means of these independent samples, was addressed by performing an equivalent 
set of non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) tests, which do not rely on the normality assumption. The results of the 
two sets of tests are broadly similar, with material disagreement regarding significance of the p-values occurring 
in only 5 cases out of 92. There are 3 cases where the t-test fords significance when the non-parametric test does 
not and 2 cases where the reverse is true. In only one of these 5 instances does the difference between p-values 
from the two sets of tests exceed 0.03. Specifically these cases are: question 1.04 which asks about whether a 
firm should avoid changes in its dividend rates that may have to be reversed in a year or so (quoted 0.04, 
unquoted 0.11); question 1.05 which asks about whether a firm should strive to maintain an uninterrupted record 
of dividend payments (quoted 0.03, unquoted 0.06); question 1.09 about whether a firm should base the current 
dividend on the firm's current earnings (quoted 0.04, unquoted 0.07); question 2.02 about whether dividend 
payments provide a signal of future earnings prospects (dividend changed 0.08, dividend unchanged 0.05); 
question 2.07 about whether a decrease in dividends will usually lead to a fall in share price (dividend changed 
0.06, dividend unchanged 0.04). 
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standard deviation of 0.74. The associated p-value of 0.00 allows rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the response mean is neutral. Such a result is consistent with the findings in a 
1989 survey of Irish quoted companies (Green et al., 1993) where respondents considered 
cash resources to be an important factor in the dividend setting decision. However, a 
significant difference emerges when the responses are separated into those from quoted and 
unquoted firms. Quoted companies' directors were significantly less inclined to believe that 
firms should base current dividends on their cash flow situation (mean score of 2.18 and 
standard deviation of 0.80) than were unquoted companies' directors (mean score of 1.87 and 
standard deviation of 0.65). This finding is not unexpected given that quoted companies' 
directors should have easier access to external funds, other things being equal. Indeed, in 
Chapter 7 interviewees of quoted firms confirmed that cash flow was not a major factor in the 
dividend setting decision. Moreover, quoted firms' desire to maintain dividends which was 
originally identified by Lintner (1956), may imply borrowing funds to make payouts rather 
than disappointing investors with a dividend cut. A significant difference also emerges when 
the responses are analysed between firms, which pay dividends, and firms that do not. As 
expected directors whose companies paid dividends were significantly less inclined to believe 
that firms should base current dividends on cash flow (mean score of 2.09 and standard 
deviation of 0.75) than were company directors whose firms did not pay dividend (mean 
score of 1.88 and standard deviation of 0.70). 
Second, there was support amongst respondents as a whole for the suggestion that 
firms should base current dividends on existing earnings levels (mean score of 2.12). As with 
the statement on cash flow/liquidity considerations, a significant difference emerges when the 
responses are assessed separately for quoted and unquoted firms but there was no significant 
difference on this issue between the views of managers in dividend-paying and non dividend- 
paying companies and between firms, which have recently changed their dividend payout 
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policy and firms that have not. Specifically, unquoted companies' directors 
believed strongly 
that firms should base dividends on their current earnings (mean score of 2.02) whereas 
quoted companies' directors appeared to be less certain on this issue, with a significantly 
higher mean of 2.23 emerging. This result is again consistent with the survey findings 
reported by Green et al. (1993), where respondents indicated that profitability (both current 
and expected) was the most important factor in the dividend decision. However, unlike those 
replying in the earlier study, respondents in the present survey were less certain about the 
view that a firm should base its dividend on expected future earnings (mean score of 3.02 and 
standard deviation 1.06). No significant differences were noted on this issue between quoted 
and unquoted companies; companies that pay dividends and those who do not; and, 
companies that recently changed their dividends. 
Third, the survey responses as a whole were generally consistent with Lintner's 
(1956) model. For example, there was strong support for the views that firms should maintain 
an uninterrupted dividend, avoid making changes in dividend rates that might have to be 
reversed in a year or so, and that a target payout ratio should exist (mean scores of 2.15,2.22 
and 2.23 respectively). All three statements had relatively low standard deviations, indicating 
some degree of consensus among firms. The associated p-values of 0.00 allow rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the population means are neutral. However, a significant difference 
emerges when comparing responses from quoted and unquoted firms. Quoted companies' 
directors provided significantly higher support for the view that firms should maintain an 
uninterrupted dividend than did those working for unquoted companies. This finding is not 
surprising, given that quoted companies may face greater pressure from current and potential 
investors to provide a tangible signal of their financial strength. Such companies may wish to 
avoid the adverse reaction to a dividend cut which has been identified in several studies of the 
share price response to a reduction in the dividend payment (Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
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Gunasekarage and Power, 2002). The finding is also consistent with the results reported by 
Baker et al. (1985) who recorded an average score of 2.26 for a similar question in their 1983 
survey of quoted firms. Predictably, although not significant, support for a stable dividend 
policy was weaker among firms that reported having changed their payout levels in the past, 
particularly so when views about reversing changes were sought. 
Fourth, there was support for the notion that a firm should be responsive to 
shareholders' preferences regarding dividends, with a mean score of 2.23 being recorded. 
One implication of this finding is that respondents were sympathetic to the view that 
clienteles of investors were attracted by particular dividend policies because of their need for 
a stable income stream (Keane, 1985). Irish corporate managers therefore appear to consider 
the views of their investor group when setting dividend policy. This evidence regarding the 
influence of shareholder views on Irish companies' dividend decision-making is similar to 
that reported for US firms by Baker et al. (1985) and for Australian firms by Partington 
(1985) and is confirmed by the findings of the interviews with financial directors in Chapter 7 
of this thesis. 
Fifth, despite agreeing that dividends should be maintained, respondents also 
supported the arguably contradictory view that the dividend should be allowed to fluctuate in 
accordance with current investment and financing needs. No significant differences were 
noted on this issue between quoted and unquoted companies and companies that pay 
dividends and those who do not. Baker and Powell (1999) reported that although nearly 90% 
of respondents in their 1997 survey believed that a firm's investment, financing and dividend 
decisions were related, the respondents held widely different views about whether a firm 
140 
should consider the dividend as a residual after financing desired investments from 
earnings. 120 
Finally, there were two statements showing mean scores of significantly above 3.00 
for the whole group. Specifically, respondents disagreed with the view that a firm should base 
its current dividend decision on last year's dividend or the amount of dividend paid by its 
competitors (mean scores of 3.13 and 3.69 respectively). Both statements had relatively high 
standard deviations, indicating very little consensus among firms. The associated p-values of 
0.04 and 0.00 allow rejection of the null hypothesis that the response means are neutral on 
these issues. This result is surprising when compared with respondents' views about 
investors' expectations. Indeed, in Chapter 7 interviewees of quoted firms are shown to 
believe that a starting position in setting the current year's dividend is the amount paid in the 
previous year. In addition, the interviewees indicated that they would not like their dividend 
to be out of line with the dividend paid by competitors, particularly competitors in Ireland 
and the UK. Indeed, responses to the questions in Section 2 of the questionnaire reported 
below strongly indicated that chief executives believe investors base their expectations about 
this year's dividend on last year's payment and on payout trends within their sector. It 
appears that, despite believing investors base expectations about this year's dividend on both 
last year's figure and sector trends, survey respondents did not regard those expectations as 
being very important in setting dividend policy. 
uo Partington (1985) concluded that on occasions when Australian firms did not have sufficient external funds 
available for investment they adopted a simultaneous policy for dividends and investment (i. e. the dividends 
were allowed to fluctuate in accordance with current investment and financing needs). 
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5.4.2 Market Signals 
Table 5.5 contains the responses to statements about whether dividends convey 
indications of future earnings to capital market participants. A number of important 
observations can be made from the table. 
First, the whole sample analysis shows that responses to the various statements 
averaged 2.46, suggesting that the respondents were generally supportive of the arguments 
raised in the dividend signalling literature. For example, respondents agreed that 
dividend 
payments provide a signal of future earnings prospects (mean score 2.56) which 
is the central 
theme dominating the current dividend signalling literature. 
121 Although the standard 
deviation of 0.94 indicated that the views of respondents on this issue varied considerably the 
associated p-value of 0.00 allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the response mean 
is 
neutral. Indeed, Irish managers appear as supportive about the signalling issue now as they 
did in 1989 when Green et al. (1993) reported support for the view that dividends are a very 
important mechanism for signalling management's expectations about future profitability. 
No significant differences were noted on this issue between the various groupings. This 
finding is particularly surprising for the quoted/unquoted dimension, because the former 
group of companies might have been expected to be more interested in signalling information 
to capital market participants in order to maintain or improve market value. The latter 
category, because of the small equity base and the preponderance of closely held shares, 
might have been expected to place less emphasis on the need for market signals. 
Second, respondents disagreed with the view that the market considered dividend 
announcements entirely independently of concurrent earnings announcements (mean score 
3.40). No significant differences were noted on this issue between the various groupings 
12'This finding contrasts sharply with the findings in Baker and Farrelly (1989), where only 3.3% of institutional 
investors were reported as believing past and current dividends to be a useful signal of future profitability. 
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although the standard deviations of almost 1.00 in each case indicated that the views of 
respondents on this issue varied considerably. However, the associated p-value of 0.00 allows 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the population mean is neutral. It is clear that respondents 
believe that the market does not consider dividend announcements separately from earnings 
news but instead views the two as joint signals. This observation confirms the empirical 
evidence reported in the academic literature for larger markets (Kane et al., 1984; Easton, 
1991; Lonie et al., 1996) and supports both the results of the event study and the findings of 
the interviews reported in Chapters 6 and 7 of this dissertation. 
Third, although respondents agreed with the conclusions of previous empirical studies 
that dividend changes convey unanticipated information to the market, the level of 
concurrence is considerably lower than that reported in Baker and Powell (1999). In 
particular, respondents agreed that a rise (fall) in dividend is typically associated with a share 
price increase (decrease) with mean scores of 2.78 and 2.56 respectively. However, the 
standard deviations of almost 1.00 in each case indicated that views on these issues varied 
considerably but the associated p-values of 0.00 in each case allow rejection of the null 
hypothesis that the response means are neutral. The figures on both of these questions reflect 
significant differences in the responses from various sub-groups of firms. For example, the 
responses from the quoted companies to the statement that a rise in dividend was typically 
associated with a share price increase was neutral at 3.02, whereas the mean response for 
unquoted companies was more in agreement at 2.55; this difference was significant at the 5% 
level. This position is confirmed by the findings reported in Chapter 7 where quoted company 
financial directors indicated that they would not expect the share price to rise (fall) with the 
dividend announcement. In particular, they confirmed that a dividend cut would not be used 
to convey bad news to the market; investors would be informed about poor trading conditions 
in advance of the dividend announcement. 
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Fourth, when the responses in Table 5.5 are analysed for the whole group, those 
replying displayed the highest level of agreement with the statements concerning investors' 
expectations. In the opinions of respondents, these expectations were based on several 
variables, most notably last year's dividend and forecast earnings (mean scores of 2.06 and 
2.27 respectively). Respondents strongly believe that the reaction of the market to an increase 
or decrease in dividends depends on investor expectations (mean scores of 2.08 and 2.17 
respectively) and that investors based their expectations about this year's dividend, albeit to a 
lesser extent, on payment trends within their sector, on current economic conditions and last 
year's earnings (mean scores of 2.32,2.32 and 2.38 respectively). The standard deviations 
recorded for each of these responses indicate that there was considerable consensus on these 
issues among respondents. The associated p-values allow rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the response means are neutral. There were a number of differences in the responses to these 
statements from the various groupings examined. Although the mean scores for quoted firms 
were higher than for unquoted companies, the p-values which result from a test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean responses are equal were greater than 0.05. The average responses 
from firms which pay dividends were in most cases higher than those from non dividend- 
paying companies. The only exceptions occurring were for: the reaction of the market to an 
increase or decrease in dividends; investors' use of the prior year's dividend; and, current 
earnings as the basis for their expectations of current year dividends. The overall results 
based on this analysis suggest that conventional signalling notions are supported more 
strongly by firms without recent experience of paying a dividend. The responses from firms 
that changed their dividends were in most cases higher than for firms that did not change their 
dividend. 
Finally, there were mixed views about whether: (i) investors perceive dividends to be 
less risky than capital gains; and (ii) investors perceive a change in the existing dividend 
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4 
payout to be more important than the actual amount of dividends. Responses to the 
statements produced mean scores (standard deviations) of 2.38 (0.87) and 2.64 (0.99) 
respectively. Conventional finance theory (e. g. Gordon, 1959; Fama and Miller, 1971) 
predicts strong support for both these statements. However, the results in this survey are 
consistent with the findings in Baker et al. (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999), where 
responses to similar questions produced equally indeterminate results. 
146 
Y v 
Ö O% 
O 
w 
Icý O 
s 
(D 
O 
1l, 
O 13: O IC? O 
N.. 
Ö 
0 
Ö 
O 
Ö 
p 
C 
C 
O 
C 
c_ý 
N 
N 
O O N O 
U 
931 7D 
O 
0 
"q O 
%0 
clý 
O 
;Z 
O 
r- 
%D 
O 
Z$ ch ein 
R O O O O - 0 0 0M 
Q el 
Ö ä C %0 
N 
00 cl- r- CO 
M Q 
M om 
Co 
ý N 
N N N N 
N 
N N fV N , N 
vý 
M +a 
«E 
Ci 
Z 
1O 
Ö 
`O 
Ö Ö 
;Z 
O 
1ý 
Ö 
00 a; 't 
11 
b 
O Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
AU aýi O - N N e0+1 
M ý aý vl v1 v1 
R 
N 
ep T 
N N N N N N N N N N N N ell 
"3 
7 
ý 
ö 
N 
O 
Op 
O 0O 
'. O 
M 
N 
'O N - 
1F 
p - 
" 
S 1 : 
4 ö ö 0 ö ö ö ö ö d ö ö 
o0 . ö 
'v 
A b 
ö 
Vgl, 
O 
3 
ö 0 
IIj 
0 
b 
ö 
0 
ö 0 N `D ö 
^ 
°' 
00 
0 
00 M N 
O d 0 d - - r. 
N ýY "7 h Clo N .. " N N N N N N 
M 
N N 
N M 
Ct) y 
i 
'CJ 
aý+ 
V1 
0 
0 
O 
N 
0 
OA 
'. D 
Ö 
'. O 
N 
Ö 
n 
Ö 
0MO 
Ö 
N 
Ö 
N 
Oý 
Ö 
o0 
Oý ONE, O' 
d 
0 
:° S ß+ Q 11 Ö M N N el (D % 
O O Ö Ö 
A G V N N lV 
M 
N N N 
lq: 
0 
M 
N 
M 
IIR 
N 
'. O 
lle 
0 
N 
N 
O . 
ý. 
C N N M 
p " 
Y G 
ý a ö ö g 
ý 
O^0 'MV 
ý $ ý 'ýt vy 
ýO 
N 
c O c c c c 
ö d d ä ö ö d 
C 
C d Z 
N N N 
e 
N M 
N N N 
h 
N 
N 
N 
ý ao 
N 
N 
r_ 
MG N 
N N M 
,Q 
vj 
O p 
O 
N 
Ö 000 Ö Ö 000 Ö 00 Ö 
ä ä. 
0 
Ö d Ö Ö Ö ti 
a 00 
N - N 
N N 
M h N 00 N Ö 
c 
- 
'V t N N N N N ý`1 N M ;t : My 
a 
Y 
> $ 
8 8 S 8 $ 8 8 $ S S $ 
p 
g "R 
O O C 0 ci O O c O O Oý "v 
Q 
402 
ýD 
0 
NO 
O 
b 
O 
b 
Ö 
n 
p 
N 
0 
00 S 
Oý 
d 
'E 
Oý p 0l p p 0 
"-ý C C 
+F C 
w 
40 (: ý 
00 
9 , 
fry, N 
ti 
N 
ri 
N 
ei 
00 00 
M %0 IC) 
%0 00 
4 
d6, 
om 
w 
G N N N N N ý". ý 
N 
N N 
n 
N 
3p 
N 
N 
N .. 
F V 
Mw 
n ý 
yý y .ý ' X ,ý m VV S « J . } U a ,C Fw 
-9. u yO uO 7 id Q G6 
g` 9 ý te 5 
o 
4' 
3 
C 
i$ 
ý{ q L 
Em 
; 
eýv 
Y 
a , b "S b 
y 
aý a 
0 
qG 
sF 
u Y 
ý' 
u b 
G 
aý+ C 
qv 
Y V Vl ý .G . 'r1 . 'C.. "ý .. 
0+ ý-' 
F `ý1' S Y 
S 
4U. 
ü 
y } ý 
Y1L 
C XQO 
Ö CUC p G 
,. 
C CO. 
G "ý C .w u 
S 
211 
CC 
"a F U ý"' 'p ,[ F' 7S 
5ö 
uL Yi 
K ý 
S >S >S > > S "ý gý ýp 'C ý,, u y vu vu 5v Sv Sv 5v v at0i Ä dH d . 
oe A' '° c ¢ ti 2 
V 
OL 
I' 4 
w 
i d 
i C 
i 4 
d 
A 
u 
U, 
I) 
eo 
G .y 
Q' 
53 
N 
N 
i 
.o 
N 
w 
ZO 
u 
y 
0 
N 
y 
i4+ 
N 
H 
w 
y 
I 
H 
1ý 
2 
A e; 
ý. O 
dN 
, ca -S 
1,32 % 
U 
11 y 
b7 
cts 
r- 
5.4.3 The Influence of Taxation on Dividend Policy 
Table 5.6 summarises responses to nine statements regarding the influence of the Irish 
tax system on dividend policies and perceptions. As was explained 
in Chapter 2, Ireland 
potentially provides an interesting setting for examining this question, as taxation policy 
has 
changed in recent years, thereby possibly influencing 
investors' desire for receiving their 
returns in the form of capital gain. However, respondents 
disagreed with the notion that the 
tax status of the company's shareholders should affect dividend levels (mean score of 
3.63, 
standard deviation 0.92 and p-value 0.00). This result does not support the 
US-based research 
findings in Baker et al. (1985) and Baker and Powell (1999). Nevertheless, a significant 
difference emerged when the responses were separated into those from quoted and unquoted 
firms. Quoted companies' directors were significantly less inclined to believe that firms 
should determine dividends on the basis of the tax status of the company's shareholders 
(mean score of 3.78 versus 3.49 for unquoted firms). Considering that it would be nearly 
impossible for quoted companies' directors to know the tax status of its shareholders, this 
result is not unexpected. Consistent with prior research respondents appeared unsure about 
whether investors in high (low) tax brackets are attracted to low (high) dividend shares (mean 
scores of 2.80 and 2.74 respectively). The associated standard deviations of 0.99 and 0.96 
respectively are the highest recorded in the table, indicating the diverse nature of views on the 
issue. However p-values of 0.00 and 0.00 respectively allow rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the population means are neutral suggesting that respondents appeared aware of the 
clientele effect. Support for the notions of a dividend clientele was also significantly stronger 
among firms that had not paid dividends or changed their dividend, suggesting that recent 
experience of the dividend-paying process in Ireland alters corporate perceptions of the likely 
impact of the payment. An analysis of the responses to both statements for quoted and 
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unquoted firms revealed that the means for the former group was higher than for the latter, 
suggesting that taxation issues were more of a concern for unquoted companies, a result 
confirmed by the interviews reported in Chapter 7. 
Respondents agreed that recent changes to the taxation regime in the Irish Republic, 
such as the treatment of scrip dividends as income; the introduction of a dividend withholding 
tax; and, the introduction of the new 12.5% rate of Corporation Tax, made dividend payments 
less attractive to shareholders. Intuitively the effect of these innovations on the tax 
differential between capital gains and dividends might have been expected to favour a high 
retention policy, thereby saving investors tax and leading to an appreciation in share values 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, (1979). 122 This may explain why such a high number of the 
sample firms do not pay dividends. Respondents also agreed that both the new lower capital 
gains tax rate of 20 % for investors and the abolition of tax credits for dividends had 
improved the relative attractiveness of capital gains over dividend income. These statements 
had the lowest mean scores of 2.09 and 2.44 respectively, and the second and fourth smallest 
standard deviations. The associated p-values of 0.00 and 0.00 respectively allow rejection of 
the null hypothesis that the population means are neutral. 
In contrast, respondents disagreed with the view that the recent introduction of a new 
capital gains tax treatment for employee share option schemes would lead to higher payout 
ratios (mean score 3.25 and the associated p-value of 0.00). The views of unquoted firms 
were slightly stronger on this issue. One possible explanation for this finding is that unquoted 
tu This result appears at odds with the views expressed about the statement that management should determine 
the annual dividend based on their perception of the tax status of the shareholders. One possible explanation for 
these findings lies in the tax clientele argument; it may be the case that Irish management do not explicitly factor 
tax considerations into their dividend decision-making, but recognise that investors tend to cluster around firms 
whose policies suit their particular tax circumstances (Elton and Gruber, 1970), a result confirmed by the 
interviews reported in Chapter 7. 
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firms may have doubts about introducing or expanding share option schemes without the 
prior approval of non-employee stakeholders. Typically, such approvals may be conditional 
on some reward for other company participants, such as a re-designation of existing 
shareholdings, a change in the firm's profit sharing arrangements, or, indeed, an alteration to 
the firm's dividend policy. 
Finally, the analysis of the responses for quoted and unquoted firms revealed that the 
mean responses of the former group were generally higher than the latter, suggesting that 
taxation issues were more of a concern for unquoted companies. This position is confirmed 
by the interview findings reported in Chapter 7.123 
123 The one exception to this general comment related to the statement about the effect of the reduced capital 
gains tax rate, but even here, the average response from the quoted firms of 2.09 was virtually identical to that 
from unquoted companies (2.08). 
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5.5 Conclusions 
The findings reported in this chapter suggest that several conclusions can be drawn 
about contemporary Irish dividend policy. 
First, taken as a whole, the survey responses were consistent with Lintner's (1956) 
early fieldwork. For example, three statements which achieved high levels of agreement 
suggested that firms should maintain an uninterrupted dividend, avoid making changes in 
dividend rates that might have to be reversed in a year or so and adopt a target payout ratio. 
Second, most respondents appeared to agree with the suggestion that dividend policy 
affects share values. In particular, they agreed that dividend payments provide a signal of 
future earnings prospects. No significant differences were noted on this issue between quoted 
and unquoted companies; companies that pay dividends and those who do not; and, 
companies that recently changed their dividends. Accordingly, the survey appears to provide 
support for theoretical models which indicate how dividends may provide a signalling 
mechanism to outside investors. The findings of the survey therefore support the Irish results 
reported by Green et al. (1993) more than a decade ago but the level of concurrence appears 
less supportive of the signalling mechanisms to outside investors as the findings of Baker and 
Powell (1999) for US firms. 
Third, respondents disagreed' with the view that the market considered dividend 
announcements entirely independently of concurrent earnings announcements. No significant 
differences were noted on this issue between the various groupings. It is clear that 
respondents believe that the market does not consider dividend announcements separately 
from earnings news but instead views the two as joint signals. This observation confirms the 
empirical evidence reported in the academic literature for larger markets. 
Fourth, there was strong support for the notion that a firm should be responsive to 
shareholders' preferences regarding dividends suggesting that respondents were sympathetic 
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to the view that clienteles of investors were attracted by particular dividend policies because 
of their need for a stable income stream 
(Keane, 1985). In addition respondents appear to 
accept that investors in high (low) tax 
brackets are attracted to low (high) dividend shares. 
Irish corporate managers therefore appear to consider the nature of their investor group when 
setting dividend policy. Support for the notion of a dividend clientele was also significantly 
stronger among firms that had not paid dividends or changed their dividend, suggesting that 
Irish corporate managers believe that they know the nature of their shareholder base and 
perceive that Irish investors discriminate between companies which pay dividends and those 
that do not in portfolio selection. 
Finally, in contrast with the findings of Baker and Powell (1999), the respondents to 
this survey hold relatively strong views about the impact of tax on dividend decisions. For 
example, respondents agreed that recent changes in the taxation regime in the Irish Republic 
make dividend payments less attractive to shareholders. These findings may explain why 
such a high number of the sample firms do not pay dividends. An analysis of the responses 
for quoted and unquoted firms suggested that taxation issues were more of a concern for 
unquoted companies, an observation that is confirmed by the interview findings reported in 
Chapter 7. 
The questionnaire used as a research instrument in this chapter has some obvious 
limitations. For example, while no non-response bias was detected for most categories of 
companies which took part in the survey, a significant difference based on whether or not a 
company paid dividends was detected; dividend paying firms tended to reply earlier. In 
addition, the number of prior questionnaire-based surveys of dividend policies against which 
to compare the results is limited. Also, there are a number of instances where the findings 
indicate apparent contradictions in the responses to the questions posed. For example, despite 
agreeing that dividends should be maintained, respondents also supported the arguably 
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contradictory view that the dividend should be allowed to fluctuate in accordance with 
current investment and financing needs. Chapter 7 of this thesis clarifies these 
inconsistencies. 
Nonetheless, the results appear to represent a useful extension to prior investigations 
of why Irish companies select particular dividend policies. To the extent that the study 
disaggregates the results according to the listed status of the company and the historical 
pattern of respondents' dividend behaviour, the findings are novel. In addition, the large 
sample size and the seniority of those responding makes the views expressed worthy of 
consideration. Finally, the transformation of the Irish economy since early work was 
conducted in this area suggested that further research on this topic was necessary. The current 
findings therefore appear to represent an enhancement of knowledge about the perception of 
dividends in a modem, high-growth, European context. 
The next chapter explores the signalling issue further using an event study 
methodology while Chapter 7 investigates and develops the issues considered in the survey 
via interviews with finance directors and analysts. 
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CHAPTER 6: EVIDENCE ON THE IRISH STOCK MARKET'S REACTION TO 
DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENTS 
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6.1 Introduction 
As was noted in Chapter 3, most research into dividend behaviour has focused on 
large developed markets such as in the US, the UK and Australia. These investigations have 
attempted to quantify how share prices respond to the publication of information about 
dividends in order to determine whether the news from the signal is favourable, unfavourable 
or non-existent; they also seek to examine whether firms' payout policies are influenced by 
the profile of their investor clientele. As was explained in Chapter 4 such studies encounter 
significant problems when the dividend news is not disclosed in isolation, but is published at 
the same time as other data such as earnings or capital expenditure plans. As will be 
explained in Section 6.4 disentangling the importance of the dividend component of the joint 
signal can be difficult (Kane et al., 1984; Lonie et al., 1996). Also, examining share price 
reactions may be difficult in smaller markets where equities are thinly traded; this issue will 
also be addressed in the current chapter. 
This chapter investigates how shares quoted on the Dublin Stock Exchange respond to 
company announcements about dividend payments. It examines the traditional "information 
content of the dividend" hypothesis with modifications appropriate to the Irish context. 
Specifically, the chapter considers whether the predictions of the `signalling' hypothesis 
appear to hold, or whether more recent findings suggesting that there is no information 
contained in dividend changes better characterise the Irish market. The question is of 
particular interest for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, very little is known about how the Irish stock market responds to changes in 
the dividend policy of Irish firms; no large scale studies have been published on this topic. 
Second, the context of the exceptional GDP growth experienced in Ireland over the past 15 
years offers a unique opportunity to examine whether dividend disbursements are viewed less 
favourably when companies are expanding at an exceptional rate. Third, by international 
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standards the Dublin Stock Exchange 
is small; most of the shares are thinly traded, and most 
quotes typically have large bid-offer spreads. 
However, as Chapter 2 explained, unlike 
smaller markets in developing countries, the 
Dublin Exchange is highly regulated and the 
rules for investor protection are similar to those that apply 
in the larger developed Western 
stock markets. By studying the relatively small 
Irish stock exchange, the role of market and 
firm size in explaining investors' response to dividend news can be investigated. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. Section 6.2 summarises the 
research approach and identifies the hypotheses to be tested. Section 6.3 describes the data 
while Section 6.4 presents the findings and compares the results with those reported in 
previous studies. Section 6.5 summarises the main conclusions and discusses their 
implications. 
6.2 Research Approach and Hypotheses 
Chapter 4 explained the research approach in detail and considered the 
methodological issues involved in an event study. This section of the chapter provides a brief 
summary of that approach and states the hypotheses to be tested. 
This study employs a conventional event-study methodology by examining the stock 
market reaction to the firm-specific news event of a dividend announcement. The analysis 
requires the actual share return to be compared with the expected share return around the 
period of the dividend announcement date in order to determine whether or not any stock 
market reaction has occurred. As Chapter 4 explained the identification of a "unique" 
dividend information announcement effect is particularly difficult, because In Ireland 
dividends are rarely disclosed in isolation; their disclosure usually accompanies the 
announcement of company earnings. The study deals with the interaction of the dividend- 
earnings news problem by in the first instance examining the share returns of the groups of 
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companies that exhibited the different types of dividend-earnings combinations and secondly 
by using an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) where the abnormal return on the announcement 
day is investigated in terms of company and signal characteristics. This examination will 
facilitate comment on whether or not corporate earnings figures provide information to 
market participants that appears to corroborate the message conveyed to the capital market by 
the dividend signal. Accordingly, in this part of the study, three hypotheses are tested as 
follows: 124 
Hl: The announcements of changes in dividend levels are associated with 
abnormal share returns; 
H2: The earnings announcement provides corroborative evidence to the 
dividend announcement; and, 
H3: Simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements interact with one 
another, to produce a joint effect, which gives rise to abnormal share 
returns ("an interaction effect'). 
6.3 Data 
As was explained in Chapter 4 daily share price data were obtained for all firms 
whose shares were quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange over the period from 1St January 1986 
to 3l't December 2001. This time span coincided with spells of recession, recovery and boom 
in the Irish economy and during the period there was a considerable influx of foreign direct 
investment into Ireland (see Chapter 2). Accordingly, the results should not be specific to any 
one stage in the business cycle, but reflective of all economic conditions. 
Dividends and earnings data were obtained for companies whose shares were traded 
124 These hypotheses are stated in their alternative forms for ease of understanding. 
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on the Dublin Stock Exchange and announced their annual dividends during the period from 
January 1986 to December 2001. The focus of the study was on annual rather than interim 
dividend data since statistical analysis and questionnaire survey evidence from managers 
suggest that dividend policy tends to be determined on a yearly basis (Watts 1973; Healy and 
Palepu, 1988; De Angelo et al., 1992; Green et al., 1993; McCluskey et al., 2003). Dividend 
per share rather than total dividend is used in this study for two reasons. First, the former 
measure is adjusted for equity issues, stock dividends and stock splits. 
125 Second, Edwards 
and Mayer's (1985) survey of British managerial attitudes to dividends reported that the 
convention in determining dividend policy is the maintenance of dividend per share not total 
dividends. 
To be included in the analysis, firms had to have announced at least 8 annual dividend 
payments over this 15-year period. 
126 Information on the amounts and the dates of the 
announcements of the dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) data were 
available from EXTEL cards, Datastrearn or Bloomberg. As was noted in Chapter 4, in all 
cases, the dates and amounts were cross-checked with the different sources and compared 
with reports in national newspapers to confirm that the correct information was being used. 
These criteria resulted in a sample of 50 Irish listed companies that made a total of 674 
dividend announcements over the sample period. These 50 companies represent 71% of the 
total number of firms quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange in 1987 and 85% of the total in 
2003; thus, dividend announcements for the vast majority of quoted firms were examined in 
this study. 
Descriptive statistics for the sample firms over the period are shown in Table 6.1. The 
125 Given the long period covered in the present investigation many such capitalisation changes will have taken 
place. 26 The decision to include such a criterion was somewhat arbitrary. It was taken in order to avoid the sample being dominated by firms which might be initiating dividends for the first time. The decision also ensured that 
the market was conditioned to the sample firms making dividend announcements. 
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table provides background details about each of the 50 sample companies. N is the number of 
dividend announcements for each firm included in the analysis. The size measure is the 
market capitalisation of each firm in millions of euro at 31st December 2001. The 
final 
column of Table 6.1 displays the reporting date for the dividend and earnings news in 2001. 
A visual inspection of Table 6.1 reveals that the sample companies were drawn from 
16 different sectors and varied in size from a low of E6m (Norish) to a high of ¬40,773m 
(Diageo). A wide mix of sectors is included ranging from manufacturing to exploration, 
indicating that the findings should not be specific to any one industry. The table also shows 
that 24 of the 50 companies made 15 annual dividend payments announcements over the 
period while only I had the minimum of 8. Therefore, the study will not be concerned with 
dividend initiations (Healy and Palpeu, 1988), which might elicit a differential market 
reaction from the normal change in dividend payout. Finally, a review of the reported dates 
for dividend and earnings announcements in 2001, displayed in the final column of Table 6.1, 
shows that dividend and earnings announcements were diffusely spread over the entire of 
calendar 2001. The reported dates for dividend and earnings announcements in every year of 
the study were diffused in a similar manner. Accordingly, there is no evidence of clustering 
on either calendar times, industrial or size dimensions. 
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Table 6.1: Details of the Sample Companies 
COMPANY N SECTOR SIZE E DATE 
Abbe 15 Construction 130 19 July 
AID 15 Banking 11,590 20 February 
A ex 14 Exploration 34 2° May 
An lo Irish Bank 15 Banking 1,306 28 November 
Arcon 13 Exploration 23 28 March 
15 Manufacturing 48 11 Aril 
Arnotts 15 Retail 130 30 March 
Bank of Ireland 15 Banking 11,632 10 May 
Barlo Grou 13 Manufacturing 149 24 May 
Bula 14 Ex loration 49 27 June 
CRII 15 Construction 10,431 6 March 
Dia eo 15 Food & Drink 40,773 6 September 
Dra on Oil 12 Exploration 210 15 March 
Dunloe Ewart 13 Property 147 22° March 
D er 12 Property 95 12 December 
Elan 10 Medical/Health 22,776 6 February 
FBD 11 Insurance 186 6 March 
F fes 15 Food & Drink 338 21" March 
Glanbia 12 Food & Drink 272 8 March 
Golden Vale 10 Food & Drink 232 16 February 
Grafton 15 Retail 594 9 March 
Greencore Grou 11 Food & Drink 509 30 November 
Green Pro erty 15 Property 821 28 February 
Heiton Holdings 15 Construction 176 5111 July 
- I. A. W. S 11 Food & Drink 928 19 September 
IFG 14 Insurance 197 29th Au t 
Ind endent News and Media 15 Media 1,327 28 March 
Irish Continental Group 13 Stora e/Trans ort 155 17 January 
Irish Life & Permanent 8 Banking 4,088 7 March 
IwP 13 Manufacturing 136 30 May 
James Crean 13 Distribution 8 12 Aril 
JS Do le Hotels Group 15 Hotels 552 11 July 
Kennrare Resources. 13 Exploration 57 11 April 
Ke Grou 12 Food & Drink 2,283 14 March 
Kin s an Grou 11 Manufacturing 690 22 March 
Mc Inerne Holdings 15 Construction 76 215E March 
Norish 15 Stora e/Trans ort 6 1u March 
0 lesb & Butler Group 12 Manufacturing 7 29th August 
Premier Oil 15 Ex loration 356 14 March 
Read x 15 Construction 150 8 March 
Rvan Hotels 15 Hotels 61 25 Anril 
F Seafield 12 Storage/Transport 12 2° March 
Smurfit 15 Paper and Packaging 2,297 27th Feb 
Tesco 15 Retail 28,741 10 April 
Tullow Oil 12 Exploration 504 5 April 
Ulster Television. 15, Media 235 8 March 
Uni-dare 15 Manufacturing 31 28 November 
United Drug 12 Medical/Health 364 O 'December 
Vislink 13 Telecommunications 23 29 March 
Waterford Wed ood 15 Manufacturin 797 6 March 
Note: This table provides background details for the companies in the sample regarding industry sectors, size (as 
measured by market capitalisation at 31 December 2001) and the number of dividend announcements made by 
each company in the sample period. Date is the reporting date for the dividend and earnings news in 2001. 
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Table 6.2 summarises the daily raw share returns earned by the sample firms over the 
sample period. 127 Three main findings emerge from an analysis of the table. First, there was 
a wide variety in the performance of the different companies over the period. For example, 
the lowest average daily return was -0.1% (recorded by Dragon Oil) while Grafton performed 
best, earning investors a mean raw return of 0.1% per day. A majority of companies (33) 
earned positive returns, on average, while a minority (17) performed poorly over the period 
1987-2001. This observation is not surprising since the time frame covered by the study 
includes one of the longest stock market booms in Irish history (see Chapter 2). 
Second, these average share returns mask a considerable amount of volatility in the price 
changes; the standard deviation figures vary from a low of 1.04% per day (for Ulster TV) to a 
high of 12.03% (Bula). Surprisingly, there appears to be no strong relationship between risk 
(as measured by standard deviation) and returns for the sample firms. Indeed, the riskiest 
share performance of Bula was associated with a mean return of -0.03% per day. This picture 
of volatile share performance is confirmed by an analysis of the daily maxima and minima 
values. For several companies, the gap between these values is sizeable, indicating that a 
number of large one-day price changes exist. This is especially true for exploration 
companies' shares which have been prone to a great deal of turbulence with rumours of 
several oil discoveries subsequently turning out to be unfounded. 
127 These descriptive statistics are based on daily share return data from the period January 1987 to December 2001. For some 28 of the companies, a shorter time span was employed because data were not available. 
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Table 6.2 Raw Returns for the Sample Companies over the Period 1987- 2001 
COMPANY MEAN SD MAX MIN SKEW KURT 
Abbe 0.0002 0.0232 0.2429 -0.2336 -0.298* 24.521* 
AIB 0.0006 0.0174 0.0922 -0.1562 -0.385* 6.484* 
Aminex -0.0006 0.0455 0.9904 -0.6931 2.838* 107.58* 
An lo Irish Bank 0.0006 0.0234 0.3279 -0.2066 1.011* 24.213* 
Arcon -0.0008 0.0478 0.5108 -0.4447 0.054 22.991* 
iah 0.0005 0.0254 0.2763 -0.3747 0.482* 29.170* 
Arnotts 0.0004 0.0164 0.3356 -0.3338 0.123* 100.61* 
Bank of Ireland 0.0007 0.0178 0.0931 -0.1335 -0.185* 4.409* 
Bar1o Grou -0.0004 0.0300 0.2744 -0.5411 -2.581* 49.224* 
Bula -0.0003 0.1203 0.6931 -0.6931 0.060 20.463* 
CRH 0.0006 0.0172 0.1019 -0.1998 -0.726* 11.795* 
Dia eo 0.0004 0.0173 0.1540 -0.2065 0.024 11.339* 
Dra on Oil -0.0010 0.0477 0.5416 -0.6491 -0.071 43.167* 
Dunloe Ewart -0.0001 0.0445 0.9491 -1.2528 -2.424* 244.93* 
D er -0.0001 0.0589 0.4137 -0.5596 -0.072 8.384* 
Elan 0.0008 0.0273 0.3079 -0.2348 0.543* 18.641* 
FBD 0.0004 0.0116 0.1137 -0.0916 0.591* 21.162* 
F es 0.0003 0.0226 0.1454 -0.2938 -0.242* 14.312* 
Glanbia -0.0001 0.0234 0.2697 -0.3725 -2.079* 45.651* 
Golden Vale 0.0001 0.0172 0.2877 -0.2877 0.861* 125.27* 
Grafton 0.0010 0.0233 0.3365 -0.2877 0.607* 50.89* 
Greencore (iron U. 000L u. uilý 0.0935 -0.1163 0.142* 183.92* 
Green Pro ertv 0.0004 0.0233 0.4637 -0.2924 0.637* 678.74* 
HeitonHoldings 0.0005 0.0251 0.2231 -0.2948 -1.058* 21.811* 
1, p W, S. 0.0007 0.0190 0.2183 -0.1861 0.115* 21.775* 
FC, 0.0004 0.0356 0.6022 -0.6391 -1.371* 90.942* 
Ind endent News and Media 0.0005 0.0201 0.1388 -0.3102 -2.059* 33.719* 
Irish Continental Group 0.0007 0.0169 0.2636 -0.1427 1.280* 35.973* 
Irish Life & Permanent 0.0009 0.0152 0.1903 -0.0782 1.622* 20.659* 
IWP 0.0001 0.0236 0.2719 -0.2426 -0.177* 25.395* 
James Crean -0.0006 0.0283 0.2412 -0.2949 -1.038* 20.483* 
Js Do le Hotel Group 0.0005 0.0181 0.1401 -0.2196 -0.398* 14.952* 
Kenmare Resources -0.0004 0.0475 0.4818 -0.6931 0.246* 33.625* 
Ke Grou 0.0008 0.0148 0.1088 -0.1216 0.141* 10.141* 
Kin s an Group 0.0008 0.0201 0.2231 -0.2231 -0.193* 29.197* 
Mc Inerne Holdings -0.0006 0.0465 0.4700 -0.6931 -1.181* 39.592* 
Norish -0.0005 0.0272 0.4329 -0.4412 -2.528* 81.296* 
O lesb & Butler Grou -0.0003 0.0417 0.5878 -0.7129 -3.836* 126.13* 
Premier Oil 0.0000 0.0279 0.2268 -0.1718 0.591* 7.479* 
Read 'x 0.0005 0.0271 0.2151 -0.3023 -0.968* 25.473* 
Ryan Hotels 0.0002 0.0267 0.3716 -0.2647 0.588* 20.514* 
Seafield -0.0006 0.0279 0.4055 -0.2744 1.536* 32.266* 
Smurfit 0.0004 0.0218 0.2394 -0.2858 -0.173* 18.688* 
Tesco 0.0004 0.0175 0.1024 -0.1336 0.001 3.239* 
Tullow Oil 0.0005 0.0305 0.1911 -0.3117 0.463* 10.102* Ulster Television 0.0005 0.0104 0.0854 -0.1277 -0.929* 14.247* Unidare -0.0002 0.0227 0.1818 -0.3592 -2.832* 47.433* United Drug 0.0007 0.0123 0.1145 -0.0899 0.931* 16.502* 
Vislink -0.0003 0.0335 0.4383 -0.3567 0.306* 37.397* Waterford Wedgwood -0.0001 0.0249 0.1927 -0.2955 -0.855* 16.159* 
Note: This table summarises the daily raw share returns earned by the sample firms over the sample period. Mean refers to the average return; SD relates to the standard deviation of returns; Max and Min are the maximum and minimum returns 
respectively, while Skew and Kurt are skewness and kurtosis statistics. An * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Finally, Table 6.2 also reports the levels of skewness and kurtosis existing in the daily 
returns. The evidence shows that for a significant proportion of the sample, the daily returns 
are not normal. Instead, they are characterised by a non-symmetric distribution. 
128 Some 25 
of the sample firms' returns exhibited positive skewness while the other 25 firms' returns 
showed negative skewness. Of these, 23 were significant suggesting that for a substantial 
number of companies' shares, a tail of negative returns was achieved. The results for the 
kurtosis statistic are even more emphatic. The values are all significant and range from a low 
of 3.329 (Tesco) to a high of 244.93 (Dunloe Ewart) indicating that the distribution of returns 
is fat tailed. 
The simple dividend forecast model (the naive dividend expectations model) used by 
Aharony and Swary (1980) was applied in this study to classify companies according to the 
type of dividend change. The model predicts that there is no change in dividend from one 
period to the next. This prediction is consistent with the hypothesis developed by Lintner 
(1956) in the 1950s. As was discussed in Chapter 3, Lintner (1956) observed that managers 
are reluctant to change dividends in either direction unless they believe that the prospects of 
the firm have significantly improved or deteriorated. Laub (1972) found that firms change 
regular dividends in only 25% of sampled quarters. This relative infrequency of dividend 
change suggests that the simple model may capture expectations as an approximation to 
company behaviour. 
ua Given the evidence about non-normality in the returns data, both parametric and non-parametric statistical 
analysis was undertaken. The tables in Appendix 5 show median abnormal and excess returns. In all cases, the 
non-parametric statistical results were very similar to those reported in this chapter. In addition the Analysis of Variance tests reported in Table 5.9, were performed after careful inspection of the data and the removal of 3 
outlier observations that caused non-normality. 
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The naive dividend expectations model is expressed as follows: 
E (Dic) =D it-i [6.1 ] 
where, E (D; t) is the expected dividend per share (DPS) for the ith firm in the t`h period and 
D; t_i is the actual DPS announced 
by it" firm in the previous period. In accordance with this 
model the unexpected dividends (UD; t) were computed as percentage changes in DPS from 
one period to the next. Therefore, 
UDit [(Dic)/ Dit-11-1 [6.21 
where, UD; c is the unexpected dividend for the it' firm in the tt period, D; t is the actual 
dividend for the it' firm in the tt' period, and the D; t_1 is the actual dividend for the it` firm in 
the previous period. 
To test the "information content" hypothesis, the total sample of 674 observations was 
grouped into three main categories, separated according to the character of the change in 
DPS. Table 6.3 summarises the number of sample companies that announced positive, 
negative and no change to their dividend. An inspection of this table reveals that almost 64% 
of the dividend changes were positive with just over 8% of the changes negative. Again such 
findings should not be surprising as Chapter 2 highlighted the prolonged boom period 
experienced by the Irish economy. Clearly, Irish firms raised their dividends during this time 
of unprecedented economic growth. The findings are also consistent with the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3 where the reluctance of managers to cut dividend payments was 
highlighted. 
As Section 6.1 highlighted, the impact of any earnings announcement is also 
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investigated in the current chapter. For this purpose, earnings per share data, (EPS), were 
obtained from EXTEL cards, Datastream or 
Bloomberg for all 16 years of the study. The 
samples of dividend-increase, dividend-decrease and 
dividend-no change companies were 
then divided into two sub-groups: (a) those companies which reported higher earnings; and 
(b) those that reported lower earnings. 
129 The unexpected earnings were calculated assuming 
that annual earnings follow a random walk. 
130 The random walk model postulates that any 
change in earnings from one period to the next 
is unpredictable; therefore: 
E (Eic) =E it-I [6.3] 
where E (Et) is the expected earnings for the it" firm in the 
0 period and E; t_1 is the actual 
earnings for the it' firm in the previous period. Unexpected earnings were computed as the 
percentage changes in EPS from year to year in conformity with the assumptions of the 
random walk model. Therefore: 
hic =1(E t)/ Ec-t]-1 [6.4] 
Where UE; t is the unexpected earnings for the it' firm in the tt' period, Et is the actual 
earnings for the it' firm in the tth period and E; t. l is the actual earnings for the i`h firm in the 
previous period. The results of this process are shown in Table 6.3. 
129None of the firms in the sample reported identical earnings in any two consecutive years. 
130This assumption was supported by early empirical investigations of annual earnings for UK and US 
companies (Little, 1962; Ball and Watts, 1972). More recent investigations have suggested that extreme 
earnings changes may exhibit mean reverting tendencies (e. g. Clayman, 1987). This thesis adopts the approach 
employed in most previous studies in this area and assumes that annual earnings follow a random walk process. 
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Table 63 Classification of the Sample based on Changes in Dividends and Earnings 
Earnings change 
Dividend change 
Positive Negative Total 
Posit_ 325 103 428 
Negative 23 33 56 
Zero 95 95 190 
Total 443 231 674 
Note: This table analyses the final sample with respect to the sign of the dividend and the earnings surprises of 
the companies in the study and shows the number of sample companies which displayed either positive or 
negative earnings changes and positive, negative and no change to their dividend. 
As expected, the majority of firms that increased their dividends reported higher EPS; 
only 103 announcements of an increase in DPS were made at the same time as a fall in EPS. 
Similarly, in the majority of instances (33 out of 56), firms that cut their dividend did so 
while announcing a fall in EPS. The 190 instances where firms did not change their DPS 
were split evenly between those reporting higher and lower EPS. 
6.4 Empirical Findings 
Table 6.4 details the abnormal and excess returns calculated for the sample firms over 
the 41-day event window. The analysis is for the whole sample of dividend changes and 
highlights the mean values, the standard deviation around the mean, and the p-value for the 
test of the null hypothesis that the average is equal to zero. 
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Table 6.4 Share Performance Around the Dividend Announcement Date 
DAY I Abnormal Re turns Excess Returns 
MEAN SD value MEAN SD value 
t-20 0.0011 0.0240 0.2220 0.0013 0.0243 0.1567 
t-19 -0.0002 0.0241 0.8281 -0.0002 0.0244 0.7910 
t-18 0.0001 0.0274 0.9494 0.0000 0.0276 0.9677 
t-17 0.0002 0.0263 0.8097 0.0007 0.0267 0.4805 
t-16 0.0008 0.0290 0.4978 0.0010 0.0284 0.3586 
t-15 -0.0011 0.0250 0.2384 -0.0010 0.0253 0.3157 
t-14 -0.0004 0.0340 0.7820 -0.0001 0.0341 0.9120 
t-13 0.0021 0.0243 0.0280* 0.0020 0.0242 0.0291k 
t-12 -0.0023 0.0281 0.0341* -0.0022 0.0278 0.0397* 
t-11 0.0006 0.0290 0.5855 0.0008 0.0289 0.4861 
t-10 0.0011 0.0259 0.2782 0.0012 0.0264 0.2519 
t-9 0.0012 0.0297 0.2962 0.0016 0.0297 0.1588 
t-8 -0.0019 0.0234 0.0390* -0.0018 0.0235 0.0448* 
t-7 0.0005 0.0231 0.5976 0.0004 0.0227 0.6314 
t-6 0.0003 0.0216 0.7575 0.0002 0.0222 0.8448 
t-5 -0.0009 0.0331 0.4770 -0.0009 0.0336 0.4669 
t-4 0.0013 0.0244 0.1707 0.0019 0.0243 0.0481* 
t-3 0.0012 0.0266 0.2386 0.0014 0.0269 0.1728 
t-2 0.0025 0.0276 0.0168* 0.0029 0.0275 0.0068* 
t-1 0.0000 0.0421 0.9818 0.0004 0.0420 0.8245 
t0 0.0082 0.0622 0.0007* 0.0085 0.0624 0.0005* 
t+1 0.0022 0.0499 0.2453 0.0025 0.0502 0.1920 
t+2 0.0015 0.0417 0.3532 0.0017 0.0422 0.2900 
t+3 0.0000 0.0460 0.9991 0.0002 0.0464 0.9105 
t+4 -0.0004 0.0349 0.7898 -0.0001 0.0351 0.9322 
t+5 0.0000 0.0378 0.9742 0.0002 0.0378 0.8958 
t+6 -0.0018 0.0305 0.1232 -0.0017 0.0307 0.1498 
t+7 -0.0002 0.0395 0.8773 0.0001 0.0398 0.9709 
t+8 0.0005 0.0259 0.6325 0.0004 0.0262 0.7231 
t+9 -0.0005 0.0229 0.5637 -0.0007 0.0233 0.4130 
t+10 -0.0001 0.0273 0.9416 -0.0001 0.0275 0.9497 
t+11 0.0018 0.0245 0.0518 0.0017 0.0251 0.0830 
t+12 0.0000 0.0251 0.9703 0.0003 0.0252 0.7507 
t+13 -0.0008 0.0216 0.3378 -0.0007 0.0221 0.3887 
t+14 
t+15 
-0.0003 
0.0002 
0.0286 
0.0417 
0.7555 
0.8954 
-0.0002 
0.0005 
0.0292 
0.0415 
0.8596 
0.7757 
t+16 -0.0011 0.0240 0.2211 -0.0006 0.0244 0.5275 t+17 0.0021 0.0532 0.3120 0.0023 0.0536 0.2569 
t+18 -0.0003 0.0234 0.7156 -0.0002 0.0236 0.8167 
t+19 -0.0007 0.0346 0.5914 -0.0010 0.0349 0.4462 
t+20 0.0005 0.0271 0.6493 0.0002 0.0273 0.8203 
Note: This table highlights the abnormal and excess returns for the sample firms for 41 days around the dividend 
announcement date (Day t). SD refers to the standard deviation while p-value relates to a t-test of the null 
hypothesis that the mean is equal to zero. An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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The main finding that emerges from this table is that the dividend announcement date 
is associated with a positive share price reaction; the mean abnormal return on day t of 0.82% 
is highly significant, having by far the lowest p-value of any day over the 41 day period. The 
average announcement day excess return of 0.85% is also highly significant. 
131 This result is 
in line with the findings of earlier empirical studies (e. g. Aharony and Swary, 1980; 
Woolridge and Ghosh, 1985; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Benartzi et at., 1997) and suggests 
that although the Irish market is much smaller than its counterparts in the US and the UK, 
investors' response to the announcement of a dividend is similar in nature. 
As regards the 20-day period prior to the dividend announcement there appears to be 
some evidence of news leaking to the market before the dividend announcement date. The 
market reaction as measured by the abnormal returns is positive on 14 of the 20 pre- 
announcement days, but is only significant for 2 of the 14 days (day t-13 and day t-2). The 
market reaction is negative on 6 of the 20 pre-announcement days, but is only significant on 2 
of these (day t-12 and day t-8). A similar pattern emerges when pre-announcement excess 
returns are analysed. Again these excess returns are positive on 14 of the 20 pre- 
announcement days. In this instance however three values are significant (day t-13, day t-4 
and day t-2). Of the 6 days when excess returns are negative significant values are recorded 
for day t-12 and dayt-8. 
A different picture emerges when post-announcement returns are analysed. For the 
20-day period after the dividend announcement, the mean abnormal return is positive on 10 
occasions and negative on 10 occasions, but never to a significant degree. This suggests that 
the Irish market responded quickly to the news contained in the dividend announcements, 
impounding that information into share prices rapidly and leaving no opportunity to earn 
above-average returns using the dividend information. This finding is consistent with earlier 
131 The excess return findings provide useful confirmation of the abnormal return evidence (see Chapter 4) 
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evidence that stock markets appear to be efficient in a semi-strong sense in terms of the 
reaction to dividend news (Pettit, 1972; Divecha and Morse, 1983; Lonie et al., 1996). 
132 
6.4.1 Announcement Effects for Different Changes in Dividend Levels 
The analysis in Table 6.4 is for the whole sample of dividend changes. Yet the 
information content (or signalling) hypothesis predicts that the market will respond 
differently depending upon the news contained in the dividend announcement. This section 
investigates the information content hypothesis for the dividend-increasing group of 
companies in the sample (DI), the dividend-decreasing group of companies in the sample 
(DD) and the dividend-no change group of companies in the sample (DNC). 
The information content hypothesis predicts that the UR for shares in those sample 
companies that increase dividends will be positive, the UR for shares in those sample 
companies that decrease dividends will be negative and the UR for shares in those sample 
companies that do not change dividends will, on average, be zero. 
Table 6.5 reports the stock market response for the dividend-increasing group of 
companies in the sample. If good news is being signalled to the stock market by a decision to 
increase the dividend then logically one might assume that in response to such a signal the 
market should react favourably resulting in an increase in the company's share price and 
higher returns to shareholders of these firms. The findings reported in Table 6.5 appear to 
support that position in an Irish context. 
The table shows that the average abnormal return, in sample companies that increased 
132 Medians, p-values and standardised Wilcoxon statistics are reported in Table 6.4 A in Appendix 6. An 
analysis of Table 6.4A suggests that the mean results shown in the chapter are not due to extreme observations. 
Specifically, the median abnormal and excess returns are positive and significant on day t-0. In addition, the 
median abnormal and excess returns are significant for a small number of days before the announcement. 
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their dividend, was positive (mean 0.87%) and highly significant (with a p-value of 0.000) on 
day t. This finding is supported by the results for excess returns in that the average excess 
return on day t was 0.92% (with a p-value of 0.000). On average, the shareholders of sample 
companies earned a positive excess return of almost 1% on the announcement day. 
In the pre-announcement period the mean abnormal return was positive on 9 
occasions, but never to a significant degree, and was negative on Ii occasions but 
significantly only on day t-8. Significant positive excess returns are reported on pre- 
announcement days t-2 (mean 0.29%) and t-1 (mean 0.28%). The corresponding p-values 
were 0.021 and 0.015 respectively indicating that the excess returns around the 
announcement date were highly significant. In the two days prior to the announcement 
shareholders in sample companies earned, on average, a positive excess return of 0.57%. 
Turning to the post announcement period, shareholders in the sample companies 
earned a statistically significant positive abnormal return of 0.34% (p-value 0.021) on day t+1 
(the day after the announcement). For the remaining 19 days following the dividend 
announcement, the mean abnormal return was positive on 8 occasions, and negative on 11 
occasions, but never to a significant degree. This finding indicates that by day t+1 the Irish 
market had responded quickly to the news contained in the dividend increase announcements. 
These post announcement period findings are supported by the results for excess returns. 
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Table 6.5: Share Performance for Dividend Increasing Companies 
Da Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
MEAN SD -value MEAN SD -value 
t-20 0.0005 0.0210 0.607 0.0011 0.0218 0.306 
t-19 -0.0003 0.0222 0.807 0.0000 0.0229 
0.994 
t-18 -0.0001 0.0219 0.959 0.0002 0.0222 
0.825 
t-17 -0.0002 0.0269 0.901 
0.0005 0.0275 0.730 
t-16 0.0011 0.0183 0.221 0.0013 0.0186 0.157 
t-15 -0.0004 0.0203 0.674 0.0002 0.0208 
0.870 
t-14 -0.0011 0.0193 0.240 -0.0006 0.0197 
0.563 
t-13 0.0015 0.0202 0.115 0.0018 0.0205 0.071 
t-12 -0.0004 0.0193 0.673 0.0000 0.0196 
0.990 
t-11 0.0014 0.0241 0.223 0.0019 0.0242 0.099 
t-10 -0.0004 0.0207 0.680 0.0003 0.0210 
0.790 
t-9 -0.0002 0.0247 0.897 0.0008 0.0253 
0.528 
t-8 -0.0023 0.0199 0.019* -0.0019 0.0201 
0.045* 
t-7 -0.0006 0.0204 0.529 -0.0004 0.0200 
0.655 
t-6 -0.0003 0.0149 0.637 -0.0002 0.0160 0.771 
t-5 0.0001 0.0222 0.937 0.0002 0.0234 0.853 
t-4 0.0007 0.0178 0.444 0.0016 0.0182 0.066 
t-3 0.0003 0.0265 0.843 0.0011 0.0272 0.424 
t-2 0.0021 0.0251 0.085 0.0029 0.0255 0.021* 
t-1 0.0021 0.0240 0.067 0.0028 0.0241 0.015* 
t0 0.0087 0.0350 0.000* 0.0092 0.0354 0.000* 
t+1 0.0034 0.0301 0.021* 0.0039 0.0304 0.008* 
t+2 -0.0002 0.0246 0.835 0.0002 0.0252 0.855 
t+3 0.0005 0.0203 0.595 0.0009 0.0209 0.358 
t+4 -0.0010 0.0292 0.498 -0.0005 0.0298 0.723 
t+5 0.0004 0.0209 0.696 0.0006 0.0216 0.545 
t+6 -0.0015 0.0199 0.117 -0.0011 0.0206 0.249 
t+7 -0.0005 0.0231 0.683 0.0002 0.0240 0.893 
t+8 -0.0008 0.0250 0.499 -0.0006 0.0257 0.604 
t+9 -0.0004 0.0169 0.610 -0.0004 0.0175 0.624 
t+10 0.0002 0.0194 0.868 0.0003 0.0200 0.743 
t+ll 0.0015 0.0228 0.181 0.0013 0.0239 0.270 
t+12 -0.0001 0.0184 0.941 0.0002 0.0191 0.844 
t+13 -0.0009 U. U193 0.327 -0.0006 0.0203 U. 3b8 
t+14 0.0009 0.0195 0.334 0.0015 0.0205 0.144 
t+15 0.0021 0.0302 0.145 0.0028 0.0303 0.056 
t+16 -0.0003 0.0207 0.750 0.0005 0.0212 0.631 
t+17 0.0001 0.0226 0.953 0.0005 0.0230 0.645 
t+18 -0.0004 0.0193 0.701 -0.0001 0.0199 0.944 
t +19 9 2ý 0.0015 0.0178 0,092 0.0017 0.0179 0.047* 
t+20 -0.0007 0.0225 0.512 -0.0006 0.0230 0.606 
This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the 41day period day t-20 to day t+20 for the 428 sample 
firms which increased their dividend. An * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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These findings appear to be consistent with the evidence from larger stock markets 
(e. g. Pettit, 1972; Divecha and Morse, 1983; Lonie et al., 1996), and suggest that the 
Irish 
market is efficient in a semi-strong sense 
in its reaction to dividend news. However, the 
magnitude of the announcement-day abnormal return of the sample companies 
is 
significantly higher than the findings for previous studies of both US and UK data (Charest, 
1978; Aharony et al., 1988; Marsh, 1993; Lonie et al., 1996). This observation may provide 
some supportive evidence for the suggestion that managers of Irish companies have greater 
opportunities to surprise the market as compared to their UK and US counterparts; it 
is 
possible that the flow of information in the Irish Stock Exchange is not as strong as that 
in 
larger markets, despite the fact that the Dublin Exchange is highly regulated and the rules for 
investor protection are similar to those that apply in the UK. One explanation for the greater 
level of surprise in the Irish reaction to dividend increases could be the relatively small 
number of analysts following Irish firms compared wit the US or the UK. However the lack 
of statistically significant post announcement returns suggests that the market interprets the 
news quickly and impounds the information into share prices rapidly, leaving little or no 
opportunities to earn above average returns after the dividend figure has been disclosed. 
133 
The results for the dividend-decreasing companies are reported in Table 6.6. If bad 
news is being signalled to the stock market by a decision to cut the annual dividend, then 
logically one might assume that the stock market would react adversely, resulting in a fall in 
the company's share price and reducing the returns to the shareholders of those firms. The 
findings reported in Table 6.6 appear to partially support that assertion in the Irish context. 
133 Medians, p-values and standardised Wilcoxon statistics are reported in Table 6.5 A in Appendix 6. The results 
for these non-parametric statistics are similar to the mean findings and suggests that the market responds 
favourably when the dividend was increased on day t-0. 
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Table 6.6: Share Performances for Dividend Decreasing Companies 
Da Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
MEAN SD -value MEAN SD -value 
t-20 0.0003 0.0246 0.925 -0.0007 0.0247 
0.835 
t-19 0.0064 0.0271 0.083 0.0039 0.0274 
0.291 
t-18 0.0008 0.0227 0.803 0.0001 0.0221 0.983 
t-17 0.0025 0.0331 0.578 0.0011 0.0327 
0.800 
t-16 -0.0069 0.0312 
0.104 -0.0077 0.0308 0.069 
t-15 0.0008 0.0334 0.861 -0.0008 0.0344 0.866 
t-14 0.0031 0.0310 0.460 0.0017 0.0298 0.679 
t-13 0.0071 0.0338 0.125 0.0062 0.0330 0.164 
t-12 -0.0051 0.0476 0.425 -0.0058 0.0471 
0.357 
t-11 -0.0029 0.0380 0.576 -0.0032 0.0381 0.532 
t-10 -0.0002 0.0301 0.968 -0.0012 0.0325 0.791 
t-9 -0.0003 0.0481 0.965 -0.0011 0.0481 
0.866 
t-8 0.0050 0.0265 0.167 0.0049 0.0266 0.175 
t-7 0.0000 0.0141 0.988 -0.0011 0.0137 0.568 
t-6 0.0024 0.0186 0.346 0.0023 0.0190 0.369 
t-5 0.0019 0.0295 0.626 0.0023 0.0314 0.591 
t-4 -0.0011 0.0238 0.731 -0.0013 0.0228 0.669 
t-3 0.0039 0.0273 0.296 0.0023 0.0294 0.559 
t-2 0.0071 0.0221 0.019* 0.0055 0.0214 0.061 
t-1 -0.0036 0.0248 0.284 -0.0052 0.0265 0.152 
t0 -0.0064 0.0496 0.341 -0.0060 0.0506 0.381 
t+1 -0.0001 0.0291 0.975 -0.0015 0.0300 0.712 
t+2 0.0089 0.0454 0.148 0.0080 0.0462 0.201 
t+3 0.0023 0.0465 0.710 0.0009 0.0473 0.890 
t+4 -0.0038 0.0405 0.483 -0.0037 0.0391 0.487 
t+5 -0.0066 0.0383 0.204 -0.0072 0.0388 0.172 
t+6 0.0012 0.0312 0.769 -0.0002 0.0307 0.964 
t+7 -0.0006 0.0255 0.852 -0.0019 0.0248 0.575 
t+8 -0.0022 0.0235 0.483 -0.0034 0.0251 0.310 
t+9 -0.0025 0.0415 0.658 -0.0034 0.0422 0.553 
Lriv V. VUli v. VLtJ v. JW 2,! L2 1 2 . vc'FY v. 1 1 
t+11 0.0002 0.0229 0.944 5 0.0002 0.0217 0.949 
t+12 0.0062 0.0256 0.077 0.0068 0.0237 0.035* 
t+13 -0.0022 0.0249 0.506 -0.0021 0.0247 0.524 
t+14 -0.0038 0.0340 0.407 -0.0059 0.0329 0.189 
t+15 -0.0028 0.0236 0.385 -0.0034 0.0240 0.286 
t+16 -0.0025 0.0309 0.547 -0.0021 0.0320 0.631 
t+17 0.0114 0.0414 0.044* 0.0101 0.0413 0.071 
t+18 0.0004 0.0265 0.903 -0.0005 0.0279 0.903 
t+19 -0.0107 0.0453 0.084 -0.0117 0.0452 0.057 
t+20 0.0089 0.0327 0.047* 0.0078 0.0331 0.083 
This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the 41day period day t-20 to day t+20 for the 56 sample 
firms which decreased their dividend. An * indicate significance at the 5% level. 
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The results set out in Table 6.6 show that the abnormal return earned on day t by 
dividend-decreasing companies was a negative 0.64%. However, the corresponding p-value 
of 0.341 indicates that the abnormal return on the announcement date was not significant. In 
the 20-day period prior to the announcement event, the mean abnormal return was positive on 
12 occasions and negative on 8 occasions, but only significantly so on day t-2. For the 20- 
days after the announcement event, the mean abnormal return was positive 9 times and 
negative 11 times, but was only statistically significant on day t+17 and day t+20.134 
The results in Table 6.6 do not support the information hypothesis since no 
statistically significant stock market reaction is observed on the day when the dividend 
reduction is announced to the market. This finding may explain the overall results in Table 
6.4 where the share price response to the total sample of dividend announcements was 
positive and statistically significant. Obviously, the positive abnormal and unexpected returns 
for the good news of the dividend increase are not dissipated by any adverse stock market 
reaction to dividend cuts since no such adverse stock market reaction is detected. A number 
of reasons might explain the absence of any response to dividend declines. For example, 
perhaps the market was conditioned into expecting the dividend cut by warnings from the 
firm or by news releases from competitors about difficult conditions within the industry. 
Alternatively the dividend cut is being used to conserve cash for major investment plans 
(Woolridge and Ghosh, 1985). The latter explanation is examined towards the end of the 
current chapter by studying the joint dividend-earnings signals emitted by firms in the 
sample. 
Finally, the results of the dividend no-change category companies are reported in 
Table 6.7. 
134 Medians, p-values and standardised Wilcoxon statistics are reported in Table 6.6 A in appendix 6. 
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Table 6.7: Share Performance for Dividend No Change Companies 
Da Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
MEAN SD -value MEAN SD -value 
t-20 0.0027 0.0297 0.204 0.0025 0.0291 0.243 
t-19 -0.0020 0.0270 0.307 -0.0020 0.0265 0.297 
t-18 0.0001 0.0380 0.961 -0.0004 0.0381 0.885 
t-17 0.0005 0.0226 0.761 0.0012 0.0227 0.464 
t-16 0.0023 0.0439 0.476 0.0030 0.0423 0.337 
t-15 -0.0033 0.0309 0.140 -0.0036 0.0307 0.106 
t-14 0.0003 0.0547 0.944 0.0002 0.0547 0.951 
t-13 0.0017 0.0289 0.406 0.0014 0.0286 0.512 
t-12 -0.0057 0.0358 0.028* -0.0061 0.0348 0.016* 
t-11 -0.0002 0.0355 0.939 -0.0007 0.0350 0.793 
t-10 0.0048 0.0337 0.050* 0.0039 0.0340 0.119 
t-9 0.0047 0.0329 0.051 0.0043 0.0318 0.063 
t-8 -0.0030 0.0289 0.156 -0.0035 0.0289 0.096 
0 0.0031 0.0299 0.160 0.0028 0.0294 0.196 
t-6 0.0010 0.0325 0.679 0.0004 0.0326 0.860 
t-5 -0.0040 0.0503 0.277 -0.0045 0.0498 0.216 
t-4 0.0034 0.0350 0.182 0.0033 0.0347 0.189 
t-3 0.0026 0.0267 0.184 0.0020 0.0256 0.291 
t-2 0.0022 0.0337 0.367 0.0022 0.0329 0.368 
t-1 -0.0039 0.0693 0.444 -0.0036 0.0688 0.470 
t0 0.0026 0.0557 0.520 0.0024 0.0554 0.556 
T+1 0.0004 0.0810 0.951 0.0006 0.0813 0.917 
T+2 0.0032 0.0648 0.493 0.0033 0.0654 0.494 
T+3 -0.0019 0.0772 0.741 -0.0016 0.0777 0.771 
T+4 0.0020 0.0439 0.529 0.0018 0.0437 0.566 
T+5 0.0012 0.0604 0.782 0.0014 0.0599 0.753 
T+6 -0.0034 0.0461 0.313 -0.0034 0.0460 0.310 
T+7 0.0004 0.0645 0.935 0.0004 0.0646 0.932 
T+8 0.0042 0.0281 0.041 * 0.0037 0.0274 0.062 
T+9 -0.0001 0.0270 0.941 -0.0007 0.0267 0.726 
T+10 -0.0012 0.0403 0.689 -0.0012 0.0402 0.672 
T+11 0.0031 0.0284 0.130 0.0030 0.0284 0.145 
T+12 -0.0015 0.0358 0.552 -0.0013 0.0355 0.605 
T+13 -0.0001 0.0254 0.948 -0.0007 0.0251 0.693 
T+14 -0.0021 0.0412 0.474 -0.0022 0.0419- 0.460 
T+15 -0.0032 0.0628 0.479 -n nn-17 n n4, ), ) n dý 
T+16 -0.0026 0.0284 0.215 -0.0026 0.0281 0.203 
T+17 0.0038 0.0916 0.564 0.0042 0.0922 0.534 
T+18 -0.0005 0.0299 0.824 -0.0005 0.0293 0.828 
T+19 -0.0027 0.0539 0.494 -0.0041 0.0545 0.305 
T+20 0.0007 0.0338 0.783 -0.0002 0.0335 0.947 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the 41 days period day t-20 to day t+20 for the 190 
sample firms which did not change their dividend from one period to the next. An * indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
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If no news is being signalled to the stock market by a decision not to change the 
annual dividend, then, logically one might conclude that no abnormal share price movements 
are expected. Again, the results reported in Table 6.7 appear to support that assertion 
in the 
Irish context. Table 6.7 shows that over the 20-day period prior to the dividend 
announcement event, the mean abnormal return was positive on 12 occasions, but only to a 
significant degree on day t-10 (p-value = 0.050). The mean returns were negative on 8 
occasions, but only to a significant extent on day t-12 (p-value = 0.016). For the 20-day 
period after the announcement, the mean abnormal return was positive on 8 occasions, but 
only to a significant degree on day t+8 (p-value = 0.041). The mean abnormal returns were 
negative on 12 occasions, but none of these abnormal returns were significant at the 5% level. 
The abnormal return on the dividend announcement day was positive but not significantly 
different from zero. The positive but statistically insignificant abnormal return on day t 
supports the hypothesis that unchanged dividends are only associated with normal share 
returns. 135 
In summary, for firms that increased their dividends (the DI) group, the average 
market response is positive and significant in each of the two days around the announcement 
date: day t and day t+l. The Irish market does appear to react negatively to the news of 
dividend decreases (the DD) group but not to any statistically significant extent. When the 
results for the dividend no-change (the DNC) group are analysed, companies were found to 
have earned positive abnormal returns of 0.26% on the announcement day, but this average 
performance was not statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, each of the Tables 6.5, 
6.6 and 6.7 show a remarkable consistency between the abnormal and excess return results; 
both the coefficient estimates and p-values are quantitatively similar. Such consistency is 
useful in the context of attempts to characterise the market reaction to corporate 
35 Medians, p-values and standardised Wilcoxon statistics are reported in Table 6.7 A in appendix 6. 
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announcements in markets where thin trading is likely to be prevalent, as abnormal returns 
are prone to systematic bias in such situations (Faff et al., 2000). 
The information content (or signalling) hypothesis also predicts that the market will 
respond differently depending upon the news contained 
in the earnings announcement. 
Specifically, the hypothesis predicts that the unexpected returns for shares in sample 
companies that increase both dividends and earnings will be positive and the unexpected 
returns for shares in sample companies that cut both dividends and earnings will be negative. 
The unexpected returns for shares in sample companies where dividend and earnings move in 
opposite directions or which do not change their dividend will be uncertain. As earnings are 
announced at the same time as dividends in Ireland the next section of the Chapter examines 
the market response to joint dividend and earnings news. Section 6.4.2 therefore investigates 
whether the stock market reaction to the dividend announcement for the three dividend 
groups differed according to the character of the concurrent earnings news (Hypothesis 2 on 
p. 158). 
6.4.2 The Announcement of Changes in Dividend and Earnings 
This section of the chapter attempts to identify whether share returns are impacted by 
the confounding event of earnings announcements over and above that associated with the 
dividend news. The null hypothesis (from page 158) is that there is no interaction effect 
between dividend and earnings news; i. e. the extent of any corroboration or conflict in the 
signals does not convey any information to the stock market. As was explained in Chapter 4, 
because all of the companies in the sample announced both items of news on the same day, it 
was impossible to isolate the dividend announcement from the earnings publication. 
Therefore, the impact of earnings announcements is examined by sub-dividing the samples of 
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dividend-increase, dividend-decrease and dividend-no-change companies into two further 
categories - (a) companies which announced an earnings increase; and (b) companies which 
disclosed an earnings decrease; a similar approach was adopted in Lonie et al. (1996). This 
provided the following six groupings: 
1. The companies in the sample which increased dividend and earnings (DIEL), 
2. The companies in the sample which increased dividends when earnings fell (DIED), 
3. The companies in the sample which cut their dividends when earnings increased (DDEI), 
4. The companies in the sample where dividends and earnings both fell (DDED), 
5. The companies in the sample which did not change their dividends despite reporting an 
earnings increase (DNCEI), and 
6. The companies in the sample, which maintained their dividend, despite a drop in reported 
earnings (DNCED). 
The two categories which are worth focusing on are Group 2 and Group 3- the DIED 
and the DDEI firms- where the dividend and earnings signals conflict. An analysis of the 
share price response to disclosures by these groups may indicate whether the dividend or the 
earnings figure appears to be more important to investors. The other two categories that 
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might supply useful insights are those where the dividend and earnings signals reinforce one 
another - Group 1 and Group 4. 
Specifically, the analysis of the abnormal and excess returns 
for these groups will address the second hypothesis on page 158 by seeing if stronger market 
reactions are present when the two signals corroborate one another. 
The grouping procedure employed in this thesis facilitates a testing with Irish data of 
Woolridge and Ghosh's (1985) hypothesis that a dividend decrease (increase), when 
combined with an earnings increase (decrease), can convey good news to the market, in 
contrast to the prediction of the information content hypothesis. It should also enable the 
results of this thesis to be compared with the findings of Lonie et al. (1996) for the UK, Kane 
et al. (1984) for the US and Easton (1991) for Australia. All three previous studies adopted a 
similar approach when testing Woolridge and Ghosh's (1985) hypothesis. 
The results for each of the six groups of sample companies: - DIEL, DIED, DDEI, 
DDED, DNCEI and DNCED for the five day period day t-2 to day t+2 are shown in Table 
6.8 and are identified in the table as follows: Panel A, DIEL sample companies; Panel B, 
DIED sample companies; Panel C, DDEI sample companies; Panel D, DDED sample 
companies; Panel E, DNCEI sample companies, and, Panel F, DNCED sample companies. 136 
136 Details of the results for each of the 41 days of the event window are shown in Appendix 6 (e. g. Table 6.8.1A for Panel A; Table 6.8. IB for Panel B, etc. ). Appendix 5 also reports medians, standardised Wilcoxon 
and p-values for each Panel (e. g. Table 6.8.2A for Panel A; Table 6.8.2E for Panel B, etc. ) 
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Table 6.8 Share performance for different dividend earnings su 
Abnormal Returns Excess 
Mean SD a-value Mean 
Da t-2 0.0019 0.0239 0.1513 0.0028 0.0244 
0.0411* 
Da t-1 0.0033 0.0245 0.0171" 0.0042 0.0247 0.0026" 
A 
Da t 0.0099 0.0378 0.0000* 0.0107 0.0382 
0.0000* 
Da t+l 0.0042 0.0256 0.0031" 0.0049 0.0263 0.0008" 
Da t+2 -0.0007 0.0245 0.5841 -0.0001 
0.0250 0.9699 
Da t-2 tot+2 0.0186 0.0573 0.0000* 0.0225 0.0579 0.0000" 
DIED -103 
Da t-2 0.0027 0.0287 0.3443 0.0031 0.0290 0.2773 
Da t-1 -0.0015 0.0218 0.4956 -0.0013 0.0214 0.5325 
B Da t 0.0048 0.0240 0.0438" 0.0047 0.0242 0.0514 
Da t+1 0.0007 0.0412 0.8634 0.0006 0.0407 0.8791 
Da t+2 0.0013 0.0253 0.5988 0.0011 0.0257 0.6678 
Da t-2 to t+2 0.0080 0.0606 0.1810 0.0082 0.0599 0.1673 
DDEI -23 
Da t-2 0.0080 0.0283 0.1873 0.0080 0.0270 0.1703 
Da t-1 0.0004 0.0221 0.9319 0.0015 0.0212 0.7341 
C Da t 0.0070 0.0410 0.4205 0.0091 0.0437 
11 0.3270 
Da t+l -0.0021 0.0248 0.6921 -0.0020 0.0254 0.7135 
Da t+2 0.0143 0.0432 0.1266 0.0130 0.0420 0.1527 
Da t-2 to t+2 0.0277 0.0745 0.0888 0.0296 0.0708 0.0570 
DDED -33 
Da t-2 0.0065 0.0170 0.0348" 0.0037 0.0166 0.2089 
Da t-l -0.0064 0.0265 0.1775 -0.0098 0.0291 0.0615 
D Da t -0.0157 0.0535 0.1012 -0.0165 0.0530 0.0833 
Da t+l 0.0012 0.0321 0.8264 -0.0012 0.0332 0.8429 
Da t+2 0.0052 0.0473 0.5344 0.0045 0.0493 0.6007 
Da t-2 to t+2 -0.0092 0.0716 0.4675 -0.0192 0.0717 0.1337 
DNCEI -95 
Da t-2 0.0076 0.0379 0.0528 0.0078 0.0374 0.0451 " 
Day t-1 -0.0028 0.0576 0.6377 -0.0024 0.0574 0.6796 
E Da t 0.0145 0.0486 0.0047* 0.0147 0.0478 0.0036" 
Da t+l -0.0017 0.0822 0.8445 -0.0014 0.0826 0.8654 
Da t+2 -0.0025 0.0426 0.5682 -0.0023 0.0430 0.6073 
Da t-2 to t+2 0.0090 0.0882 0.3240 0.0102 0.0829 0.2338 
DNCED -95 
Day t-2 -0.0032 0.0282 0.2701 -0.0035 0.0268 0.2087 
Day t-l -0.0049 0.0795 0.5477 -0.0048 0.0789 0.5550 
F Da t -0.0093 0.0599 0.1360 -0.0100 0.0598 0.1087 
Day t+l 0.0024 0.0802 0.7732 0.0027 0.0804 0.7463 
Day t+2 0.0090 0.0809 0.2831 0.0088 0.0819 0.2986 
Da t-2 to t+2 0.0015 0.0870 0.8644 0.0006 0.0870 0.9467 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the five-day period day t-2 to day t+2 for the sample firms split into six sub-groups 
depending on the change in dividend and the change in earnings: Panel Ae those firms which increased dividend and earnings (DIEL), Panel B 
those which increased dividends when earnings fell (DIED), Panel C- those which cut their dividends when earnings increased (DD-EI), Panel 
D- those where dividends and earnings fell (DDED), Panel E- those which did not change their dividends despite reporting increased earnings 
(DNCEI), and Panel F- those which maintained their dividend despite a drop in reported earnings (DNCED). An * indicates significance at 5%. 
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A number of findings emerge from the table. First, there is marked variability in the 
stock market reaction across the various dividend-earnings groups. This is especially true 
when both dividend per share and earnings per share move in the same direction. For 
example, the mean abnormal return on day t for companies which published increases in both 
dividend per share and earnings per share (Panel A, the DIEL group in Table 6.8) is positive 
(0.99%) and highly significant (p-value = 0.0000) while for companies which announced cuts 
in both variables (Panel D, the DDED group), the market response, although not significant, 
is negative at -1.57%. When the abnormal return of the dividend-increase sample was 
examined in Section 6.4.1, it was found that the abnormal return earned by those companies 
was highly significant and equal to 0.87% on day t. The results for the "good news" category 
of companies in Panel A (the DI-EI sample) show that that sample group earned a positive 
1.86% abnormal return during the five days surrounding the dividend announcement period 
for their shareholders. These results show that, in the Irish context, when both signals are in 
agreement with one another and when the dividend evidence is corroborated by earnings 
news, the stock market reacts more positively than for the dividend-increase sample as a 
whole. The results for the "bad news" category of companies in Panel D (the DDED sample) 
show that that sample group earned a negative 0.92% abnormal return during the five days 
surrounding the dividend announcement period for their shareholders. However, this 
abnormal return was not statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.4675). The stock market 
therefore seemed to mark down the prices of the shares of these companies but not to any 
statistically significant extent. This finding is weaker than the results detected by Ghosh and 
Woolridge (1988) in their analysis of dividend cutting and dividend omitting firms. The 
DDED results reported in this chapter for Irish companies are also slightly different from the 
findings of Lonie et al. (1996). Specifically, Lonie et al. (1996) reported that their sample of 
UK companies which disclosed reductions in both dividends and earnings earned a negative 
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abnormal return of -2.92% for the two days at the time of the announcement (Day t-1 and 
Day t) which was significant at the 5% level (t = 2.42). 
Therefore, as hypothesised, the DIEI sample realised a statistically significant positive 
abnormal return during the pre-announcement period while the DDED sample generated a 
large negative (but not significant) abnormal return during the same time frame. For the 
dividend-eamings increase group, the abnormal returns over the pre-announcement period are 
fully consistent with the subsequently announced dividend change and the resultant stock 
market reaction. For the dividend-earnings decrease category, the evidence is not as strong. 
Second, for those firms which emitted mixed signals (Panel B, the DIED group and 
Panel C, the DDEI group), the average market response is positive on the announcement day; 
for DIED firms, the mean abnormal return is a statistically significant 0.48% (p-value = 
0.0438) while for DDEI companies the mean abnormal return is larger but statistically 
insignificant 0.70% (p-value = 0.4205). Surprisingly, the market does not appear to have 
reacted negatively to the fact that the dividend and earnings changes are moving in the 
opposite direction. When the two signals conflict, there is some evidence from the 
announcement day results that the market appears to have difficulty in making up its mind. 
For example, the mean abnormal return on day t for DIED firms is significant at the 5% level, 
but this is not the case for DDEI companies. These results may indicate that, when companies 
communicate seemingly divergent signals, the stock market tends to be sceptical about the 
news that it has received because of the difficulty of interpreting such mixed signals. 
However, the fact that the standard deviation on the announcement day for the DIED group is 
lower than the standard deviation of the DIEI group may indicate that the share-return 
volatility of these securities is lower at the announcement date when mixed signals are 
emitted. 
When the findings for the whole five-day period in Table 6.8 are studied the earnings- 
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increase category of the dividend-decrease sample companies (Panel C, DDEI) has recorded 
a statistically insignificant positive 2.77% abnormal return Day t-2 to Day t+2 compared with 
a negative return of 0.92% for the DD-ED in the same five day period. 
137 These findings 
may indicate that the market is focused on the earnings number when a dividend cut occurs. 
However, this result may be attributable to the small size of the sample. 
In summary, for those firms which emitted mixed signals (the DIED and DDEI 
groups), there is some evidence that the market appears to focus on the dividend change in 
that the mean abnormal return on day t for DIED firms was significant at the 5% level, 
whereas this was not the case for DDEI companies. The evidence about which signal 
dominates is not conclusive however, and so the issue is re-examined in Section 6.4.3 using 
analysis of variance tests. 
Finally, the results for the two earnings categories in the dividend no-change sample 
are also analysed. According to Table 6.8 the earnings-increase group of the dividend no- 
change companies (Panel E, DNCEI) earned, on average, a significant positive abnormal 
return of 1.4500 on the day the dividend was announced, the highest abnormal return within 
the 41 day event window and the highest return achieved among all the categories of 
company examined. One rationale for the DNC findings is that investors may believe that 
managers were behaving according to Lintner's predictions; that is, the companies with 
growth in earnings that do not raise dividend levels are waiting to see whether the trend in 
earnings will persist before increasing the dividend in the future. 138 
The final category of sample companies (Panel F, DNCED), which announced an 
unchanged dividend while recording a fall in their earnings, earned a statistically insignificant 
137 From Table 6.6 the dividend-decrease sample as a whole was positive 0.59% for in the same five-day period (i. e. t-2; 0.0071 + t-1; -0.0036 + t-0; -0.0064 + t+1; -0.0001 + t+2; 0.0089). 18The study by Green and Mcllkenny (1991) supports this contention in that the model where dividends 
adjusted to changes in long-run expected earnings had a higher explanatory power. See also Divecha and Morse (1983). 
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negative abnormal return during the five-day dividend announcement period. The abnormal 
return for day t was -0.93% (p-value 0.500). The finding of an insignificant abnormal return 
may be explained by the fact that, in spite of a fall in earnings, management's belief that 
profits have not yet diverged significantly from their long-term growth path persuades them 
to maintain the dividend payout level. On the other hand, the market may have anticipated 
this reduction in profits and have already impounded this adverse expectation into share 
prices. However, given the general findings reported in this chapter, and the survey evidence 
reported in Chapter 5, of current earnings appearing to be the dominant market signal, this 
result is rather surprising. 
In summary, for those sample companies that did not disclose any change in their 
annual dividend (Panel E, the DNCEI group, and Panel F, the DNCED group), the market 
seems to base its response on the earnings news. These findings are consistent with those 
reported for UK data by Lonie et al. (1996) who reported that the most favourable reaction of 
all was for the DNCEI group, whereas minimal price movements occurred for the DNCED 
group. Finally, Table 6.8 highlights a remarkable consistency between the abnormal and 
excess return results; both the coefficient estimates and p-values are quantitatively similar. 
The cumulative abnormal returns for each of the dividend-earnings categories of 
companies (DIEL, DDEI, DNCEI, DIED, DDED, DNCED) are shown in Figure 6.1. Two 
points emerge from a visual inspection of this graph. First, over the period from t-20 to t+20 
the three earnings-increase groups (DIEI, DDEI, DNCEI) have outperformed the three 
earnings-decrease groups (DIED, DDED, DNCED) when performance is measured by 
positive abnormal returns. By contrast, the DDED group yields a negative CAR in the post- 
announcement test period. Second, abnormal returns for all the categories were associated 
with the actual dividend and earnings announcements and in each case the results are 
consistent with the messages conveyed by the companies if the signalling hypothesis is valid. 
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Note: This figure provides graphical evidence of Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the 41-day period 
around the dividend announcements for each of the dividend-earnings categories of companies (DIE1, 
DDEI, DNCEI, DIED, DDED, DNCED) 
6.4.3 Analysis of Variance 
The overall impression created by the results shown in Table 6.8 is that dividends do 
act as a signal, but the effect is linked to the market's interpretation of concurrent earnings 
information. However, the findings do not permit a robust conclusion to be drawn about 
which of the two components of the joint signal dominates. In order to investigate this 
question, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed where the abnormal return on 
day t was explained in terms of company and signal characteristics. Specifically, the 
following model was investigated: 
AR ;, =a+Q; +0; +A; +, u, +A(5j, +AE;., +(O(5AE),., +Y, + ý,., [6.5] 
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Where a is a constant term, aj is a dummy variable identifying the sector for company i 
(SECTOR), and takes on one of 11 values depending upon the industry in which the firm 
operates, Oi refers to the quartile in which the company is placed according to market 
capitalisation at 31/12/01 (SIZE). GROWTH N. refers to the quartile in which the company is 
placed according to annually compounded growth in market capitalisation over the sample 
period and µ; is a dummy variable which ranged in value from 1 to 50 to identify the sample 
companies (FIRM); inclusion of this variable allows for the variability in the market response 
across the sample firms. The symbol tsi, t is the change in earnings per share (CEPS) and was 
coded "1" for an increase and "2" for a decrease, OSjI represents the change in dividend per 
share (ODPS) variable and coded into a1 for an increase, "2" for a decrease and "3" 
for no change, (MS Ac)jg are the interaction coefficients. YEAR yt takes on a value from 1 
for 1987 to 15 for 2001 and ý,,, is the error term. The results from this ANOVA are shown in 
Table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: ANOVA for Abnormal Returns on the Dividend Announcement Day 
Note: This table shows the results for an ANOVA performed on the abnormal returns of the sample on the dividend 
announcement day (Day t). SEC relates to the industry in which the company operates, SIZE refers to the size 
quartile in which the company is placed based on market capitalisation at 31 December 2001, GROWTH is the 
quartile in which the company was placed according to annually compounded growth in market capitalisation and FIRM refers to the company making the dividend announcement. Changes in dividends were coded according to 
whether the variation was an increase, a decrease or no change while changes in earnings were coded according to 
whether the variation was an increase or decrease. Finally, YEAR relates to the year in which the dividend 
announcement took place. DF is the degrees of freedom. 
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The findings from the table indicate that these different variables can explain 13.1% 
of the variation from the mean abnormal returns on 
day t. A more detailed examination of the 
explanatory variables reveals that within company 
factors such as; sector (F-ratio = 1.481, p- 
value = 0.191), size (F-ratio = 
1.289, p-value 0.294), and, growth (F-ratio = 1.289, p-value 
0.294), have very little explanatory power. The only significant variables in the ANOVA 
model, with p-values well below the critical value 
for significance at the 5% level are 
earnings (F-ratio = 16.509, p-value = 
0.000) and the interaction between dividend/earnings 
(F-ratio = 4.725, p-value = 0.009). When these results are considered in conjunction with the 
finding evidenced in the other tables it appears that in the Irish stock market the earnings 
signal dominates, but that the 
dividend signal has some incremental explanatory power via its 
interaction with the earnings signal. The findings of this investigation for Irish companies 
therefore has more in common with the UK results of Lonie et al. (1996) than the US and 
Australian evidence of Kane et al. (1984) and Easton (1991). The former study highlighted 
that the earnings signal dominated its dividend counterpart, while the latter two investigations 
reached the opposite conclusion. Given the greater similarity in business environment and the 
overlap in the sample time period, the closeness of these Irish results with the UK findings is 
perhaps not surprising, although the Irish market is very different to the markets studied 
previously, in terms of its small size and in the context of the exceptional GDP growth 
experienced in Ireland over the period studied. 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the stock market reaction to dividend signals for a sample of 
50 Irish companies over a 15-year time span. Despite the fact that the hypothesis has been 
tested by extensive empirical work in the USA, UK and Australia very few similar studies 
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have been conducted on Irish firms. 
The chapter set out to test three hypotheses. The results of tests of the first hypothesis, 
that the announcements of changes in dividend levels are associated with abnormal share 
returns, confirm that in general, abnormal returns on the announcement 
date for the dividend 
change sample were of the order of magnitude predicted 
by the dividend-signalling literature 
and the results indicate that there 
is a statistically significant market reaction on the dividend 
announcement day. 
The results of tests of the second hypothesis, that the earnings announcement supplies 
corroborative evidence for the dividend announcement, show that the abnormal returns on the 
announcement date for different dividend-earnings combinations of companies 
(DIEL, DIED, 
DDEI, DDED, DNCEI and DNCED) were of the order of magnitude predicted by the 
dividend-signalling literature; the good-news companies in the DIEL group earned large 
positive abnormal returns, while the bad-news companies in the DDED group had the largest 
negative abnormal returns of all the groups considered; the abnormal returns of the other 
main categories were ranked in the expected order. 
The results of tests of the third hypothesis, that simultaneous dividend and earnings 
announcements interact with one another to produce a joint effect which can be measured by 
abnormal share returns ("an interaction effect"), show that when account is taken of the fact 
the both dividends and earnings are disclosed to the public at the same time it appears that the 
earnings component tends to dominate, with the role of dividends limited to its interaction 
with the earnings news. 
These findings were found to be robust to the choice of metric used to establish 
benchmark returns; in particular, employment of excess returns (generated on the assumption 
that the expected return for all firms is equal to the market return, and hence often used in 
studies of smaller markets, where thin trading can lead to biased results), yielded evidence 
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that was entirely consistent with that obtained using abnormal returns. The results indicated 
that, characteristically, dividend and earnings signals jointly influenced the level of abnormal 
return earned by the companies in the sample and that the dominant number is earnings. 
These results confirm the findings of the US study of the interaction effect by Kane et al. 
(1984), the UK study by Lonie et al. (1996) and the Australian study by Easton (1991) 
respectively. 
Finally, the results of this study are consistent with the semi-strong form of the 
efficient markets hypothesis; on average all the major share price movements occurred on the 
announcement day of changes in dividends and earnings. On the other hand, the standard 
deviation is greater, relatively speaking, around the event period day t-1, t and t+1, revealing 
greater volatility in share returns and supplying further support for the EMH. 
The results are also consistent with the survey questionnaire evidence on signalling 
reported in Chapter 5 that the market did not consider the dividend announcement separately 
from earnings news. These similarities occur despite a number of obvious idiosyncrasies in 
the research setting, most notably the extraordinary performance of the Irish economy and the 
small size of the Dublin Stock Exchange, relative to other markets in which the role of 
dividend announcements has been examined. The evidence suggests, therefore, that the joint 
signalling effect of dividends and earnings in developed stock markets is not restricted to the 
largest, most liquid exchanges nor is dependent on the existence of 'typical' macro-economic 
conditions. 
It appears that the market interpretation of the dividend signal, especially when 
investors are simultaneously confronted by an unexpected and possibly conflicting earnings 
announcement, is a rather more complex process than that implied by many studies in the 
dividend-signalling literature. Chapter 7 explores this complexity further by conducting 
interviews with financial directors of firms and financial analysts. The interviews seek to 
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examine financial directors' perceptions about the relationship between dividend policy and 
firm value. In particular Chapter 7 considers whether the conclusions reported in Chapter 5 
and in this chapter, that dividends in isolation may not provide a robust signalling mechanism 
to Irish investors, are confirmed. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE VIEWS OF IRISH FINANCIAL DIRECTORS AND FINANCIAL 
ANALYSTS ON DIVIDENDS 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports the results of the third research method used in this study. The 
chapter records the findings of interviews conducted with financial directors involved in 
dividend decisions for their firms and the findings of interviews with financial analysts from 
leading Dublin stockbroker firms on whether dividends influence share prices. The research 
approach in this chapter complements the questionnaire and event study results presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
The findings of the survey questionnaire highlighted a number of instances of 
apparent contradictions in the responses to the questions posed. For example, despite 
agreeing that dividends should be maintained, respondents supported the contradictory view 
that the dividend should be allowed to fluctuate in accordance with current investment and 
financing needs-139 In addition, although the findings of the survey provide support for the 
theoretical signalling models, when specific statements are studied the views of respondents 
appeared less supportive of the dividend signalling literature than might have been 
expected. '4° In particular, respondents disagreed with the view that the market considered 
dividend announcements separately from earnings news and the conclusions of Chapter 6 
appear to confirm, that in the Irish stock market, dividends in isolation might not provide a 
robust signalling mechanism to Irish investors, but that instead the earnings signal dominates. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 provides details of 
the sample companies selected for interview while Section 7.3 analyses the results from the 
interviews using quotes to illustrate the points being made. Section 7.4 concludes the chapter. 
139 Particularly surprising was the fact that no significant differences were noted on this issue between quoted 
and unquoted companies and companies that pay dividends and those that do not. 140 For example respondents appeared to have very diverse views about the suggestion that a rise (fall) in dividend was typically associated with a share price increase (decrease). 
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7.2 Sample Companies Selected for Interviews 
The process of selecting the interviewees, the decisions taken about the conduct of the 
interviews and the analysis of the data emanating from the interviews is detailed in the 
Chapter 4. This section provides a description of the companies selected for interview. 
The study conducted interviews with 20 financial directors to explore the question of 
how firms determine the amount of dividends to pay to shareholders and to examine financial 
directors' perceptions about the relationship between dividend policy and firm value. Because 
of changes to the corporate taxation framework in Ireland, (see Chapter 2), the interviews 
also enquired about the influences which taxation has in determining payout ratios. In 
keeping with the research approach taken in Chapter 5, the interviews consider whether 
responses to these topics differ among industry groups, between quoted and unquoted 
companies and across dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms. Finally, to obtain an 
alternative point of view, and to compliment the research, the chapter also reports the results 
of interviews with 4 financial analysts from leading Dublin stockbroker firms on whether 
dividends influence share prices. 
Table 7.1 provides a description of the companies selected for interview, indicating 
their industry grouping, whether they were quoted or unquoted firms, whether they paid a 
dividend or not and whether any dividend paid had changed recently. 
A review of the table shows that 10 of the firms had listings on three markets (the 
Dublin Stock Exchange, the London Stock Exchange and an American Stock Exchange), 
three had dual listings (the Dublin Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange), two 
were quoted on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in London, while the shares of one 
firm were traded over the counter by a leading Dublin brokerage house. The remaining eight 
firms were unquoted at the time of the study; one of these firms had a turnover of more than 
E1 billion, two firms had a turnover of between E10 and E50 million, one firm had a turnover 
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of between £2.5 and £5 million, and 
four small enterprises had a turnover of less than £2.5 
million. Fifteen of the firms had paid dividends 
in the past and eight of these reported paying 
dividends every year of their existence. Five firms had never paid a dividend. The majority of 
dividend paying firms reported changing their dividend payment recently. 
Table 7.1: Details of Interviewees 
FIRM SECTOR LISTINGS DIVIDEND CHANGE 
A Building & Construction Ire/UK/US Yes Yes 
B Building & Construction Ire/UK Yes Yes 
C Building & Construction None Occasional Yes 
D Banking & Financial services Ire/UK/US Yes Yes 
E Banking & Financial services Ire/UK/US Yes Yes 
F Agribusiness, Food & Drink Ire/UK Yes Yes 
G Agribusiness, Food & Drink Market maker Never No 
H Computers & Technology Ire/UK/US Never No 
I Computers & Media None Occasional No 
J Transport Ire/UK/US Never No 
K Exploration & mining AIM: UK Never No 
L Exploration & production AIM: UK Never No 
M Manufacturing IRE/UK Yes No 
N Manufacturing None Occasional No 
p Manufacturing None Occasional No 
p Distribution None Occasional No 
Distribution None Occasional No 
R Professional services None Yes Yes 
S Property management None Yes Yes 
T Health-care Ire/US Occasional No 
Note: This table provides details about the 20 interviewees. The listings characteristic was determined by responses to the 
question " On which stock exchanges is your company quoted? " the dividend characteristic was based on responses to the 
question "Does your company pay an annual dividend? " The change characteristic was determined by responses to the 
question "Has the level of the dividend changed recently? " 
7.3 Description of Results 
The interviews focused on the following issues: (i) how firms determine the amount 
of dividends to pay to shareholders; (ii) whether interviewees believed in the `signalling' 
concept; and (iii) the influences of taxation on dividend payout ratios. The analysis considers 
whether responses to these topics differed among industry groups, between quoted and 
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unquoted companies and across dividend paying and non-dividend paying companies. 
The 
interviews with analysts complimented the discussions with finance directors by focussing on 
whether dividends were relevant to share values and provided signals of 
future prospects. 
7.3.1 Determinants of Dividend Payments 
The extensive nature of the discussions with the interviewees suggested that Irish 
firms devote considerable attention to dividend policy. However, significant differences 
emerged in the attitudes of quoted and unquoted firms to this issue. In keeping with Lintner's 
(1956) study, quoted companies' directors reported spending significant amounts of time 
deliberating before deciding on the level of dividend payments that their firms should make. 
Interviewee responses as a whole were generally consistent with Lintner's (1956) 
model. In particular there was strong support from quoted firms for the views that firms 
should: (i) maintain an uninterrupted dividend; (ii) avoid making changes in dividend rates 
that might have to be reversed in a year or so; and (iii) have a target payout ratio. Quoted 
companies' directors provided stronger support for the view that firms should maintain an 
uninterrupted dividend than did those working for unquoted companies. This finding is 
consistent with the results reported in Chapter 5 when a similar question was posed in the 
postal survey. Predictably, support for a stable dividend policy was weaker among unquoted 
firms. The primary concern among finance directors of dividend-paying quoted firms 
appeared to be the attainment of smooth growth in payout ratios, with current earnings and 
prior dividend payments influencing the target level. Interviewee M summed up the position 
of the quoted company interviewees from regular dividend-paying companies: 
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`In present market conditions I don't think it's an option to 
change our dividend policy. Investors value stability more than 
variability; if we were going to do something different from our 
recent pattern there would have to be a big reason to do so. 141 " 
There was significant support for the notion that a firm should be responsive to 
shareholders' preferences regarding dividends. This evidence regarding the influence of 
shareholder views' on Irish companies' dividend decision-making is similar to that reported 
for the US by Baker et al. (1985), for Australia by Partington (1985) and for Ireland in the 
survey findings documented in Chapter 5. Interviewee A, the financial director of a quoted 
construction company outlined that his company's board would "try to keep to the tacit 
bargain with their shareholders and honour their established policy". 
In reply to the specific question "would your board allow the dividend to fluctuate in 
accordance with the firm's current investment and financing needs" all of the interviewees 
from quoted companies in the sample who regularly pay dividends made clear that they 
would not allow the dividend to fluctuate. Interviewee F, the financial director of a long 
established quoted food and drinks firm, confirmed that: 
"We would never allow the dividend to fluctuate, we always, 
had a steady growth in the dividend even when we were 
involved in major acquisitions or had significant cap-ex 
requirements. We would use debt rather than pass on the 
dividend. " 
141 Interviewee G, the director of a food and drinks firm, (the shares of which are traded over the counter), stated 
that when his firm became cash positive the board decided to use surplus cash to fund investments and reduce 
debt rather than initiate dividends payments. This suggests that dividends are not based on the distribution of `excess cash' but supports the view that dividend stability (even where no dividends are paid) is a major 
consideration in the dividend setting process. 
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Interviewees D and E, the financial directors of financial services firms, in confirming their 
views that they would never allow the 
dividend to fluctuate, made the point that the policy 
which many financial services 
firms adopted in the late 1980s and early 1990s of paying 
substantial dividends and having 
frequent rights issues to fund expansion or acquisitions 
would not now be tolerated by the market. 
142 This view was confirmed by all of the financial 
analysts, who indicated that the market would take a 
dim view of any company raising funds 
to pay a dividend. 
A significant difference emerged between interviewees from quoted and unquoted 
firms on the question of dividends as a residual. Unquoted firms appeared to accept that firms 
should allow the dividend to fluctuate, in accordance with current investment and financing 
needs, confirming one of the conclusions drawn from the questionnaire study reported in 
Chapter 5.143 
The perceptions of interviewees from quoted companies that do not pay regular 
dividends were very different. Specifically, the financial directors in such firms believed that 
their shareholders tended to view any dividend initiations with suspicion. For example, 
Interviewee K, the financial director of an exploration company stated that "our shareholders 
would be in a state of shock if [the company] were to start paying dividends; they are punters 
and have bought [the shares] for capital growth. " Interviewee J, the financial director of a 
quoted transportation company that has never paid a dividend in its history, confirmed this 
142 This comment appears to refute Jensen's (1986) hypothesis on agency theory. However the comments of the 
interviewees may have been a reflection of the adverse experience that a number of financial services firms have 
had with overseas acquisitions. 
143 For example, Interviewee N, the financial director of the largest unquoted firm taking part in the study, 
confirmed: "We would always allow the dividend to fluctuate, we would be 100% flexible. The fundamental 
principal that we applied was that the dividend was in effect surplus to operating requirements. We would never 
do anything that might adversely affect the financial stability of the group, if we borrowed money for an 
acquisition our objective was to pay it down as soon as possible so that we had a balance sheet that could carry 
three or four bad years. If we did take a dividend for tax reasons or whatever in practically all cases we lent the 
funds back to the group. " 
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sentiment. The director indicated that his board did consider paying a dividend about two 
years ago, but concluded that any payment, even a very small one, would send a very 
negative signal to the market. The board's view was that the payment of a dividend would 
give the impression to shareholders that the board believed that the period of exponential 
growth to be over. The financial analysts interviewed appeared to disagree with this view. 
One analyst asserted that: 
"I do not agree that paying a dividend is a sign of weakness - 
the dividend would not be a negative, it is not necessarily the 
case that when a dividend is paid that growth has ceased. 
Microsoft have announced that the company is to introduce 
dividend payments. I don't know of any analyst who would 
suggest that the growth story at Microsoft is over. " 
Another analyst remarked that: 
"I see dividend policy as a discipline on the business - not a 
sign of weakness. Ultimately there is an expectation that 
companies will pay a dividend, I don't believe that the payment 
of a dividend disturbs the growth strategy. A dividend policy 
ensures that the company generates cash. " 
The main point emphasised by all the financial analysts in this regard is that they 
would not expect to see any change in the dividend that had not been notified to them in 
meetings with the directors of quoted companies. For example, one of the analysts remarked 
that "[he] took the dividend policy as a given, it is not an agenda item and brokers notes 
never mention it". However, while the analysts acknowledged that most Irish companies 
maintained a stable payout they agreed that in the context of market conditions following the 
events of September 11th 2001 it might be appropriate for many firms to review their payout 
policy. In particular, they agreed that the dividend capacity of many Irish companies was 
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currently high with most quoted companies 
in Ireland having profits levels which cover the 
annual dividend of at least 3 times. One analyst commented that 
his firm had carried out a 
review of the dividend paying capacity of Irish companies and the report 
had noted that: 
"Since 2000, dividends have provided the only return for 
investors from their shareholdings. We now view the dividend 
as very important in portfolio selection, particularly for private 
clients. Many Irish listed companies could afford to increase 
the dividend without putting any stress on their balance sheet. 
In general, Irish companies have a greater capacity to pay 
increased dividends than European companies since Irish 
dividend yields are, on average, 20-30% lower" 
The analysts believed that Irish Stock Exchange constituents will have to face the reality of 
larger cash disbursements over the coming decade as return on capital and the historical focus 
on capital growth no longer justify lower payouts. None of the analysts could confirm, 
however, whether an increased payout would lead to significantly higher ratings for those 
companies that changed their policies, although they believed that the increasing dividend 
would appeal to a wider circle of investors and thereby increase demand for the shares of 
high yielding companies. 
Directors of unquoted firms appeared to rely extensively on their taxation advisors in 
determining dividend payments. Interviewee R, the financial director of a professional 
services firm, summed up the position of all the unquoted close companies interviewed for 
the study when he noted that: 
"We would never consider paying a dividend to our 
shareholders if our auditors/tax advisors had not suggested 
that we do so to eliminate Corporation surcharge tax. Given 
that most of our income is considered professional income 
rather than trading income we are liable to a surcharge144 if we 
don't distribute. " 
144 The professional service income of a closely held company is subject to a 15% additional Corporation Tax 
(surcharge) if such companies do not distribute profits within 18 months of the companies year-end. 
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The views of the financial directors of unquoted companies regarding payout determinants 
also reflected the impact of major lenders 
in the decision. For example, Interviewee P the 
financial director of an unquoted distribution company noted that: 
"We would never pay a dividend if funds were required for 
expansion or diversification. Our bank would not support us if 
we made dividend payments unless it could be shown that the 
dividend had to be paid for tax reasons. Even in such 
circumstances, the bank would require us to reinvest the 
dividend in the company; dividends are a negative for 
bankers. " 
Interviewee 0, the financial director of an unquoted manufacturing firm, confirmed that their 
bankers and the Irish Industrial Development Authority (from which the company had 
received substantial development grants) insisted on an annual cap on dividend payments. He 
continued: 
"We got around the problem by agreeing to designate 
distributable reserves as non-distributable reserves, and either 
agreeing to lend the dividends we received back to the company 
as subordinated shareholder loans, or give irrevocable 
undertakings to subscribe for convertible loan stock to ensure a 
comfortable gearing position " 
Most quoted company interviewees disagreed that their firms based current dividends 
on cash flow considerations. Interviewee A, the financial director of a quoted construction 
firm stated that: 
"We have large credit lines available; liquidity is not an issue 
for us in setting the dividend " 
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Interviewee E, the financial director of a financial services firm summed up the positions in 
respect of that sector: 
"Given our strong balance sheet and substantial dividend 
cover we have relatively easy access to funds, so liquidity is not 
an issue for us in the determination of the dividend" 
This observation appears inconsistent with the findings of a 1989 survey of Irish quoted 
companies (Green et al., 1993) where respondents considered cash resources to be an 
important factor in the dividend setting decision. It also differs from the findings reported in 
Chapter 5 in that directors of quoted companies who replied to the questionnaire displayed 
the highest level of agreement with the statement that firms should base current dividends on 
cash flow considerations. The only exception was Interviewee M, the financial director of a 
quoted manufacturing firm, which had suffered substantial trading losses in recent years; he 
indicated that: 
"We had an established policy of paying dividends to our 
shareholders, but when we got into financial difficulties we had 
to pass on the dividend simply because we had no cash. I 
suppose if we had had easier access to funds we might have 
considered it but legally I don't think we could have paid the 
dividend because at that time we had negative reserves ". 
Paradoxically cash flow was not a consideration for unquoted companies in the determination 
of dividends as the finance directors of unquoted firms were less inclined to believe that firms 
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should base current dividends on their cash flow situation. 
"' This observation appears to be 
inconsistent with the findings of the survey reported in Chapter 5 where unquoted company 
respondents considered cash resources to be the most important factor in the dividend setting 
decision. 
There was a strong view amongst the interviewees that firms should base current 
dividends on future earnings expectations; this was particularly the case with quoted firms 
who regularly pay dividends. Interviewee D confirmed that the board would "seek to 
establish a policy of paying out say 35-40% of earnings over say a five or six year period so 
that over the long term such a trend would be accepted by the market". This result is again 
inconsistent with the survey findings reported in Chapter 5 where respondents indicated that 
expected future profitability was not as important as current earnings in the dividend 
decision. 
All quoted company financial directors agreed with the view that a firm should base 
its current dividend decision on last year's dividend plus a percentage growth factor and that 
the amount of dividend paid should reflect the amount paid by its competitors. Interviewee A 
stated that "we would look at our sector, particularly the UK; we would not want to be out of 
line with our competitors either in Ireland or the UK". This response is surprising given the 
survey responses reported in Chapter 5 where the majority of those answering indicated that 
the dividend policy of competitors would not influence their decision. 
To summarise, the primary concern among finance directors of dividend-paying 
quoted firms appeared to be the attainment of smooth growth in payout ratios, with current 
and future earnings, prior dividend payments and the dividend policy of firms in the sector 
influencing the target level. In contrast, the perceptions of finance directors from quoted 
145 Interviewee P confirmed: "If we had to pay a dividend to our shareholders for whatever reason and we didn't have the cash, the shareholders would simply lend the funds back to the company or we would simply declare a 
scrip dividend. I can't see how cash flow or liquidity would ever be a problem in that regard. " 
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companies that do not pay regular dividends indicated that their shareholders tended to view 
any dividend initiations/changes with suspicion. Financial analysts agreed that firms should 
strive to achieve a smooth growth in dividend payout ratios, but believed that the suspicions 
of non-dividend paying companies were unfounded. Finally, unquoted firms appeared to rely 
extensively on their taxation advisors in determining dividend payments. 
7.3.2 Market Signals 
The fmance directors of dividend-paying companies appeared more supportive of the 
dividend-signalling literature than the survey respondents in Chapter 5 and all interviewees 
from dividend-paying quoted companies agreed with the view that the market interprets a 
dividend change as a signal. The directors of non dividend-paying companies also appeared 
to accept that the market interprets any change in policy (i. e. the initiation of a dividend) as a 
signal. However, all quoted company interviewees suggested that the signal was not based on 
dividends alone; they disagreed with the view that the market considered dividend 
announcements separately from earnings news confirming the findings of the survey 
responses in Chapter 5. In response to a direct question on the topic, Interviewee F's 
viewpoint was typical of all six quoted dividend-payers when he stated that: "investors look 
at both earnings and dividends, but the prime number is earnings, no question". He continued 
"investors use the dividend as an indication of how confident and comfortable you are with 
the earnings number for the coming year, but the real story is earnings; the dividend is a 
peripheral signal. 99146 
All analysts agreed with this view and pointed out that "[the market's] expectations 
are such that the dividend is seen as routine based on last year's dividend plus a percentage. " 
146 This view supports the findings reported in Chapter 6 where earnings was noted to be the dominant variable. 
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The view of one analyst was typical who indicated that the issue of signalling was very 
important: 
"... if your company sends out a signal that your dividend 
policy is to pay out a certain percentage of earnings it becomes 
very diicult to change that policy" 
Another analyst suggested that where a company is taken over and the new owners have a 
reputation for paying substantial dividends it is very difficult to "avoid the pressure caused by 
reputation, even if the previous owners had passed on the dividend or had perhaps never paid 
a dividend. "147 Predictably, support for a stable dividend policy was weaker among firms 
that reported having changed their payout levels in the past, particularly when views about 
reversing changes were sought. 
These responses appear to confirm the findings of Green et al. (1993) who 
documented strong support for the view that dividends represent a very important mechanism 
for signalling managements' expectations about future profitability. Although interviewees 
generally agreed with the conclusions of previous empirical studies, that dividend changes 
convey some unanticipated information to the market, the level of consensus on this issue 
was considerably lower than was expected. In particular, interviewees did not agree with the 
view that a rise (fall) in dividend is typically associated with a share price increase (decrease). 
Interviewee D's viewpoint is typical of respondents at all six quoted companies that pay 
annual dividends in arguing that: 
147 The analyst highlighted the example of a prominent Irish businessman who became a major shareholder and director in Waterford Wedgewood. Despite a history of trading losses and dividend passes in that company dividend payments were immediately resumed following the takeover. The businessman was now in the process 
of taking over Eircom and the analyst observed that prospectus for the Eircom takeover showed that significant dividend payouts were planned following a successful takeover. 
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"An increase in the dividend will not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the share price because that is what the market is 
expecting based on the historical pattern. A cut in the dividend 
would lead to a drop in the share price if the market wasn't 
prepared for it, but we would never use the dividend to convey 
bad news; the information would have been put out in advance 
by trading statements, comments by the chairman at the AGM, 
etc. The market moves in curious ways" 
Interviewees agreed with questions concerning the importance of investors' expectations in 
determining how the market interpreted a dividend change as a signal. In the opinions of 
those questioned, the expectations of shareholders were based on several variables, most 
notably last year's dividend and current earnings. The financial analysts also highlighted the 
influence of payment trends within sectors, current economic conditions and last year's 
earnings on investors' expectations about what the future dividend might be. 
Unquoted firms did not appear to share these perceptions and believed that the 
signalling issue was not particularly relevant to their circumstances. This finding is perhaps 
not surprising, given that all of the unquoted companies in the sample, except the largest one, 
were 100% owned by shareholders who were also directors. As the directors are actively 
engaged with their firms on a day-to-day basis, they could be expected to be fully aware of 
the financial position of their firms. In these circumstances they were more likely to face the 
pressure of providing signals of their financial strength to bankers rather than to themselves 
as shareholders. However the financial directors of unquoted firms accepted that the 
signalling issue was " probably important for listed companies that regularly pay dividends. " 
All of those interviewed confirmed that they would not buy shares in listed companies for the 
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dividend148 but if they did "[they] would not regard the dividend change as a signal; the 
earnings change was more relevant. " In summary, financial directors of quoted companies 
appeared to accept that the market interpreted the dividend as a signal, but that the signal was 
not based on dividends alone; the earnings figure was seen as being more important and the 
prime number. Financial analysts agreed, but were unanimous in their views that once a 
quoted company established dividend policy it was very difficult to cut or pass on the 
dividend. Financial directors of unquoted firms on the other hand believed that the signalling 
issue was not particularly relevant to their circumstances. However all the financial directors 
of sample companies confirmed that they would not buy company shares solely for the 
dividend. 
7.3.3 The Influence of Taxation on Dividend Policy 
Significant differences emerged regarding the role of taxation in the dividend 
decisions of quoted and unquoted firms. Quoted companies' directors were significantly less 
inclined to believe that firms should determine dividends on the basis of the tax status of the 
company's shareholders. For example, in his answer to the question about whether boards 
should determine the annual dividend based on their perception of the tax status of the 
shareholder, Interviewee M stated that "it would be nearly impossible for boards of quoted 
companies to know the tax status of its shareholders". He continued: 
"We have such a variety of shareholders that we couldn't 
possibly consider that issue. " 
148 The financial director of the largest unquoted company stated that when interest rates fell he bought a number 
of high dividend yield shares as an arbitrage play. He stated that "[he] was seriously out of the money, the dividend yield had given a bum steer, earnings is the more important number -any firm can pay a dividend. " 
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Interviewee A arrived at a similar view based upon a different justification; he pointed out 
that "as 85%-90% of [his firm's] shareholders are institutions or corporate investors, the tax 
status of individual shareholders would be of no interest to [the firm] "'. 
149 However, 
Interviewee A did admit that while his firm might be unaware of the personal tax 
circumstances of its individual shareholders, it would always try and maximise any potential 
tax break for shareholders stating that `... we owe it to our shareholders to do whatever is 
possible on the tax side'. He continued: 
"For example, when export sales relief was available we 
distributed the profits from exports in preference to profits from 
the domestic market. When the government introduced a tax 
relief for shareholders in receipt of dividends paid by firms 
which carried on manufacturing activities, we offered our 
shareholders the choice of receiving the dividend from either 
profits which qualified for the 10% manufacturing tax rate or 
profits which did not qualify. Only about 12% of our 
shareholders opted for a manufacturing dividend because the 
tax credit was lower which didn't surprise us as most of our 
shareholders are institutions, pension funds, etc. and they 
would want the larger tax credit" 
Respondents who worked in unquoted companies had very different perceptions 
about the relevance of taxation to the dividend decisions. Interviewee N summed up the 
position of all the interviewees from unquoted companies when he stated that "the tax 
status of individual shareholders is the key factor in determining our dividend policy and 
I" Very little empirical work has been published on the nature of share ownership of Irish quoted firms or on 
how institutional shareholders affect the propensity of Irish quoted firms to pay dividends. Murphy (2003) 
examined the share registers of four firms quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange in four different sectors 
(financials; industrials; foods; and tourism undertakings), and considered how their respective trades affected 
volatility in the market. The author noted that although private individuals are the majority of the holders in Irish 
quoted firms institutional investors hold on average 88% of the shares. Based on interview evidence with the 
two largest stockbroker firms in Dublin the author reported that institutional investors have longer-term 
investment time horizons; the investment philosophy of institutional holders focuses on achieving returns by 
efficiently managing and controlling portfolio risk, institutional holders trade in larger amounts of stock than 
private clients but trade less frequently; private clients have shorter-term investment time horizons than 
institutional investors; the investment philosophy of private clients depends on their tax status; private clients 
are price takers and create more noise in the market as their volume trades are smaller and more frequent. 
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would be the main focus of our meeting with our tax advisors. " Among the remaining 
interviewees, there tended to be support for the clientele hypothesis. For example, those 
firms that did not have a policy of paying dividends believed that the tax status of their 
shareholders was unimportant. As Interviewee G indicated: 
"People buy our shares for capital gains not for dividend 
income. Punters would be shocked if [our firm] paid a 
dividend; it would be totally unexpected as they're only 
interested in capital gain, they would not know what to do with 
the dividend voucher" 
However, Interviewee K reported that his firm's position on the issue was not fixed, but 
instead varied according to the circumstances of its shareholders; he stated that his board 
might consider the tax status of its shareholders because the company had started producing 
oil and would earn profits in the future. This interviewee expressed views consistent with 
"clientele" theories of dividends, guessing that the shareholders in his firm "would sell out" if 
they got a dividend as they would not be interested in paying tax on dividend income; he 
believed that "companies get the shareholders they deserve and that his firm's shareholders 
were gamblers; not guys looking for a stream of income. " 
All of the interviewees agreed that recent changes in the tax code in Ireland had 
influenced the dividend decisions of firms because of altered demands from shareholders. 
For example, Interviewee F noted that the abolition of tax credits on dividends had had a 
negative effect and believed that they should be re-introduced. Interviewee N concurred with 
this view, but explained why investors were not overly concerned about the change at the 
time: 
"The abolition of the credits happened at a time of a boom, 
when stock prices were racing ahead, and, the whole world 
wanted capital gains. From the Government's point of view, it 
was beautifully timed in that nobody cared; but nowadays it is 
a concern in that shareholders are taxed twice on the same 
income. " 
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All the financial directors from regular dividend-paying firms agreed that the only 
major effect of the introduction of the dividend withholding tax 
(DWT) in 1999 was that 
fines paid dividends immediately prior to its introduction so shareholders could avail of 
imputed tax credits on those dividends. Interviewee D was typical in this regard stating that 
his company "brought forward the final dividend payment to ensure that their shareholders 
would be able to avail of the imputed tax credit before the 
introduction of the dividend 
withholding tax regime. " The introduction of dividend withholding tax appears to have had 
little substantial effect on dividend policy, although interviewee M felt that: 
"The paper work associated with it is a pain .... I think the 
Revenue could make it easier particularly as in our case we 
have a significant number of overseas shareholders who are 
exempt. " 
In contrast, interviewees agreed that both the recent introduction of a low rate of Corporation 
Tax in the Republic of Ireland, and the treatment of scrip dividends as income, made 
dividend payments less attractive to shareholders and favoured retentions (capital gains). 
Conventional finance literature pays little direct attention to the influence of advisers 
on major corporate decisions. In contrast, all the interviewees from unquoted firms referred to 
the important role played by tax advisers in the dividend decisions of their firms. Their views 
are summed up by Interviewee N the financial director of the largest of the unquoted firms. 
He confirmed "the dividend decision in our firm is highly dependent on the personal tax 
circumstances of our shareholders and the advice of our tax advisors. " This interviewee went 
on to state that prior to 5t' April 1990, his firm had followed a policy of paying substantial 
dividends; the dividends paid to shareholders at that time were tax-free because the company 
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was entitled to export sales relief. After 1990 
however, the dividends were no longer tax- 
free, but the tax advisors were able to help with new tax shelters: 
"For example when our shareholders bought a building in the 
Customs House Docks Development Area which had very 
attractive tax depreciation allowances our tax advisors 
suggested that we increase the dividend to enable the 
shareholders to pay for the building. The shareholders were 
able to claim a refund of the tax credits attaching to the 
dividend because they sheltered the dividend income with 
capital allowances ". 
Interviewee 0, the financial director of an unquoted manufacturing firm, indicated 
that his firm only paid a dividend when it was tax efficient to do so. For example, his firm 
had paid their first dividend in 1985, following a government decision to introduce tax relief 
for shareholders in receipt of dividends paid by firms that carried on manufacturing activities 
in the Republic of Ireland. 150 Interviewee 0 also pointed out that when the relief for 
dividends paid by manufacturing concerns was withdrawn, the firm discontinued dividend 
payments for a time. He pointed out that: 
"We only re-introduced dividend payments after another 
company in the group (i. e. a royalty company) had developed a 
patented manufacturing process. Our tax advisors informed us 
that dividends paid out of such a patent royalty company were 
tax-free. As a result the group resumed dividend payments in 
1991 and the firm continues to pay substantial tax-free royalty 
dividends" 
130 Certain manufacturing companies will continue to pay Corporation Tax at 10% until 2010. Under the 
arrangements introduced in 1985 only 50% of the dividend paid by manufacturing concerns was taxable in the 
hands of shareholders, but shareholders were entitled to a full tax credit on the dividend under the imputation 
system; in most cases the relief provided shareholders with a tax refund. The relief was withdrawn in 1989 
(Finance Act 1989). 
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Interviewee I, the financial director/shareholder of an unquoted computer technology 
company which had patented computer software, stated that shareholder directors used to 
receive a substantial part of their remuneration in the form of dividends rather than salary 
because tax rules at that time allowed tax-free royalty dividends. After the rules on royalty 
dividends paid by software companies were changed, the company ceased paying dividends; 
he stated that "it was then more tax efficient for the company to pay remuneration as salaries 
rather than dividends as the company obtains a tax deduction for salary while there is no tax 
deduction for dividends. "' Interviewee N noted that the tax advice they had received 
suggests: 
"It is more tax efficient to pay shareholders an attendance fee 
to attend an AGM rather than pay an annual dividend 
particularly since tax credits were abolished in 1999. " 
The importance attached by the interviewees to the tax regime is summed up by Interviewee 
P, the financial director of a distribution company which earned substantial rental and 
investment income, who stated that his firm only pay dividends to avoid a possible 
irrecoverable Corporation Tax surcharge on undistributed rental and investment income. 
"Our tax advisors have informed us that because we are a 
close company we must pay a dividend on any after tax rental 
and investment income within eighteen months of our year end 
otherwise we must pay a 20% surcharge which is 
irrecoverable. We would not otherwise consider paying a 
dividend as it is inefficient from a tax point of view to do so. " 
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Interview S, the financial director of a property and investment company agreed that his firm 
only pay dividends to avoid a possible Corporation Tax surcharge. He continued: 
"We don't even pay the dividend to our ultimate shareholders. 
The dividend is paid to a holding company resident in the Isle 
of Man. The Manx company retains and accumulates the 
dividend funds. The ultimate shareholders don't want the 
dividend because their tax rate is effectively 47% on any 
dividend they receive. We may have to pay Dividend 
Withholding Tax (DWT) if the Isle of Man company pays a 
dividend, but our tax advisors have informed us that it is more 
efficient to pay the DWT than a 20% surcharge which is 
irrecoverable. " 
Finally, the main concern of the financial analysts on the taxation issue was the loss of 
the tax credits following the abolition of the imputation system. One of the analysts made the 
point that "this move was a stealth tax on the [pension] funds which had not been properly 
debated at the time" He continued "I don't accept Gordon Brown's analysis that the 
imputation system encourages companies to pay out dividends rather than invest the profits". 
A further concern of the analysts was that "there was no longer a level playing field" in the 
market for private clients' funds as "the [marginal] tax rate on dividend income is now 47% 
as opposed to 25% on bank deposit interest income. " However none of the analysts were in 
favour of abolishing income tax on dividends as had been suggested in the US. One analyst 
proposed that: "the most equitable solution would be that the Dividend Withholding Tax 
(DWT) should operate in the same manner as Deposit Interest Retention Tax (DIRT) for 
interest income. "151 
To summarise, most dividend paying quoted companies' directors were not inclined 
to accept that firms should determine dividends on the basis of the tax status of the 
151 Under Irish tax rules a retention tax is applied to bank deposit interest at source. No further income tax is 
payable on deposit interest (TCA 1997). However social security levies of 5% are due (Finance Act 2002). 
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company's shareholders. However, they did it that they would always try and maximise 
any potential tax break for shareholders in the dividend decision. There appeared to be an 
acceptance of the tax clientele argument amongst non-dividend paying quoted companies, in 
that these directors believed that their shareholders were not interested in dividend income, 
and would in all probability exit the firm if dividend payments were initiated. Interviewees in 
unquoted companies had very different perceptions; they believed that the tax status of 
individual shareholders-and particularly input from tax advisers-were the key factors in 
determining their dividend policy. 
7.4 Conclusions 
The evidence from the interviews suggests that several conclusions can be drawn 
about contemporary Irish attitudes towards dividend policy. First, in keeping with Lintner's 
(1956) original study, quoted companies' directors were found to spend significant amounts 
of time deliberating before deciding on the level of dividend payments that their firms make. 
The primary concern of financial directors in quoted firms that pay dividends appeared to be 
the attainment of smooth growth in payout ratios that reflect current earnings and prior 
dividend levels. All such directors agreed that firms should maintain an uninterrupted 
dividend, avoid making changes in dividend rates that might have to be reversed in a year or 
so and adopt a target payout ratio. 
Second, most interviewees were supportive about the suggestion that dividend policy 
affects share values, but this was particularly the case in circumstances where the dividend is 
cut. However, all interviewees believe that the more important signal is provided by the 
earnings figure. The study therefore provides some support for theoretical models that predict 
the manner in which dividends can act as signalling mechanisms to outside investors, but 
only to compliment the message provided by the earnings figure. In that context, the findings 
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support the results of the questionnaire-based study reported in Chapter 5 and the event study 
in Chapter 6. 
Finally, the interviewees appeared to hold relatively strong views about the impact of 
tax on dividend decisions. For example, all the financial directors of dividend-paying quoted 
firms agreed that recent changes in the taxation regime in the Irish Republic make dividend 
payments less attractive to shareholders. Moreover, quoted company directors appear to 
subscribe to the clientele argument (i. e. shareholders discriminate between those companies 
which pay dividends and those which do not). For unquoted firms, dividend policy appears to 
be strongly driven by taxation issues, and in all cases interviewees confirmed that 
shareholders re-invested the dividends they received back into the company; tax advisors 
appear to play a major role in determining dividend policy for such companies. 
While the evidence in this chapter broadly supports the findings from Chapters 5 and 
6 this support is not unanimous; subtle differences exist. Therefore, the final chapter of this 
thesis attempts to compare the three sets of empirical results and draw persuasive 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
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8.1 Introduction 
Financial theorists are puzzled by corporate dividend behaviour. Most individual 
investors should value a euro of pre-tax corporate dividends less than a pre-tax euro of 
corporate retentions, because in a majority of 
jurisdictions the former results in greater tax 
liabilities for investors. Companies, however, face equal taxation costs of paying out 
dividends and retaining earnings. Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrated that in the 
absence of taxes, dividend policy should 
have no effect on share valuation. Therefore, as 
dividends suffer taxation penalties, firms should pay no dividends. Widespread dividend 
payments to taxable investors are therefore surprising and have 
been interpreted as evidence 
of irrational behaviour (Poterba and Summers, 1984). A full understanding of why firms pay 
dividends still eludes researchers despite the fact that there has been almost fifty years of 
research on the dividend question, mainly undertaken in the US, the UK and Australia. 
This study attempts to address the dividend question in an Irish context. Prior to this 
study very little was reported in the academic literature about the attitudes of company 
executives and investors to dividend policy in Ireland. The small number of Irish studies 
which have been undertaken have provided only a partial explanation of these decisions; in 
addition they are based on small samples from a fairly distant time period. Since the Irish 
economy has changed dramatically over recent years (Forfäs, 2001), the findings of previous 
studies may not remain valid and so modem investigation of the topic is therefore timely and 
worthwhile. 
8.2 Conclusions of the Study 
The central objectives of the study were to: (i) ascertain how Irish firms determine the 
amount of dividends to pay to shareholders; (ii) examine the relationship between dividend 
policy and firm value in an Irish context; and (iii) investigate whether belief in the 
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`signalling' concept is widely held by Irish companies and stockbrokers. The study 
accomplishes these different aims using three empirical investigations: a questionnaire 
survey; interviews; and, a market-based event study. 
The evidence from the empirical work suggests that several novel conclusions can be 
drawn about contemporary Irish attitudes towards dividend policy. First, the findings of the 
study suggest that Irish quoted firms are generally aware of the clientele effect. The directors 
of Irish quoted companies believe that they know the nature of their shareholder base and 
perceive that Irish investors discriminate between companies which pay dividends and those 
that do not in portfolio selection. Therefore, the suggestion that companies subscribe to the 
clientele argument is supported in an Irish context; the directors of Irish quoted companies 
believe that companies appeal to a clientele of shareholders whose consumption patterns 
accord with the dividend payment patterns of the companies they select for their portfolio. 
Second, the evidence suggests that most Irish companies are aware that the recent 
changes in the taxation regime in the Republic of Ireland have made dividend payments less 
attractive to individual shareholders and that dividend payments impose a substantial tax 
penalty on individual shareholders. However, quoted companies do not appear to regard the 
tax status of investors as a key factor in the determination of the annual dividend. Although 
the directors of quoted companies indicated that they always attempt to maximise tax benefits 
on dividend payments for individual shareholders, the respondents in this thesis indicated that 
they are more concerned with dividend continuity and the dividend expectations of 
institutional investors. The directors of quoted companies accept that the abolition of the 
imputation system has reduced the dividend yield for all shareholders. However, dividend- 
paying companies believe that they must honour the tacit understanding with their 
institutional shareholders to ensure that dividend stability is combined with moderate growth. 
In addition, Irish quoted companies appear to be very concerned with ensuring that their 
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dividend policy is not out of line with the dividend policy of competitors in their industry 
sector, particularly in Ireland and the UK. The opinions expressed by the directors of 
unquoted companies differed markedly from those of quoted companies. For unquoted 
companies, dividend policy is strongly driven by the taxation status of their owner 
shareholders; tax advisors therefore play a key role in determining the dividend policy of 
such companies. The findings confirm that unquoted companies have a different view of the 
dividend question than companies operating in a competitive, market-based environment. 
Third, the major determinants of modem Irish dividend policy appear strikingly 
similar to those mentioned in John Lintner's (1956) behavioural model developed from the 
1950s. Irish quoted companies follow a policy in which dividend reductions are anathema 
and an increased dividend will only be declared if management are convinced that the new 
dividend level can be maintained. The latter observation is not consistent with the evidence 
reported in previous studies of Irish data, which did not support Lintner's (1956) partial 
adjustment model (see Barrett and Cotter, 1990). In the context of this study, quoted 
companies appear to believe that the level and rate of change of the dividend are key 
variables in financial planning. This may explain why, despite the known tax penalty 
associated with dividend payments, a significant number of quoted sample companies 
continue to make regular payments to investors. 
Fourth, Irish companies were generally supportive of the suggestion that dividend 
policy affects share valuations. Although the study does not uncover the exact reasons for the 
belief in the relevance of dividends, there appears to be support for theoretical models that 
indicate how dividends can act as signalling mechanisms to outside investors. Specifically, 
the findings indicated that quoted companies which announced major reductions in dividends 
and earnings tended to educate the stock market through profit and dividend warnings before 
the occurrence of the actual dividend/earnings announcement in an effort to prevent 
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undesirably large swings in share prices. Therefore, the study provides strong support for the 
theoretical signalling models, particularly in the context where the dividend is cut or passed. 
The findings of this study are therefore as supportive of the effectiveness of the-theoretical 
signalling models as the empirical findings reported in the academic literature for larger stock 
markets. 
Fifth, belief in the dividend-signalling model seems stronger among investors. A 
clean, previously un-examined extensive database of Irish equity prices, announcement dates 
of dividends and earnings was constructed. The evidence from the market-based event study 
indicates that Irish investors react to dividend announcements in a manner consistent with the 
announcements conveying important information to the capital market. This reaction was 
very pronounced on the dividend announcement date. On average, the Irish stock market 
responded: (i) favourably to news of dividend increases; (ii) favourably to news of no change 
in dividends; and, (iii) unfavourably to news of a cut in dividends. The performance was 
statistically significant for sample companies that increased their dividends but not for the 
dividend no-change companies or those companies which cut their dividends. These findings 
provide additional evidence for the suggestion that Irish quoted companies tend to only 
increase their dividend if management are convinced that the new dividend level can be 
sustained. The evidence also indicates that quoted Irish companies which announce major 
reductions in dividends may attempt to inform the market before the announcement date of 
results to limit the element of surprise at the time the news is made public. 
Sixth, there was considerable evidence that management decisions to change the 
dividend became known to the market before the final dividend announcement date, 
particularly in cases where the dividend was cut or passed. '52 However, a different picture 
152 One reason for this "discovery" may have been the interim results which had been disclosed by the firm. Additionally, competitors' results may have suggested that bad news was in the pipeline. Of course, the 
evidence is also consistent with information leakage. 
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emerged when the share returns around the 
dividend news were analysed. Specifically, test 
results confirmed that the Irish market responded quickly to the news contained 
in the 
dividend announcements, indicating that limited exploitable arbitrage opportunities existed 
in 
the post announcement period. The results for tests of different changes 
in dividend levels all 
produce evidence to this effect; this 
finding is consistent with evidence reported for larger 
stock markets and may indicate that the Irish stock market conforms with the semi-strong 
form of market efficiency in terms of its reaction to dividend news. This conclusion is not 
surprising because, as was pointed out in Chapter 2, while the Irish stock market 
is small by 
international standards, unlike smaller markets in developing countries it is highly regulated 
and the rules for investor protection are similar to those that apply in the larger developed 
Western stock markets. In addition, many stocks listed on the Irish exchange have dual 
listings having both a quotation in Dublin and on at least one larger market such as London or 
New York. In this context, the regulations regarding the disclosure of information to the 
market are as rigorous as those that apply in larger markets. 
Seventh, when the three dividend groups were sub-divided into six dividend/earnings 
categories, according to whether the firms reported higher or lower profits than in the 
preceding year, test results confirm that the earnings announcement supplies corroborative 
evidence to the dividend announcement. Specifically, the evidence suggests that the abnormal 
returns on the announcement date for different dividend-earnings combinations of companies 
(DI-El, DI-ED, DD-EI, DD-ED, DNC-EI and DNC-ED) were of the order of magnitude 
predicted by the dividend-signalling literature; the good-news companies in the DI-El group 
earned large positive abnormal returns, while the bad-news companies in the DD-ED group 
had the largest negative abnormal returns of all the groups considered; the abnormal returns 
of the other main categories were ranked in the expected order. 
Eighth, the results of tests of whether the simultaneous dividend and earnings 
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announcements interact with one another (the "interaction effect") show that when account is 
taken of the fact that dividends and earnings are disclosed simultaneously and the impact of 
the joint signal is analysed, the earnings component tends to dominate, with the role of 
dividends limited to its interaction with the earnings news. These findings are found to be 
robust to the choice of metric used to establish benchmark returns; in particular, employment 
of excess returns (generated on the assumption that the expected return for all firms is equal 
to the market return, and hence often used in studies of smaller markets, where thin trading 
can lead to biased results), yielded evidence that was entirely consistent with the results 
obtained using abnormal returns. The results indicate that dividend and earnings signals 
jointly influenced the level of abnormal return earned by the companies in the sample. These 
results confirm the findings of similar studies conducted on larger stock markets. 
Ninth, a more detailed examination of the explanatory factors influencing returns on 
the dividend announcement date using analysis of variances revealed that between company 
factors, such as sector and size, have very little explanatory power. Earnings and 
dividend/earnings interaction are the only significant variables in the ANOVA model, with p- 
values well below the critical value for significance at the 5% level. When these results are 
considered in conjunction with the findings about the "interaction effect" that the dividend 
signal in isolation is insignificant, it appears that the earnings signal dominates in the Irish 
stock market, but the dividend signal has some incremental explanatory power via its 
interaction with the earnings news. In summary, the evidence in this study confirms the 
dominant impact of earnings news on share prices. The findings of this investigation for Irish 
companies therefore have more in common with UK findings (Lonie et al., 1996) than with 
the reported evidence for US and Australian data in Kane et al. (1984) and Easton (1991). 
Given the greater similarity in business environment, the similarity of these Irish results to the 
UK findings is perhaps not surprising, although the Irish market is very different in terms of 
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its small size and in the context of the exceptional GDP growth experienced 
in Ireland over 
the period of the study. 
8.3 Limitations 
The study has some obvious limitations. Firstly, for the survey questionnaire, while 
no non-response bias was detected for most of the categories of companies which took part 
in 
the survey, significant non-response bias was detected for dividend paying companies; it 
appears that the views of non-respondents might be different from those of respondents 
in the 
case of dividend paying companies. Given the nature of the survey it is probably not 
surprising that dividend-paying companies were more inclined to respond than non-dividend 
paying companies. Second, the number of prior Irish questionnaire-based surveys of dividend 
policies against which to compare the results is limited. The few studies that have been 
conducted focussed on different samples which may hinder any comparison being made. 
Third, there were a number of instances where the findings of the survey indicate 
inconsistencies in the responses to the questions posed. However, the findings from the 
interviews clarified most of the uncertainties thrown up by the survey responses. Of course, 
interviews are themselves subject to a number of well-known limitations; only a small 
number were conducted in this research, but nevertheless several senior executives and 
brokers gave generously of their time and were very supportive of the research. 
Finally, this dissertation did not examine the nature of share ownership of Irish quoted 
firms and how these shareholdings might affect the propensity of firms to pay dividends. As 
regards the event study, the thesis did not consider the effect of taxation on the behaviour of 
different classes of high and low yield securities, whether price reaction to dividend news is 
smaller in firms with high institutional holdings or consider whether interim dividends had 
conveyed some of the information contained in the total dividend paid. These aspects of the 
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dividend debate are important items on the agenda for future research using Irish data, 
because most of the studies conducted on these topics use US data. 
Despite its acknowledged limitations the present study is the most comprehensive 
investigation to date of Irish dividend policy. The findings represent an extension to prior 
investigations of why Irish companies select particular dividend policies in an environment 
where dividend payments to shareholders are tax penalised. To the extent that the study 
disaggregates the results according to the listed status of firms, industrial sectors and the 
historical pattern of respondents' dividend behaviour, the findings are novel. In addition, the 
relatively large sample sizes used in each element of the empirical work enhance confidence 
in the conclusions. Finally, the transformation of the Irish economy since the early analyses 
were conducted suggested that further research on this topic was necessary. The current 
findings therefore represent an enhancement of knowledge about the perception of dividends 
in a modem, high-growth, European context. 
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Appendix 2.1 
Individual Company Data For Companies Listed On The Irish Stock Exchange 31 December 
2003 
Official List 
Foreign 
Listing 
Market 
Cap. 
Em 
Market 
Turnover 
Em 
Volume 
Traded 
millions 
ISEQ 
Weighting 
Beta 
Abbey L 227 97.79 16.96 0.36 0.24 
Allied Irish Banks L/N 10,743 17,389.4 1,360.42 16.97 1.09 
Aminex L 27 0.23 0.80 0.04 -0.51 
An lo Irish Bank L 4,101 7,080.48 848.87 6.46 0.88 
Arcon Resources L 87 10.5 254.70 0.14 -0.02 
Aviva L 13,339 0.01 0.00 - - 
Bank of Ireland L/N 10,502 17,242.40 1,654.21 16.55 1.28 
Barlo Group L 67 40.16 147.71 0.10 -2.41 
CRH L/ 8,582 9,192.79 643.99 13.52 1.15 
DCC L 880 1234.51 115.61 1.39 0.45 
Diageo L/N 44,228 0.00 0.00 - - Donegal 
Creameries 
- 33 4.76 1.72 . 05 0.08 
Dragon Oil L 159 24.03 62.82 
. 25 0.28 _ Elan Corporation L/N 2,108 711.05 158.00 3.32 2.34 
FBD Holdings L 570 81.97 7.68 0.90 
. 05 First Active L 884 1,062.80 190.20 1.39 0.23 
F es L 571 698.32 483.04 0.90 0.30 
Galen Holdings L 1,497.2 317.50 71.00 16.60 0.40 
Glanbia L 497.3 173.47 1,060.40 11.70 2.80 
Grafton Group L 867.8 762.77 107.60 12.30 1.90 
Greencore Group L 558.7 517.63 146.40 8.10 4.20 
Gresham Hotel 
Group 
L 71.5 38.71 - 6.10 3.70 
Heiton Holdings L 160.3 83.90 3.90 12.10 4.50 
IWP L 17 44.46 -inQ nn I un I 
LAWS Group L 912.3 662.82 52.60 16.20 1.10 
IFG Group L 39 115.23 235.00 4.80 3.90 
INM L 1,232.6 721.06 5,775.10 11.00 - Irish Continental 
Group 
L 204.3 174.22 - 9.80 2.40 
Irish Life & 
Permanent 
L 2,596.8 6,090.09 807.30 9.00 5.00 
Jurys Doyle Hotel L 558 433.79 45.50 13.00 2.60 
Kennrare 
Resources 
L 58.2 5.17 - - - 
Kerry Group L 2,518.7 1,554.58 180.00 13.30 0.90 
Kin s an Group L 438.9 472.18 540.70 8.10 1.70 
McInerney 
Holdings 
L 96.7 40.73 468.80 6.40 1.80 
Norish L 6.8 3.32 - 3.00 6.60 Oakhill Group L 5.6 1.28 9.90 - - Oglesby & Butler - 2.8 0.12 - 4.50 8.70 Power Leisure L 277 287.97 7.00 14.50 1.30 Qualceram Shires L 26.6 6.34 - 6.10 4.30 Read ix - 178.6 28.13 85.40 10.10 4.00 R it Holdings L/ 4,322.2 5,121.15 5,738.30 16.20 - Ulster Television 
Unidare 
L 
L 
240.1 
23.7 
2.90 
4.88 
- 
24.00 
16.90 
7.30 
3.00 
- United Drug L 429.4 294.50 268.60 16.40 1.90 
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Viridian Group L 1,077.8 18.04 - 44.40 3.60 
W'ford Wed wood L/ 217.2 409.32 9,747.70 9.00 4.60 
ITE 
Datalex 28.2 6.27 148.00 - - 
Horizon L 28.5 5.68 
Technology 
13.20 - - 
Icon 303.1 4.59 - 22.50 - 
Iona Technologies 72.1 52.42 7.00 24.00 - 
Trini Biotech 117.1 0.03 15.60 - - 
EXPLORATION 
Glencar Mining - 2.4 0.42 - - - 
Minmet - 24.7 0.33 - - - 
Ormonde Mining - 3.1 2.15 - - - 
Ovoca Resources -31.58 - - - 
Providence - 5.3 1.18 
Resources 
3.20 - - 
DEVELOPING 
COMPANIES 
CPL Resources L 9 0.81 - - - 
Rapid Technolo L - 0.56 - - - 
Since the ISE has adopted the Listing Rules of the London as its own Listing Rules, most of the older Irish 
companies are listed in London. New companies have a listing on NASDAQ. In the Table, L= Company listed on 
the London Stock Exchange, N= Company listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Q= Company listed on the 
NASDAQ 
(Source: Irish Stock Exchange, Annual Statistical Review, 2003). 
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Appendix 2.2 
Details Of Taxation Rates 1986- 2003 
TAX DIVIDEND 
PERIOD TAX CREDIT 
RATE 
DIVIDEND 
WIT HOLDING 
TAX 
RATE 
CORPORATION 
TAX 
RATE 
CAPITAL 
GAINS 
TAX RATE 
1986/87 56% 0% 50% 40% 
1987/88/89 47% 0% 47% 40% 
1989/90/91 38% 0% 43% 40% 
1991/92/93/94/95 33% 0% 40% 40% 
1995/96/97 30% 0% 38% 40% 
1997 26.5% 0% 36% 20% 
1997/98 12% 0% 32% 20% 
1998/99 12% 0% 28% 20% 
1999/2000 0% 24% 24% 20% 
2000/2001 0% 24% 24% 20% 
2001 0% 22% 20% 20% 
2002 0% 20% 16% 20% 
2003 0% 20% 12.5% 20% 
Note: This table provides details about tax rates that applied since 6t` April 1986 to 31' December 2003. The tax 
year ran from 6t' April each year to the following 5'h April. Effective from 6`h April 2001 the tax year was changed 
to a calendar year basis. The `year' 2001 was a transitional tax period and was regarded as a nine months `year'. 
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Appendix 5.1 
7th September 2001 
Dear 
RE: Dividend payment policy in Irish companies 
Dublin City University, in conjunction with Davy Stockbrokers, is undertaking a research project on 
dividend payment policy in Irish companies. The Irish Stock Exchange has indicated its support for 
this research. 
The project is an examination of the relevance of dividends in an Irish context. A vital aspect of the 
project requires us to obtain the views of your company and of other top Irish companies on the 
factors which you believe should influence the dividend payment decision. 
Please help by completing the enclosed questionnaire. The questionnaire has been designed to require 
not more than ten minutes to complete. The information provided will be treated in confidence. Only 
the results of the survey will be published, no individual company details will be divulged. A freepost 
reply envelope is enclosed. 
All completed questionnaires received will be entered in a draw for a case of Champagne. The 
draw will take place on 25`' October 2001. 
We will be happy to send you a summary report of the results of this study. To obtain the report 
please indicate to this effect by ticking the box at question 6 on page 4 of the questionnaire. 
Many thanks for your time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tom Mc Cluskey 
Director of Taxation Studies DCU 
Robbie Kellaher 
Head of Research Davy Stockbrokers 
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Appendix 5.2 
7t' October 2001 
Dear 
RE: Dividend payment policy in Irish companies 
We have not received your reply to our letter of 7' September 2001 
Obtaining your views is extremely important to us. 
Please help by completing and returning the enclosed questionnaire as soon as possible. The 
information provided will be treated in confidence. Only the results of the survey will be published, 
no individual company details will be divulged. A freepost reply envelope is enclosed. 
Only completed questionnaires received will be entered in a draw for a case of Champagne. The 
draw will take place on 25th October 2001. 
We will be happy to send you a summary report of the results of this study. To obtain the report 
please indicate to this effect by ticking the box at question 6 on page 4 of the questionnaire. 
Many thanks for your time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tom Mc Cluskey 
Director of Taxation Studies DCU 
Robbie Kellaher 
Head of Research Davy Stockbrokers 
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Appendix 5.3 
TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE PLEASE TICK THE 
APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU 
AGREEIDISAGREE WITH EACH OF THE STATEMENTS. 
Section 1: Determinants of dividend 
payment levels 
This section seeks your views on the 
factors a firm should consider in setting Strongly Disagree its dividend payment policy Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
A firm should ...... 
1. Allow the dividend to fluctuate in QQQQQ 
accordance with its current investment 
and financing needs 
2. Be responsive to its shareholders' 
0 11 QQ0 
preferences regarding dividends 
3. Have a target dividend pay-out ratio 
Q 11 Q0 11 
4. Avoid making changes in its dividend Q0QQQ 
rates that might have to be reversed in 
a year or so 
5. Strive to maintain an uninterrupted 
QQ0QQ 
record of dividend payments 
6. Determine the current dividend based 
00Q00 
on last year's dividend 
7. Determine the current dividend based 
00000 
on cash flow/liquidity considerations 
8. Base the current dividend on the 00000 
amount of dividend paid by its 
competitors 
9. Base the current dividend on the firm's 
current earnings 
Q0QQQ 
10. Base the current dividend on the firm's 
expected earnings 
If you have any further comments on the factors which your firm would consider in setting its dividend payment policy please include them here. 
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Section 2: Market Signals 
This section seeks your views on how the 
market/investors react to dividends 
Strongly 
A ree Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
1. The market views dividend 
announcements entirely independently of Q Q Q Q Q 
concurrent earnings announcements 
2. Dividend payments provide a signal of 
future earnings prospects 
Q Q Q Q Q 
3. An increase in dividends will usually lead 
to a rise in share price Q Q Q Q Q 
4. The market reaction to an increase in 
dividend will depend on how the new 
figure compares to investors' expectations Q Q Q Q Q 
5. A change in the existing dividend payout 
is more important than the actual amount 
of dividends paid Q Q Q Q 0 
6. Investors perceive dividends to be less 
risky than capital gains 
7. A decrease in dividends will usually lead 
Q Q Q Q Q 
to a fall in share price 
8. The market reaction to a decrease in Q Q Q Q Q 
dividend will depend on how the new 
figure compares to investors' expectations 
9. Investors base their expectations about 
Q Q Q Q Q 
this year's dividend on: 
(a) The previous year's dividend Q Q Q Q Q 
(b) Trends within the sector Q Q Q Q Q 
(c) Current economic conditions Q Q Q Q Q 
(d) Last year's earnings 
announcement Q Q Q Q Q 
(e) Forecast earnings Q Q Q Q Q 
If you have any further comments on how the marketlinvestors react to dividends please include them here. 
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Section 3: Taxation 
This section seeks your views on the 
influence of taxation on dividend 
policy 
Strongly Disagree 
Agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly 
1. Management should determine the 
annual dividend based on their QQQQQ 
perception of the tax status of the 
shareholders 
2. Investors in high tax brackets are 00QQQ 
attracted to low dividend shares 
3. Investors in low tax brackets are QQQQQ 
attracted to high dividend shares 
4. The abolition of the tax credits on 
dividends has made dividend QQQQQ 
payments less attractive to investors 
5. Investors prefer returns from capital 
gains rather than dividends because QQQQQ 
of the reduction in the capital gains 
tax rate to 20% 
6. The taxation of scrip dividends as 
income rather than deferred capital QQQQQ 
gains has made cash dividends 
more attractive to shareholders 
7. The introduction of the dividend 
withholding tax has made dividend 
payments less attractive to 0QQQQ 
shareholders 
8. The introduction of the new 12.5% QQQQQ 
rate of Corporation Tax will lead to 
higher dividend pay-outs 
9. The introduction of capital gains tax 
treatment for employee share QQQQQ 
options will lead to higher dividend 
pay-out ratios 
If you have any further comments on the influence of taxation on dividend policy 
please Include them here. 
235 
SECTION 4: General Information Please tick the appropriate box 
Yes No 
1. Is your company or your parent company quoted on a Stock Exchange? 0 Q 
2. Does your company or parent company pay an ordinary dividend each year? Q 0 
3. Has the level of the dividend changed since the previous year? Q Q 
4. Should the reasons for dividend payments be fully explained to investors? 0 Q 
5. If "yes", please indicate the method you might use to explain to the market 
why a particular dividend has been set. (Tick one or several) 
(a) Press releases Q Q 
(b) Investor meetings Q 0 
(c) Analyst/Stockbroker meetings/Fund managers road shows Q Q 
(d) Other, please specify, 
6. Please indicate whether you would like us to send you a summary report 
of the results of this survey. 
0 0 
7. Please indicate the main activity of your company: 
Building Q Construction Materials D Mining 0 Energy Q 
Banking/ 
Financial Services 0 Communications Q Property Q Biotech Q 
Manufacturing Q StoragelTransport Q Healthcare/Medical Q 
Wholesale/Retail 0 Food/Drink Q Tourism/Leisure Q 
IT Software Q IT Hardware Q Business Services Q 
Other Q Please specify 
8. Please indicate your position in your organisation 
Chief Executive Q Chief Accountant Q 
Financial Director Q Company Secretary Q 
Other Q Please specify 
I Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
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Table 6.4A: Share Performance Around the Dividend Announcement Date 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon -value Da Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon -value 
t-20 0.0000 1.0424 0.297 t-20 0.0002 1.8085 0.071 
t-19 0.0000 -0.3973 0.691 t-19 0.0000 -0.5498 0.583 
t-18 0.0000 0.1824 0.855 t-18 0.0000 0.3121 0.755 
t-17 -0.0003 -1.1224 0.262 
t-17 0.0000 0.5860 0.558 
t-16 0.0001 0.6075 0.544 t-16 0.0000 0.6988 0.485 
t-15 0.0000 0.1679 0.867 t-15 0.0000 0.1523 0.879 
t-14 0.0000 -0.4085 0.683 t-14 0.0000 0.2704 0.787 
t-13 -0.0001 0.6472 0.518 t-13 0.0000 1.6749 0.094 
t-12 0.0000 -0.4676 0.640 t-12 0.0000 -1.2038 0.229 
t-11 0.0000 0.4992 0.618 t-11 0.0000 0.9514 0.342 
t-10 0.0000 0.0517 0.959 t-10 0.0000 0.7351 0.462 
t-9 -0.0001 0.0406 0.968 t-9 0.0000 1.5246 0.127 
t-8 0.0000 -0.6237 0.533 t-8 0.0000 -0.8763 0.381 
0 0.0004 1.2171 0.224 t-7 0.0000 0.9691 0.333 
t-6 0.0001 0.3320 0.740 1-6 0.0000 0.0093 0.993 
t-5 0.0000 0.4652 0.642 t-5 0.0000 0.2870 0.774 
t-4 -0.0003 -0.2483 0.804 t-4 0.0000 2.0981 0.036* 
0 0.0001 1.2857 0.199 t-3 0.0000 1.6424 0.101 
t-2 0.0002 2.1445 0.032* t-2 0.0000 2.7901 0.005* 
t-1 0.0002 1.6395 0.101 t-1 0.0000 2.4126 0.016* 
t-0 0.0013 4.9197 0.000* t-0 0.0000 5.0466 0.000* 
t+l 0.0002 1.4428 0.149 t+l 0.0000 2.1627 0.031* 
t+2 0.0000 0.3180 0.751 t+2 0.0000 0.9845 0.325 
t+3 0.0003 1.0598 0.289 t+3 0.0000 0.7121 0.477 
t+ -0.0001 -0.6067 0.544 t+4 0.0000 -0.6186 0.536 1+ 0.0000 0.0312 0.975 t+5 0.0000 0.0707 0.944 
1+6 0.0000 -1.3852 0.166 t+6 0.0000 -1.6012 0.109 
t+7 -0.0002 -1.0503 0.294 t+7 0.0000 -0.0297 0.977 
t+8 0.0000 0.6330 0.527 t+8 0.0000 0.0454 0.964 
t+9 -0.0001 -0.8285 0.407 t+9 0.0000 -0.7191 0.472 
1+10 0.0001 -0.1263 0.900 t+10 0.0000 -0.5419 0.588 
t+ll 0.0004 2.6877 0.007* t+11 0.0000 1.8433 0.065 
t+12 -0.0001 -0.5103 0.610 t+12 0.0000 0.4361 0.663 
t+13 -0.0002 -1.2582 0.208 t+13 0.0000 -1.1868 0235 
t+14 0.0000 -0.1461 0.884 t+14 0.0000 0.6590 0.510 
t+15 0.0001 -0.0624 0.950 t+15 0.0000 0.6591 0.510 
t+16 -0.0001 -1.6997 0.089 t+16 0.0000 -1.1676 0.243 
t+17 0.0000 0.1997 0.842 t+17 0.0000 1.3195 0.187 
t+18 -0.0001 -0.8669 0.386 t+18 0.0000 -0.6080 0.543 
t+19 0.0000 1.0934 0.274 t+19 0.0000 0.4610 0.645 
t+20 0.0002 0.7992 0.424 t+20 0.0000 0.1108 0.912 
Note: This table highlights the median abnormal and excess returns for the sample firms for 41 days around the dividend announcement date (Day t). The standardised wilcoxon test examines the null hypothesis that the 
median is different from zero. An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.5A: Share Performance for Dividend Increasing Companies 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon value Day Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon value 
t-20 0.0000 0.6771 0.498 t-20 0.0000 2.0493 0.040* 
t-19 0.0000 -0.3775 0.706 t-19 0.0000 -0.0688 0.946 
t-18 -0.0001 -0.5512 0.582 t-18 0.0000 0.4345 0.664 
t-17 -0.0005 -1.9252 0.054 t-17 0.0000 -0.0221 0.983 
t-16 0.0000 0.3558 0.722 t-16 0.0000 0.9735 0.331 
t-15 -0.0002 -0.0168 0.987 t-15 0.0000 1.1143 0.265 
t-14 -0.0003 -1.5225 0.128 t-14 0.0000 -0.5030 0.615 
t-13 -0.0004 -0.2185 0.827 t-13 0.0000 1.6532 0.098 
t-12 -0.0001 -0.7063 0.480 t-12 0.0000 0.1239 0.902 
t-11 -0.0002 0.5257 0.599 t-11 0.0000 2.0142 0.044* 
t-10 -0.0002 -0.9545 0.340 t-10 0.0000 0.5492 0.583 
t-9 -0.0006 -1.1961 0.232 t-9 0.0000 0.5736 0.567 
t-8 -0.0003 -1.3516 0.177 t-8 0.0000 -0.8431 0.400 
0 0.0003 0.1386 0.890 t-7 0.0000 0.3062 0.76 
t-6 -0.0001 -0.9992 0.318 t-6 0.0000 -0.2196 0.827 
t-5 0.0001 0.8486 0.396 t-5 0.0000 0.8618 0.389 
t-4 -0.0009 -2.2195 0.026* t-4 0.0000 0.6988 0.485 
t-3 -0.0001 -0.0653 0.948 t-3 0.0000 1.5587 0.119 
t-2 0.0000 0.7611 0.447 72 0.0000 2.3232 0.020* 
t-1 0.0004 2.1121 0.035* t-1 0.0000 3.3371 0.001* 
t-0 0.0016 5.2644 0.000* t-0 0.0000 5.8154 0.000* 
t+1 0.0002 1.4314 0.152 t+1 0.0000 2.4656 0.014* 
t+2 -0.0004 -0.6944 0.488 t+2 0.0000 0.9128 0.362 
t+3 0.0001 0.7887 0.430 t+3 0.0000 1.1285 0.259 
t+4 -0.0005 -1.4818 0.138 t+4 0.0000 -0.5858 0.558 
t+5 0.0000 0.2613 0.794 t+5 0.0000 1.0787 0.281 
t+6 -0.0004 -1.8011 0.072 t+6 0.0000 -1.6567 0.098 
t+7 -0.0007 -2.3816 0.017* t+7 0.0000 -0.6461 0.519 
t+8 -0.0004 -1.1696 0.242 t+8 0.0000 -0.6946 0.488 
t+9 -0.0004 -1.3162 0.188 t+9 0.0000 -0.7046 0.481 
t+10 -0.0003 -0.7043 0.481 t+10 0.0000 -0.0445 0.965 
t+11 0.0005 2.4057 0.016* t+11 0.0000 1.6388 0.101 
t+12 -0.0003 -0.7907 0.429 t+12 0.0000 -0.0822 0.935 
t+13 -0.0005 -1.5661 0.117 t+13 0.0000 -0.7418 0.459 
t+14 -0.0001 -0.6652 0.506 t+14 0.0000 1.4696 0.142 
t+15 0.0000 0.2609 0.794 t+15 0.0000 1.7747 0.076 
t+16 -0.0005 -1.8832 0.060 t+16 0.0000 -0.1088 0.914 
t+17 -0.0005 -1.7853 0.074 t+17 0.0000 0.1611 0.872 
t+18 -0.0004 -1.8524 0.064 t+18 0.0000 -0.5171 0.606 t+19 0.0000 0.7252 0.468 t+19 0.0000 2.0921 0.036* 
t+20 0.0000 -0.3613 0.718 t+20 0.0000 -0.3322 0.740 
Note: This table highlights the median abnormal and excess returns for the sample firms for 41 days around the dividend announcement date (Day t). The standardised wilcoxon test examines the null hypothesis that the 
median is different from zero.. An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.6A: Share Performance for Dividend Decreasing Companies 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon -value Day Median 
Standardised 
Wilcozon value 
1-20 0.0000 0.1876 0.854 t-20 0.0000 -0.1429 0.898 
t-19 0.0009 1.3622 0.174 t-19 0.0000 0.5227 0.614 
t-18 0.0012 0.8483 0.399 t-18 0.0000 0.0000 1.000 
t-17 0.0010 1.1257 0.262 t-17 0.0000 0.6571 0.520 
t-16 -0.0006 -0.8810 0.381 t-16 0.0000 -1.7534 0.082 
t-15 0.0003 0.0979 0.925 t-15 0.0000 -0.5032 0.626 
t-14 0.0012 0.8116 0.419 t-14 0.0000 0.2435 0.820 
t-13 0.0013 1.7375 0.083 t-13 0.0000 1.2071 0.237 
t-12 0.0013 1.5172 0.13 t-12 0.0000 0.0286 0.989 
t-11 0.0004 0.0816 0.938 t-11 0.0000 -0.5387 0.602 
t-10 0.0001 -0.0897 0.932 t-10 0.0000 -1.1573 0.255 
t-9 0.0004 0.7831 0.436 t-9 0.0000 0.2737 0.796 
t-8 0.0004 0.9136 0.363 t-8 0.0000 1.1101 0.274 
0 -0.0007 -0.4405 0.663 t-7 0.0000 -1.2877 0.205 
t-6 0.0016 1.1909 0.235 t-6 0.0000 0.9253 0.363 
t-5 0.0009 0.4486 0.657 t-5 0.0000 -0.0143 1.000 
t-4 0.0003 0.5710 0.571 t-4 0.0000 -0.3733 0.723 
0 0.0007 0.7015 0.486 t-3 . 0.0000 -0.1912 0.862 
t-2 0.0012 2.2187 0.027* t-2 0.0000 1.8225 0.072 
t-i -0.0003 -0.1876 0.854 t-1 0.0000 -1.2166 0.230 
t-0 0.0004 -0.3997 0.692 t-0 0.0000 -0.9910 0.326 
t+1 0.0007 1.0196 0.310 t+1 0.0000 -0.4058 0.697 
t+2 0.0020 2.2595 0.024* t+2 0.0000 1.6851 0.094 
t+3 0.0013 1.0523 0.295 t+3 0.0000 -0.0404 0.979 
t+4 0.0009 0.7423 0.460 t+4 0.0000 -0.2159 0.839 
t+5 0.0005 0.1305 0.899 t+5 0.0000 -0.9524 0.347 
t+6 0.0010 0.9870 0.326 t+6 0.0000 -0.3123 0.764 
W 0.0006 0.6607 0.511 t+7 0.0000 -0.8587 0.401 
t+8 0.0007 0.7260 0.470 t+8 0.0000 -1.0949 0.281 
t+9 -0.0003 -0.3834 0.704 t+9 0.0000 -0.2433 0.820 
t+10 0.0005 0.3508 0.729 t+10 0.0000 -0.0869 0.945 
t+1l 0.0003 0.3915 0.698 t+11 0.0000 -0.0747 0.955 
t+12 0.0004 1.0930 0.276 t+12 0.0000 1.7202 0.089 
t+13 -0.0006 -0.6199 0.538 t+13 0.0000 -0.6347 0.538 
t+14 0.0009 1.3378 0.182 t+14 0.0000 -1.1359 0.268 
t+15 -0.0006 -0.7749 0.441 t+15 0.0000 -1.2877 0.205 
t+16 0.0009 1.0278 0.306 t+16 0.0000 -0.0933 0.940 
t+17 0.0018 2.5940 0.010* t+17 0.0000 1.8248 0.071 
t+18 0.0012 1.1828 0.239 t+18 0.0000 0.2817 0.794 
t+19 -0.0002 -0.6444 0.522 t+19 0.0000 -1.9466 0.053 
t+20 0.0014 1.8843 0.060 t+20 0.0000 1.5741 0.119 
Note: This table highlights the mean and median abnormal and excess returns for the dividend increasing 
sample firms for 41 days around the dividend announcement date (Day t). SD refers to the standard deviation. 
An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.7A: Share Performance for Dividend No Change Companies 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon value Day Median 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon value 
t-20 0.0002 0.9620 0.336 t-20 0.0000 0.7582 0.451 
t-19 -0.0002 -0.8763 0.381 t-19 0.0000 -1.1888 0.236 
t-18 0.0003 0.7326 0.464 t-18 0.0000 -0.1470 0.886 
t-17 0.0001 0.1687 0.867 t-17 0.0000 0.7486 0.458 
t-16 0.0003 1.1792 0.239 t-16 0.0000 0.9915 0.324 
t-15 0.0003 0.2887 0.773 t-15 0.0000 -1.1904 0.235 
t-14 0.0004 1.0322 0.302 t-14 0.0000 1.2315 0.220 
t-13 0.0001 0.8622 0.389 t-13 0.0000 0.3487 0.731 
t-12 0.0003 -0.6409 0.522 t-12 0.0000 -2.5766 0.010* 
t-11 0.0003 0.2348 0.815 t-11 0.0000 -0.8943 0.373 
t-10 0.0003 1.6245 0.104 t-10 0.0000 1.3639 0.174 
t-9 0.0004 1.4181 0.156 t-9 0.0000 2.0528 0.041* 
t-8 0.0004 0.3926 0.695 t-8 0.0000 -1.3171 0.189 
t-7 0.0007 2.3180 0.020* t-7 0.0000 1.4480 0.149 
t-6 0.0005 1.4127 0.158 t-6 0.0000 0.1232 0.905 
t-5 -0.0001 -0.5701 0.569 t-5 0.0000 -0.6821 0.497 
t-4 0.0007 2.7373 0.006* t-4 0.0000 2.3593 0.019* 
t-3 0.0008 2.1469 0.032* t-3 0.0000 1.0955 0.275 
t-2 0.0008 1.8147 0.07 t-2 0.0000 0.9042 0.367 
t-1 0.0001 0.0998 0.921 t-1 0.0000 0.4066 0.687 
t-0 0.0008 1.7552 0.079 t-0 0.0000 1.5001 0.134 
t+l 0.0002 0.1889 0.851 t+1 0.0000 0.6152 0.540 
t+2 0.0003 0.4034 0.687 t+2 0.0000 -0.2973 0.769 
t+3 0.0002 0.3032 0.762 t+3 0.0000 0.0539 0.959 
t+4 0.0003 0.8433 0.399 t+4 0.0000 -0.1840 0.857 
t+5 0.0003 -0.2798 0.780 t+5 0.0000 -0.8169 0.416 
t+6 0.0000 -0.4364 0.663 t+6 0.0000 -0.4813 0.632 
t+7 0.0004 1.5233 0.128 t+7 0.0000 1.3468 0.179 
t+8 0.0009 2.6195 0.009* t+8 0.0000 1.6498 0.100 
t+9 0.0004 0.6037 0.547 t+9 0.0000 -0.1113 0.914 
t+10 0.0005 0.8095 0.419 t+10 0.0000 -1.1497 0.252 
t+11 0.0004 1.2542 0.210 t+11 0.0000 1.3280 0.186 
t+12 0.0000 -0.3414 0.733 t+12 0.0000 0.0980 0.925 
t+13 0.0003 0.4845 0.628 t+13 0.0000 -0.5180 0.607 
t+14 0.0001 0.2078 0.836 t+14 0.0000 -0.3467 0.732 
t+15 0.0003 0.0321 0.975 t+15 0.0000 -0.7327 0.466 
t+16 0.0002 -0.7081 0.479 t+16 0.0000 -2.0112 0.045* 
t+17 0.0003 1.4737 0.141 t+17 0.0000 1,2110 0.227 
t+18 0.0003 0.5448 0.586 t+18 0.0000 -0.5562 0.581 t+19 0.0006 1.2395 0.215 t+19 0.0000 -0.4476 0.657 
t+20 0.0005 1.0409 0.298 t+20 0.0000 0.0172 0.990 
Note: This table highlights the mean and median abnormal and excess returns for the dividend no change sample fines for 41 days around the dividend announcement date (Day t). SD refers to the standard deviation. An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.8 A medians and Wilcoxon test of share performance for different dividend earnings sub-groups 
Group Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Median value Median value 
DIM N=325) 
Da t-2 0.0004 0.4720 0.0000 0.0150* 
Da t-1 0.0011 0.0330* 0.0000 0.0000* 
A 
Da t 0.0055 0.0000* 0.0067 0.0000* 
Day t+1 0.0015 0.0580 0.0013 0.0020* 
Day t-2 -0.0005 0.2700 0.0000 0.6210 
Days t-2 to t+2 0.0144 0.0000* 0.0195 0.0000* 
DIEDN=103) 
Da t-2 0.0002 0.7920 0.0000 0.5890 
Day t-1 0.0004 0.7040 0.0000 0.9620 
B Da t 0.0036 0.0190* 0.0031 0.0740 
Day t+1 -0.0005 0.7010 0.0000 0.6710 
Day t-2 0.0006 0.5890 0.0000 0.3420 
Days t-2 to t+2 0.0067 0.1560 0.0068 0.1050 
DDEI =23 
Da t-2 0.0015 0.2670 0.0000 0.1510 
Day t-1 -0.0003 0.9150 0.0000 0.7600 
C Da t 0.0011 0.5740 0.0000 0.5630 
Day t+1 -0.0007 0.5740 0.0000 0.5540 
Da t-2 0.0017 0.2540 0.0000 0.3150 
Da t-2 to t+2 0.0164 0.1660 0.0233 0.0670 
DDED =33 
Da t-2 0.0032 0.0510 0.0000 0.3590 
Da t-1 0.0000 0.9710 0.0000 0.0690 
D Da t -0.0061 0.3260 -0.0063 0.0890 
Da t+l 0.0029 0.1200 0.0000 1.0000 
Da t-2 0.0047 0.0400* 0.0000 0.2330 
Days t-2 to t+2 0.0006 0.9570 -0.0016 0.1750 
DNCEI =95 
Day t-2 0.0012 0.1720 0.0000 0.0770 
Da t-1 -0.0004 0.6200 0.0000 0.8730 
E Day t 0.0077 0.0020* 0.0089 0.0010* 
Da t+1 -0.0013 0.2510 0.0000 0.3000 
Day t-2 0.0000 0.9740 0.0000 0.6740 
Days t-2 to t+2 0.0111 0.0740 0.0070 0.0540 
DNCED (N=95) 
Day t-2 0.0009 0.2140 0.0000 0.4490 
Day t-1 0.0005 0.4770 0.0000 0.4220 
F Da t -0.0007 0.5000 0.0000 0.1900 
Da t+1 0.0014 0.1490 0.0000 0.0260* 
Day t-2 0.0005 0.5970 0.0000 0.9590 
Days t-2 to t+2 0.0038 0.4640 0.0000 0.9940 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the five-day period day t-2 to day t+2 for the sample firms split into-"b- 
groups depending on the change in dividend and the change in earnings: Panel A= those firms which increased dividend and earnings 
(DIEI), Panel B= those which increased dividends when earnings fell (DIED), Panel C- those which cut their dividends when earnings 
increased (DD-El), Panel D- those where dividends and earnings fell (DDED), Panel E= those which did not change their dividends 
despite reporting increased earnings (DNCEI), and Panel F= those which maintained their dividend despite a drop in reported earnings 
(DNCED). An * indicates significance at 5%. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel A: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
increasing and earnings increasing companies (DIEI) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Mean SD -value Mean SD -value 
t-20 -0.0001 0.0186 0.909 0.0007 0.0193 0.106 
t-19 -0.0006 0.0218 0.291 -0.0001 0.0225 0.993 
t-18 0.0002 0.0197 0.622 0.0006 0.0202 0.457 
t-17 0.0004 0.0248 0.034* 0.0011 0.0255 0.984 
t-16 0.0001 0.0187 0.337 0.0003 0.0191 0.849 
t-15 0.0004 0.0180 0.795 0.0013 0.0186 0.087 
-14 t -0.0015 0.0172 0.049* -0.0008 0.0178 0.619 
F 
t-13 0.0013 0.0190 0.607 0.0019 0.0190 0.055 
t-12 -0.0011 0.0203 0.179 -0.0001 0.0209 0.781 
t-11 0.0013 0.0227 0.740 0.0020 0.0229 0.033* 
t-10 -0.0007 0.0218 0.238 0.0002 0.0222 0.492 
t-9 -0.0004 0.0225 0.200 0.0006 0.0233 0.522 
t-8 -0.0014 0.0179 0.135 -0.0008 0.0179 0.829 
t-7 -0.0004 0.0218 0.784 0.0002 0.0214 0.277 
t-6 -0.0008 0.0148 0.128 -0.0004 0.0161 0.806 
t-5 0.0001 0.0235 0.659 0.0007 0.0248 0.231 
t-4 0.0005 0.0167 0.005* 0.0019 0.0172 0.490 
t-3 0.0004 0.0268 0.528 0.0016 0.0275 0.092 
t-2 0.0019 0.0239 0.1513 0.0028 0.0244 0.041 * 
t-1 0.0033 0.0245 0.0171* 0.0042 0.0247 0.003* 
t-0 0.0099 0.0378 0.000* 0.0107 0.0382 0.000* 
t+1 0.0042 0.0256 0.0031* 0.0049 0.0263 0.001* 
t+2 -0.0007 0.0245 0.5841 -0.0001 0.0250 0.970 
t+3 0.0005 0.0204 0.672 0.0011 0.0210 0.269 
t+4 -0.0006 0.0295 0.119 -0.0001 0.0301 0.651 
t+5 0.0006 0.0193 0.885 0.0008 0.0199 0.385 
t+6 -0.0016 0.0193 0.067 -0.0010 0.0200 0.187 
t+7 -0.0010 0.0237 0.011* -0.0004 0.0246 0.355 
t+8 -0.0021 0.0261 0.052 -0.0014 0.0271 0.472 
ºTu -u. uu iý u. u i 13 1 u. u331 -U. 0009 0.01/9 U. 206 
t+10 -0.0001 0.0205 0.135 0.0003 0.0210 0.863 
t+11 0.0023 0.0239 0.023* 0.0023 0.0245 0.054 
t+12 -0.0005 0.0186 0.267 0.0002 0.0190 0.935 
t+13 -0.0006 0.0165 0.218 -0.0005 0.0165 0.862 
t+14 0.0008 0.0204 0.229 0.0014 0.0208 0.267 
t+15 0.0026 0.0328 0.610 0.0035 0.0329 0.083 
t+16 0.0000 0.0196 0.017* 0.0012 0.0202 0.954 
t+17 -0.0003 0.0229 0.039* 0.0004 0.0236 0.652 
t+18 -0.0014 0.0180 0.008* -0.0005 0.0185 0.645 
t+19 0.0009 0.0167 0.393 0.0017 0.0168 0.078 
t+20 -0.0007 0.0235 0.491 -0.0003 0.0240 0.927 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to 
day t+20 for the sample firms where dividends increased and earnings increased (DIE1) (N=325). 
An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel B: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
increasing and earnings decreasing companies (DIED) 
Abnormal Returns I Excess Returns 
Da Mean SD value Mean SD value 
t-20 0.0025 0.0272 0.281 0.0022 0.0285 0.212 
t-19 0.0008 0.0237 0.240 0.0001 0.0244 0.928 
t-18 -0.0008 0.0278 0.876 -0.0010 0.0276 0.562 
t-17 -0.0019 0.0327 0.890 -0.0015 0.0329 0.890 
t-16 0.0041 0.0167 0.010* 0.0042 0.0167 0.014* 
t-15 -0.0028 0.0261 0.742 -0.0033 0.0265 0.481 
t-14 0.0001 0.0249 0.794 0.0002 0.0249 0.954 
t-13 0.0023 0.0238 0.682 0.0015 0.0247 0.923 
t-12 0.0018 0.0154 0.311 0.0002 0.0147 0.843 
t-11 0.0019 0.0282 0.585 0.0018 0.0283 0.713 
t-10 0.0005 0.0170 0.732 0.0006 0.0170 0.895 
t-9 0.0006 0.0308 0.855 0.0014 0.0310 1.000 
t-8 -0.0051 0.0251 0.898 -0.0057 0.0254 0.055 
t-7 -0.0012 0.0152 0.867 -0.0023 0.0145 0.185 
t-6 0.0010 0.0150 0.423 0.0003 0.0157 0.957 
t-5 0.0002 0.0173 0.373 -0.0013 0.0182 0.638 
t-4 0.0012 0.0211 0.611 0.0009 0.0210 0.839 
t-3 -0.0002 0.0257 0.289 -0.0006 0.0262 0.887 
t-2 0.0027 0.0287 0.3443 0.0031 0.0290 0.589 
t-1 -0.0015 0.0218 0.4956 -0.0013 0.0214 0.962 
t-0 0.0048 0.0240 0.0438* 0.0047 0.0242 0.074* 
T+1 0.0007 0.0412 0.8634 0.0006 0.0407 0.671 
T+2 0.0013 0.0253 0.5988 0.0011 0.0257 0.342 
T+3 0.0006 0.0199 0.359 0.0004 0.0205 0.842 
t+4 -0.0021 0.0285 0.805 -0.0018 0.0291 0.690 
t+5 -0.0004 0.0254 0.448 0.0000 0.0262 0.526 
t+6 -0.0012 0.0218 0.633 -0.0017 0.0225 0.348 
t+7 
I 
0.0013 0.0212 0.713 0.0018 0.0218 0.747 
t+8 0.0031 0.0209 0.221 0.0017 0.0210 0.935 
t+9 0.0023 0.0151 0.256 0.0012 0.0162 0.535 
t+10 0.0011 0.0151 0.259 0.0005 0.0165 0.846 
t+11 -0.0012 0.0188 0.373 -0.0021 0.0216 0.935 
t+12 0.0012 0.0177 0.628 0.0002 0.0196 0.972 
t+13 -0.0019 0.0263 0.295 -0.0009 0.0293 0.255 
t+14 0.0014 0.0165 0.500 0.0017 0.0198 0.360 
t+15 0.0005 0.0195 0.127 0.0005 0.0198 0.570 
t+16 -0.0014 0.0239 0.697 -0.0017 0.0240 0.684 
t+17 0.0012 0.0218 0.852 0.0007 0.0211 0.598 
t+18 0.0028 0.0230 0.362 0.0014 0.0240 0.726 
t+19 0.0033 0.0210 0.006* 0.0019 0.0209 0.221 
t+20 -0.0009 0.0189 0.679 -0.0014 0.0196 0.609 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for 
the sample firms where dividends increased and earnings fell (DIED) (N=103). An* indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel C: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
decreasing and earnings increasing companies (DDEI) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Day MEAN SD -value MEAN SD value 
t-20 -0.0006 0.0168 0.533 -0.0016 0.0179 0.813 
t-19 0.0076 0.0208 0.438 0.0056 0.0210 0.286 
t-18 0.0008 0.0231 0.157 0.0007 0.0232 0.529 
t-17 -0.0090 0.0328 0.176 -0.0091 0.0342 0.236 
t-16 0.0017 0.0184 0.915 0.0011 0.0211 0.919 
t-15 0.0105 0.0296 0.140 0.0093 0.0309 0.262 
t-14 0.0141 0.0337 0.149 0.0129 0.0328 0.100 
t-13 0.0081 0.0480 0.727 0.0090 0.0471 0.441 
t-12 -0.0092 0.0499 1.000 -0.0102 0.0505 0.563 
t-11 -0.0063 0.0255 0.207 -0.0065 0.0276 0.415 
t-10 -0.0085 0.0155 0.125 -0.0102 0.0175 0.013* 
t-9 0.0008 0.0499 0.323 0.0008 0.0505 0.800 
t-8 -0.0011 0.0305 0.595 -0.0003 0.0310 0.760 
0 -0.0017 0.0092 0.513 -0.0022 0.0102 0.272 
t-6 0.0032 0.0220 0.294 0.0041 0.0216 0.262 
t-5 -0.0016 0.0198 0.386 -0.0001 0.0180 0.666 
t-4 -0.0046 0.0217 0.475 -0.0048 0.0219 0.343 
+_'t nmmA nmQ1 n7)-l nnn, <7 nfký'7, C .. 'Clic 
t-2 0.0080 0.0283 0.267 
v. vvv, 
0.0080 
v. VL IU 
0.0270 
V. VLJ 
0.151 
t-1 
P 
0.0004 0.0221 0.915 0.0015 0.0212 0.760 
0 t- - 0.0070 0.0410 0.574 0.0091 0.0437 0.563 
t+l -0.0021 0.0248 0.574 -0.0020 0.0254 0.554 
t+2 0.0143 0.0432 0.254 0.0130 0.0420 0.315 
t+3 0.0098 0.0291 0.323 0.0079 0.0286 0.398 
t+4 0.0007 0.0204 0.494 0.0016 0.0216 0.724 
t+5 -0.0009 0.0196 0.843 -0.0008 0.0213 0.756 
t+6 0.0045 0.0254 0.280 0.0057 0.0248 0.451 
t+7 -0.0074 0.0154 0.053 -0.0060 0.0131 0.059 
t+8 0.0013 0.0131 0.533 -0.0011 0.0133 0.722 
t+9 0.0002 0.0298 0.149 0.0015 0.0307 0.919 
t+10 0.0065 0.0227 0.704 0.0084 0.0246 0.307 
t+l1 -0.0041 0.0162 0.354 -0.0043 0.0149 0.234 
t+12 0.0032 0.0104 0.323 0.0029 0.0122 0.441 
t+13 -0.0039 0.0234 0.207 -0.0034 0.0228 0.554 
t+14 -0.0118 0.0448 0.820 -0.0131 0.0440 0.183 
t+15 -0.0018 0.0143 0.403 -0.0036 0.0159 0.343 
t+16 0.0016 0.0155 0.659 0.0031 0.0162 0.529 
t+17 0.0197 0.0531 0.061 0.0196 0.0511 0.024* 
t+18 -0.0027 0.0080 0.456 -0.0027 0.0103 0.205 
t+19 -0.0023 0.0237 0.574 -0.0032 0.0224 0.554 
t+20 0.0094 0.0258 0.254 0.0083 0.0259 0.236 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for 
the sample firms where dividends decreased and earnings increased (DDEI) (N=23). An* indicates significance 
at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel D: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
decreasing and earnings decreasing companies (DDED) 
Abnormal Returns 
. Excess Return s 
Da Mean Std Deviation -value Mean S td Deviation p-value 
t-20 0.0009 0.0291 0.475 -0.0001 0.0287 0.887 
t-19 0.0055 0.0310 0.317 0.0027 0.0313 0.563 
t-18 0.0007 0.0227 0.915 -0.0004 0.0217 0.724 
t-17 0.0105 0.0314 0.015* 0.0082 0.0301 0.094 
t-16 -0.0129 0.0368 0.158 -0.0137 0.0351 0.045* 
t-15 -0.0060 0.0346 0.268 -0.0078 0.0354 0.126 
t-14 -0.0046 0.0269 0.851 -0.0062 0.0251 0.197 
t-13 0.0063 0.0195 0.014* 0.0043 0.0184 0.286 
t-12 -0.0023 0.0465 0.056 -0.0028 0.0451 0.625 
t-11 -0.0004 0.0450 0.224 -0.0009 0.0442 0.894 
t-10 0.0056 0.0362 0.198 0.0051 0.0387 0.505 
t-9 -0.0011 0.0475 0.816 -0.0024 0.0471 0.979 
t-8 0.0092 0.0228 0.093 0.0085 0.0229 0.069 
t-7 0.0012 0.0167 0.943 -0.0003 0.0158 0.327 
t-6 0.0018 0.0161 0.655 0.0011 0.0172 0.969 
t-5 0.0044 0.0348 0.129 0.0039 0.0383 0.583 
t-4 0.0013 0.0252 0.198 0.0011 0.0234 0.894 
t-3 0.0016 0.0270 0.555 -0.0007 0.0306 0.415 
t-2 0.0065 0.0170 0.051 0.0037 0.0166 0.359 
t-1 -0.0064 0.0265 0.971 -0.0098 0.0291 0.069 
t-0 -0.0157 0.0535 0.326 -0.0165 0.0530 0.089 
t+1 0.0012 0.0321 0.120 -0.0012 0.0332 1.000 
t+2 0.0052 0.0473 0.040* 0.0045 0.0493 0.233 
t+3 -0.0029 0.0554 0.555 -0.0040 0.0568 0.572 
t+4 -0.0070 0.0500 0.642 -0.0073 0.0477 0.660 
t+5 -0.0105 0.0471 0.789 -0.0116 0.0472 0.293 
t+6 -0.0011 0.0349 0.509 -0.0043 0.0339 0.295 
t+7 0.0041 0.0300 0.028* 0.0010 0.0302 0.724 
t+8 -0.0047 0.0286 0.830 -0.0051 0.0309 0.367 
t+9 -0.0043 0.0483 0.555 -0.0068 0.0488 0.780 
t+10 -0.0013 0.0247 0.915 -0.0042 0.0241 0.308 
t+11 0.0032 0.0264 0.253 0.0033 0.0252 0.410 
t+12 0.0083 0.0323 0.453 0.0096 0.0290 0.126 
t+13 -0.0010 0.0261 0.943 -0.0012 0.0262 0.824 
t+14 0.0018 0.0231 0.112 -0.0008 0.0216 0.933 
t+15 -0.0034 0.0285 0.734 -0.0033 0.0285 0.476 
t+16 -0.0054 0.0381 0.411 -0.0056 0.0393 0.638 
t+17 0.0056 0.0303 0.104 0.0035 0.0320 0.724 
t+18 0.0026 0.0339 0.056 0.0011 0.0355 0.367 
t+19 -0.0165 0.0553 0.681 -0.0176 0.0555 0.083 
t+20 0.0085 0.0371 0.174 0.0075 0.0378 0.339 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for the sample firms where dividends decreased and earnings fell (DDED) (N=33). An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel E: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend no 
change and earnings increasing companies (DNCEI) 
Abnormal Returns E xcess Returns 
Da Mean Std Deviation -value Mean Std Deviation -value 
t-20 0.0026 0.0305 0.579 0.0020 0.0305 0.869 
t-19 -0.0020 0.0273 0.198 -0.0013 0.0263 0.600 
t-18 -0.0036 0.0292 0.832 -0.0038 0.0294 0.325 
t-17 0.0009 0.0267 0.736 0.0023 0.0271 0.322 
t-16 -0.0016 0.0251 0.869 0.0001 0.0203 0.919 
t-15 -0.0050 0.0293 0.331 -0.0043 0.0295 0.319 
t-14 0.0077 0.0355 0.112 0.0085 0.0353 0.016* 
t-13 0.0001 0.0197 0.918 0.0003 0.0192 0.952 
t-12 -0.0080 0.0441 0.135 -0.0078 0.0426 0.026* 
t-11 -0.0042 0.0333 0.245 -0.0039 0.0330 0.051 
t-10 0.0051 0.0268 0.177 0.0044 0.0280 0.197 
t-9 0.0049 0.0244 0.231 0.0051 0.0233 0.053 
t-8 0.0005 0.0174 0.964 0.0003 0.0188 0.864 
t-7 0.0037 0.0341 0.117 0.0032 0.0333 0.364 
t-6 0.0019 0.0370 0.349 0.0018 0.0370 0.525 
t-5 -0.0004 0.0491 0.912 -0.0008 0.0487 0.868 
t-4 0.0016 0.0332 0.129 0.0023 0.0333 0.057 
t-3 0.0005 0.0262 0.425 0.0009 0.0253 0.549 
t-2 0.0076 0.0379 0.172 0.0078 0.0374 0.077 
t-1 -0.0028 0.0576 0.620 -0.0024 0.0574 0.873 
t-0 0.0145 0.0486 0.002* 0.0147 0.0478 0.001* 
ai4 n nnn n Innft n neq i. nn. . n nnni ........ 
l- I -V. VV 1I V. UOLL V. LJ 1 -V. UU1°F V. UOLO V. JVV 
t+2 -0.0025 0.0426 0.974 -0.0023 0.0430 0.674 
t+3 0.0030 0.0761 0.742 0.0029 0.0770 0.764 
t+4 0.0029 0.0464 0.977 0.0033 0.0466 0.811 
t+5 -0.0047 0.0416 0.219 -0.0032 0.0411 0.278 
t+6 -0.0069 0.0501 0.185 -0.0061 0.0502 0.446 
t+7 -0.0002 0.0261 0.766 0.0006 0.0248 0.581 
t+8 0.0059 0.0310 0.050* 0.0060 0.0300 0.071 
t+9 -0.0046 0.0294 0.745 -0.0050 0.0299 0.124 
t+10 -0.0041 0.0383 0.745 -0.0030 0.0382 0.617 
t+11 0.0031 0.0343 0.611 0.0035 0.0346 0.475 
t+12 -0.0011 0.0359 0.673 -0.0009 0.0351 0.935 
t+13 0.0013 0.0306 0.629 0.0004 0.0302 0.838 
t+14 -0.0047 0.0542 0.542 -0.0040 0.0549 0.761 
t+15 -0.0037 0.0357 0.768 -0.0040 0.0349 0.461 
t+16 -0.0033 0.0357 0.250 -0.0031 0.0353 0.126 
t+17 0.0035 0.0654 0.135 0.0042 0.0659 0.106 
t+18 0.0000 0.0368 0.899 0.0004 0.0366 0.864 
t+19 -0.0021 0.0570 0.673 -0.0035 0.0574 0.824 
t+20 0.0017 0.0327 0.579 0.0011 0.0322 0.703 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for the sample firms where dividends no change and earnings increase (DNCEI) (N-95). An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.1 Panel F: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend no 
change and earnings decreasing companies (DNCED) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Return s 
Day Mean Std Deviation P-value Mean Std Deviation N value 
t-20 0.0028 0.0290 0.392 0.0030 0.0279 0.415 
t-19 -0.0020 0.0269 1.000 -0.0028 0.0269 0.243 
t-18 0.0038 0.0449 0.213 0.0030 0.0451 0.466 
t-17 0.0001 0.0177 0.954 0.0001 0.0174 1.000 
t-16 0.0062 0.0567 0.077 0.0058 0.0564 0.182 
t-15 -0.0017 0.0326 0.130 -0.0029 0.0320 0.564 
t-14 -0.0071 0.0682 0.916 -0.0080 0.0681 0.407 
t-13 0.0034 0.0358 0.183 0.0024 0.0357 0.540 
t-12 -0.0034 0.0249 0.448 -0.0045 0.0247 0.183 
t-11 0.0038 0.0374 0.133 0.0026 0.0367 0.551 
t-10 0.0045 0.0396 0.323 0.0033 0.0393 0.469 
t-9 0.0045 0.0397 0.411 0.0035 0.0386 0.409 
t-8 -0.0064 0.0367 0.633 -0.0073 0.0361 0.071 
t-7 0.0024 0.0253 0.076 0.0023 0.0250 0.280 
t-6 0.0000 0.0274 0.284 -0.0009 0.0277 0.627 
t-5 -0.0076 0.0515 0.330 -0.0081 0.0508 0.233 
t-4 0.0052 0.0369 0.021 * 0.0043 0.0362 0.154 
t-3 0.0047 0.0272 0.022* 0.0030 0.0259 0.375 
t-2 -0.0032 0.0282 0.214 -0.0035 0.0268 0.449 
t-1 -0.0049 0.0795 0.477 -0.0048 0.0789 0.422 
p 
t-0 -0.0093 0.0599 0.500 -0.0100 0.0598 0.190 
T+1 0.0024 0.0802 0.149 0.0027 0.0804 0.026* 
T+2 0.0090 0.0809 0.597 0.0088 0.0819 0.959 
T+3 -0.0067 0.0784 0.904 -0.0062 0.0785 0.695 
T+4 0.0011 0.0415 0.239 0.0004 0.0409 0.978 
T+5 0.0071 0.0744 0.407 0.0059 0.0741 1.000 
T+6 0.0001 0.0417 0.422 -0.0007 0.0414 0.830 
T+7 0.0010 0.0877 0.013* 0.0002 0.0881 0.194 
T+8 0.0025 0.0248 0.078 0.0015 0.0245 0.517 
T+9 0.0043 0.0235 0.251 0.0036 0.0225 0.130 
t+10 0.0017 0.0423 0.409 0.0005 0.0422 0.230 
t+11 0.0032 0.0210 0.210 0.0025 0.0206 0.191 
t+12 -0.0020 0.0359 0.993 -0.0018 0.0361 0.773 
t+13 -0.0016 0.0189 0.805 -0.0019 0.0188 0.198 
t+14 0.0004 0.0217 0.345 -0.0005 0.0226 0.851 
t+15 -0.0028 0.0816 0.745 -0.0033 0.0810 0.801 
t+16 -0.0018 0.0186 0.819 -0.0022 0.0185 0.183 
t+17 0.0042 0.1121 0.549 0.0042 0.1129 0.888 
t+18 -0.0010 0.0209 0.301 -0.0013 0.0196 0.563 
t+19 -0.0033 0.0510 0.166 -0.0046 0.0518 0.645 
t+Zu 1-0.0003 1 0.0349 1 0.352 1-0.0015 N 0.0348 1 0.682 1 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for the sample firms 
where dividends no change and earnings fell (DNCED) (N=95). An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.2 Panel A: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
Increasing and earnings increasing companies (DIEL) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcozon Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 -0.0003 0.909 0.1150 0.0000 0.106 1.6195 
t-19 -0.0004 0.291 -1.0560 0.0000 0.993 -0.0095 
t-18 -0.0002 0.622 -0.4931 0.0000 0.457 0.7447 
t-17 -0.0007 0.034 -2.1180 0.0000 0.984 0.0209 
t-16 -0.0005 0.337 -0.9594 0.0000 0.849 -0.1913 
M M 
-0.0003 0.795 -0.2596 0.0000 0.087 1.7119 
t-14 -0.0005 0.049* -1.9669 0.0000 0.619 -0.4984 
t-13 -0.0006 0.607 -0.5150 0.0000 0.055 1.9175 
t"12 12 -0.0004 0.179 -1.3452 0.0000 0.781 0.2787 
t-11 -0.0004 0.740 0.3328 0.0000 0.033* 2.1335 
t-10 -0.0004 0.238 -1.1799 0.0000 0.492 0.6875 
t-9 -0.0007 0.200 -1.2806 0.0000 0.522 0.6409 
t-8 -0.0007 0.135 -1.4934 0.0000 0.829 0.2175 
t-7 0.0003 0.784 0.2738 0.0000 0.277 1.0885 
t-6 -0.0005 0.128 -1.5242 0.0000 0.806 -0.2462 
t-5 0.0000 0.659 0.4421 0.0000 0.231 1.1987 
t-4 . 0.0012 0.005* -2.7936 0.0000 0.490 0.6910 
W -0.0004 0.528 -0.6308 0.0000 0.092 1.6864 
t-2 -0.0001 0.472 0.7200 0.0000 0.015 2.4248 
t-1 0.0002 0.033* 2.1275 0.0000 0.000* 3.7955 
t-0 0.0015 0.000* 4.7278 0.0000 0.000* 5.5888 
t+1 0.0002 0.058 1.8934 0.0000 0.002* 3.0991 
t+2 -0.0004 0.270 -1.1028 0.0000 0.621 0.4959 
t+3 0.0001 0.672 0.4231 0.0000 0.269 1.1053 
t+4 -0.0006 0.119 -1.5580 0.0000 0.651 -0.4526 
t+5 -0.0002 0.885 -0.1455 0.0000 0.385 0.8703 
t+6 -0.0005 0.067 -1.8341 0.0000 0.187 -1.3202 
t+7 -0.0008 0.011* -2.5376 0.0000 0.355 -0.9254 
t+8 -0.0008 0.052 -1.9426 0.0000 0.472 -0.7207 
t+9 -0.0007 0.033* -2.1319 0.0000 0.266 -1.1126 
t+10 -0.0007 0.135 -1.4946 0.0000 0.863 -0.1736 
t+11 0.0004 0.023* 2.2665 0.0000 0.054 1.9251 
t+12 -0.0005 0.267 -1.1106 0.0000 0.935 -0.0827 
t+13 -0.0006 0.218 -1.2317 0.0000 0.862 -0.1748 
t+14 -0.0004 0.229 -1.2036 0.0000 0.267 1.1117 
t+15 -0.0005 0.610 -0.5099 0.0000 0.083 1.7340 
t+16 -0.0010 0.017* -2.3823 0.0000 0.954 0.0579 
t+17 -0.0008 0.039* -2.0593 0.0000 0.652 0.4514 
t+18 -0.0008 0.008* -2.6632 0.0000 0.645 -0.4619 
t+19 -0.0003 0.393 -0.8540 0.0000 0.078 1.7627 
t+20 -0.0002 0.491 -0.6892 0.0000 0.927 -0.0929 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t_ZO to day 
U20 for the sample firms where dividends and earnings increased (DIEI) . An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.2 Panel B: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
increasing and earnings decreasing companies (DIED) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Standardised 
Da Median value Wilcozon Median -value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 0.0006 0.281 1.0790 0.0000 0.212 1.2526 
t-19 0.0002 0.240 1.1772 0.0000 0.928 -0.0959 
t-18 0.0002 0.876 -0.1575 0.0000 0.562 -0.5873 
t-17 0.0009 0.890 -0.1406 0.0000 0.890 -0.1436 
t-16 0.0004 0.010 2.5661 0.0000 0.014 2.4633 
t-15 0.0005 0.742 0.3303 0.0000 0.481 -0.7095 
t-14 0.0000 0.794 0.2625 0.0000 0.954 -0.0635 
t-13 0.0004 0.682 0.4116 0.0000 0.923 0.1014 
t-12 0.0001 0.311 1.0146 0.0000 0.843 -0.2042 
t-11 0.0000 0.585 0.5471 0.0000 0.713 0.3734 
t-10 -0.0005 0.732 0.3438 0.0000 0.895 -0.1395 
t-9 0.0006 0.855 -0.1846 0.0000 1.000 -0.0051 
t-8 0.0003 0.898 -0.1304 0.0000 0.055 -1.9245 
t-7 0.0004 0.867 -0.1686 0.0000 0.185 -1.3327 
t-6 0.0004 0.423 0.8028 0.0000 0.957 0.0604 
t-5 0.0000 0.373 0.8926 0.0000 0.638 -0.4762 t-4 0.0005 0.611 0.5098 0.0000 0.839 0.2075 
t-3 0.0002 0.289 1.0620 0.0000 0.887 0.1475 
t-2 0.0009 0.792 0.2659 0.0000 0.589 0.5442 
t-1 0.0018 0.704 0.3811 0.0000 0.962 -0.0529 
t-0 -0.0002 0.019 2.3484 0.0000 0.074 1.7923 
t+1 -0.0002 0.701 -0.3856 0.0000 0.671 -0.4280 
t+2 0.0005 0.589 0.5425 0.0000 0.342 0.9533 
t+3 0.0000 0.359 0.9197 0.0000 0.842 0.2039 
t+4 0.0006 0.805 -0.2490 0.0000 0.690 -0.4031 
t+5 0.0000 0.448 0.7605 0.0000 0.526 0.6387 
t+6 -0.0001 0.633 -0.4790 0.0000 0.348 -0.9421 t+7 0.0004 0.713 -0.3689 0.0000 0.747 0.3263 
t+8 0.0003 0.221 1.2246 0.0000 0.935 -0.0874 t+9 0.0006 0.256 1.1366 0.0000 0.535 0.6256 
t+10 0.0006 0.259 1.1298 0.0000 0.846 0.1992 
t+11 0.0001 0.373 0.8926 0.0000 0.935 -0.0872 t+12 -0.0002 0.628 0.4861 0.0000 0.972 -0.0398 t+13 0.0005 0.295 -1.0485 0.0000 0.255 -1.1436 t+14 0.0012 0.500 0.6758 0.0000 0.360 0.9206 
t+15 0.0007 0.127 1.5295 0.0000 0.570 0.5736 
t+16 0.0004 0.697 0.3913 0.0000 0.684 -0.4120 t+17 0.0003 0.852 -0.1880 0.0000 0.598 -0.5322 t+18 0.0009 0.362 0.9130 0.0000 0.726 -0.3556 t+19 0.0004 0.006 2.7389 0.0000 0.221 1.2291 
t+20 0.0001 0.679 0.4150 0.0000 0.609 -0.5165 
Note: Lms tame snows me aonormat and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day 
t+20 for the sample firms where dividends increased and earnings fell (DIED) An* indicates significance 
at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.2 Panel C: Share performance around the dividend announcement 
date for dividend 
decreasing and earnings increasing companies (DDEI) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median -value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 -0.0008 0.533 -0.6387 
0.0000 0.813 -0.2962 
t-19 0.0009 0.438 0.7908 0.0000 0.286 1.1255 
t-18 0.0018 0.157 1.4295 0.0000 0.529 0.7001 
t-17 -0.0014 0.176 -1.3687 
0.0000 0.236 -1.2439 
t-16 -0.0007 0.915 
0.1217 0.0000 0.919 0.1529 
t-15 0.0009 0.140 1.4903 0.0000 0.262 1.1722 
t-14 0.0014 0.149 1.4599 0.0000 0.100 1.6893 
t-13 -0.0007 0.727 -0.3650 
0.0000 0.441 0.8402 
t-12 0.0004 1.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.563 -0.6224 
t-11 -0.0014 0.207 -1.2774 
0.0000 0.415 -0.8664 
t-10 -0.0004 0.125 -1.5512 
0.0000 0.013 -2.5471 
t-9 0.0005 0.323 1.0037 0.0000 0.800 0.3381 
t-8 -0.0005 0.595 -0.5475 0.0000 0.760 -0.3568 
t-7 -0.0010 0.513 -0.6691 0.0000 0.272 -1.1832 
t-6 0.0009 0.294 1.0645 0.0000 0.262 1.1722 
t-5 -0.0005 0.386 -0.8820 0.0000 
0.666 -0.4707 
t-4 -0.0008 0.475 -0.7300 0.0000 0.343 -1.0070 
t-3 0.0001 0.727 0.3650 0.0000 0.625 0.5335 
t-2 0.0007 0.267 1.1254 0.0000 0.151 1.5213 
t-1 -0.0009 0.915 -0.1217 0.0000 0.760 0.3568 
t-0 0.0011 0.574 0.5779 0.0000 0.563 0.6224 
t+l -0.0006 0.574 -0.5779 0.0000 0.554 -0.6761 
t+2 0.0010 0.254 1.1558 0.0000 0.315 1.0358 
t+3 0.0011 0.323 1.0037 0.0000 0.398 0.8891 
t+4 0.0010 0.494 0.6995 0.0000 0.724 0.3922 
t+5 -0.0001 0.843 -0.2129 0.0000 0.756 -0.3556 
t+6 0.0012 0.280 1.0949 0.0000 0.451 0.7847 
t+7 -0.0006 0.053 -1.9466 0.0000 0.059 -1.9604 
t+8 0.0002 0.533 0.6387 0.0000 0.722 -0.4146 
t+9 -0.0015 0.149 -1.4599 0.0000 0.919 0.1529 
t+10 0.0004 0.704 0.3954 0.0000 0.307 1.0669 
t+11 -0.0009 0.354 -0.9429 0.0000 0.234 -1.2603 
t+12 0.0000 0.323 1.0037 0.0000 0.441 0.8402 
t+13 -0.0011 0.207 -1.2774 0.0000 0.554 -0.6516 
t+14 0.0006 0.820 0.2433 0.0000 0.183 -1.4003 
t+15 -0.0009 0.403 -0.8516 0.0000 0.343 -1.0070 
t+16 0.0003 0.659 0.4562 0.0000 0.529 0.7338 
t+17 0.0013 0.061 1.8857 0.0000 0.024 2.3102 
t+18 -0.0002 0.456 -0.7604 0.0000 0.205 -1.3522 Lt+19 
-0.0010 0.574 -0.5779 0.0000 0.554 -0.6761 
t+20 0.0008 0.254 1.1558 0.0000 0.236 1.2439 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t20 to day t4.20 
for the sample firms where dividends and earnings increased (DDEI). An* indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.2 Panel D: A Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend 
decreasing and earnings decreasing companies (DDED) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Day Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 0.0017 0.475 0.7236 0.0000 0.887 0.1704 
t-19 0.0018 0.317 1.0095 0.0000 0.563 -0.6224 
t-18 0.0012 0.915 0.1161 0.0000 0.724 -0.3922 
t-17 0.0034 0.015 2.4390 0.0000 0.094 1.7039 
t-16 
M 
-0.0005 0.158 -1.4205 0.0000 0.045 -2.0251 
t-15 -0.0015 0.268 -1.1167 0.0000 0.126 -1.5689 
t-14 -0.0003 0.851 -0.1965 0.0000 0.197 -1.3337 
t-13 0.0021 0.014 2.4568 0.0000 0.286 1.1255 
t-12 0.0022 0.056 1.9208 0.0000 0.625 0.5241 
t-11 0.0010 0.224 1.2239 0.0000 0.894 0.1778 
t-10 0.0006 0.198 1.2954 0.0000 0.505 0.7113 
t-9 0.0001 0.816 0.2412 0.0000 0.979 0.0517 
t-8 0.0005 0.093 1.6885 0.0000 0.069 1.8520 
t-7 -0.0003 0.943 -0.0804 0.0000 0.327 -1.0198 
Ft-6 1 0.0016 0.655 0.4556 0.0000 0.969 -0.0784 
t-5 0.0018 0.129 1.5277 0.0000 0.583 0.5883 
t-4 0.0013 0.198 1.2954 0.0000 0.894 0.1778 
t-3 0.0013 0.555 0.5986 0.0000 0.415 -0.8664 
t-2 0.0019 0.051 1.9565 0.0000 0.359 0.9683 
t-1 0.0000 0.971 -0.0447 0.0000 0.069 -1.8520 
t-0 -0.0001 0.326 -0.9917 0.0000 0.089 -1.7205 
t+1 0.0026 0.120 1.5634 0.0000 1.000 0.0000 
t+2 0.0039 0.040 2.0637 0.0000 0.233 1.2241 
t+3 0.0015 0.555 0.5986 0.0000 0.572 -0.5964 
t+4 0.0007 0.642 0.4735 0.0000 0.660 -0.4708 
t+5 0.0013 0.789 0.2770 0.0000 0.293 -1.0791 
t+6 0.0004 0.509 0.6700 0.0000 0.295 -1.0832 
t+7 0.0020 0.028 2.2067 0.0000 0.724 0.3922 
t+8 0.0013 0.830 0.2233 0.0000 0.367 -0.9414 
t+9 0.0009 0.555 0.5986 0.0000 0.780 -0.3145 
T+10 0.0008 0.915 0.1161 0.0000 0.308 -1.0703 
T+11 0.0015 0.253 1.1525 0.0000 0.410 0.8629 
T+12 0.0006 0.453 0.7594 0.0000 0.126 1.5799 
T+13 0.0000 0.943 0.0804 0.0000 0.824 -0.2667 
T+14 0.0011 0.112 1.5992 0.0000 0.933 -0.1690 
T+15 0.0003 0.734 -0.3484 0.0000 0.476 -0.7645 
t+16 0.0009 0.411 0.8309 0.0000 0.638 -0.5022 
t+17 0.0019 0.104 1.6349 0.0000 0.724 0.3922 
t+18 0.0021 0.056 1.9208 0.0000 0.367 0.9414 
t+19 0.0002 0.681 -0.4199 0.0000 0.083 -1.7581 
t+20 0.0019 0.174 1.3669 0.0000 0.339 0.9825 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t. 20 to day t+2o for the sample firms where dividends and earnings fell (DDED). An* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
252 
Appendix 6.8.2 Panel E: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend no 
change and earnings increasing companies (DNCEI) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Da Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoaon Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 0.0002 0.579 0.5568 0.0000 0.869 0.1728 
t-19 -0.0006 0.198 -1.2889 0.0000 0.600 -0.5348 
t-18 0.0000 0.832 -0.2142 0.0000 0.325 -0.9947 
t-17 0.0000 0.736 0.3388 0.0000 0.322 1.0032 
t-16 -0.0001 0.869 -0.1674 0.0000 0.919 0.1143 
t-15 -0.0003 0.331 -0.9735 0.0000 0.319 -1.0032 
t-14 0.0004 0.112 1.5926 0.0000 0.016 2.4168 
t-13 0.0000 0.918 -0.1051 0.0000 0.952 -0.0721 
t-12 -0.0005 0.135 -1.4953 0.0000 0.026 -2.2261 
t-11 0.0000 0.245 -1.1643 0.0000 0.051 -1.9597 
t-10 0.0001 0.177 1.3512 0.0000 0.197 1.2974 
t-9 0.0001 0.231 1.1993 0.0000 0.053 1.9447 
t-8 0.0000 0.964 -0.0467 0.0000 0.864 0.1822 
t-7 0.0003 0.117 1.5692 0.0000 0.364 0.9190 
t-6 0.0001 0.349 0.9384 0.0000 0.525 0.6441 
t-5 0.0000 0.912 0.1129 0.0000 0.868 0.1740 
t-4 0.0002 0.129 1.5192 0.0000 0.057 1.9128 
t-3 0.0000 0.425 0.7995 0.0000 0.549 0.6075 
t-2 0.0005 0.172 1.3668 0.0000 0.077 1.7765 
t-1 0.0000 0.620 -0.4984 0.0000 0.873 -0.1668 
t-0 0.0022 0.002 3.0918 0.0000 0.001 3.2911 
t+1 -0.0007 0.251 -1.1487 0.0000 0.300 -1.0431 
t+2 0.0002 0.974 0.0350 0.0000 0.674 -0.4311 
t+3 0.0003 0.742 0.3314 0.0000 0.764 0.3063 
t+4 0.0000 0.977 -0.0312 0.0000 0.811 -0.2505 
t+5 0.0000 0.219 -1.2319 0.0000 0.278 -1.0939 
t+6 -0.0003 0.185 -1.3276 0.0000 0.446 -0.7698 
t+7 0.0000 0.766 -0.2998 0.0000 0.581 0.5610 
t+8 0.0009 0.050 1.9599 0.0000 0.071 1.8128 
t+9 0.0001 0.745 -0.3276 0.0000 0.124 -1.5472 
t+10 0.0004 0.745 0.3271 0.0000 0.617 -0.5078 
t+11 0.0001 0.611 0.5110 0.0000 0.475 0.7244 
t+12 0.0000 0.673 -0.4244 0.0000 0.935 -0.0901 
t+13 0.0003 0.629 0.4847 0.0000 0.838 0.2129 
t+14 0.0000 0.542 -0.6113 0.0000 0.761 -0.3135 
t+15 0.0001 0.768 -0.2969 0.0000 0.461 -0.7453 
t+16 0.0000 0.250 -1.1514 0.0000 0.126 -1.5396 
t+17 0.0004 0.135 1.4962 0.0000 0.106 1.6265 
t+18 0.0000 0.899 -0.1284 0.0000 0.864 -0.1795 
t+19 0.0002 0.673 0.4234 0.0000 0.824 -0.2308 
t+20 0.0002 0.579 0.5568 0.0000 0.703 0.3937 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t-20 to day t+20 for 
the sample firms where dividends no change and earnings increased (DNCEI). An* indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
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Appendix 6.8.2 Panel F: Share performance around the dividend announcement date for dividend no 
change and earnings decreasing companies (DNCED) 
Abnormal Returns Excess Returns 
Day Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon Median value 
Standardised 
Wilcoxon 
t-20 0.0003 0.392 0.8574 0.0000 0.415 0.8286 
t-19 0.0008 1.000 0.0019 0.0000 0.243 -1.1785 
t-18 0.0002 0.213 1.2472 0.0000 0.466 0.7401 
t-17 0.0007 0.954 -0.0594 0.0000 1.000 0.0237 
t-16 0.0011 0.077 1.7706 0.0000 0.182 1.3454 
t-15 0.0005 0.130 1.5144 0.0000 0.564 -0.5886 
t-14 0.0005 0.916 -0.1076 0.0000 0.407 -0.8409 
t-13 0.0009 0.183 1.3326 0.0000 0.540 0.6246 
t-12 0.0008 0.448 0.7609 0.0000 0.183 -1.3473 
t-11 0.0004 0.133 1.5033 0.0000 0.551 0.6068 
t-10 0.0005 0.323 0.9911 0.0000 0.469 0.7352 
t-9 0.0007 0.411 0.8240 0.0000 0.409 0.8451 
t-8 0.0008 0.633 0.4788 0.0000 0.071 -1.8127 
t-7 0.0008 0.076 1.7743 0.0000 0.280 1.0949 
t-6 -0.0001 0.284 1.0727 0.0000 0.627 -0.5040 
t-5 0.0010 0.330 -0.9762 0.0000 0.233 -1.2064 
t-4 0.0010 0.021 2.3088 0.0000 0.154 1.4395 
t-3 0.0008 0.022 2.2902 0.0000 0.375 0.9014 
t-2 0.0002 0.214 1.2435 0.0000 0.449 -0.7667 
t-1 -0.0001 0.477 0.7127 0.0000 0.422 0.8133 
t-0 0.0009 0.500 -0.6769 0.0000 0.190 -1.3185 
t+1 0.0004 0.149 1.4439 0.0000 0.026 2.2396 
t+2 0.0001 0.597 0.5308 0.0000 0.959 0.0598 
t+3 0.0009 0.904 0.1225 0.0000 0.695 -0.4020 
t+4 0.0005 0.239 1.1804 0.0000 0.978 -0.0374 
t+5 0.0003 0.407 0.8315 0.0000 1.000 -0.0089 
t+6 0.0012 0.422 0.8055 0.0000 0.830 0.2233 
t+7 0.0008 0.013 2.4758 0.0000 0.194 1.3082 
8 0.0004 0.078 1.7668 0.0000 0.517 0.6582 
t+9 0.0006 0.251 1.1507 0.0000 0.130 1.5256 
t+10 0.0005 0.409 0.8277 0.0000 0.230 -1.2166 
t+11 0.0004 0.210 1.2546 0.0000 0.191 1.3207 
t+12 0.0004 0.993 -0.0111 0.0000 0.773 0.2982 
t+13 0.0006 0.805 0.2487 0.0000 0.198 -1.3034 
t+14 0.0005 0.345 0.9465 0.0000 0.851 -0.2018 
t+15 0.0005 0.745 0.3266 0.0000 0.801 -0.2643 
t+16 0.0003 0.819 0.2301 0.0000 0.183 -1.3453 
t+17 0.0004 0.549 0.6013 0.0000 0.888 0.1514 
t+18 0.0009 0.301 1.0356 0.0000 0.563 -0.5931 t+19 0.0008 0.166 1.3882 0.0000 0.645 -0.4703 t+20 0.0007 0.352 0.9317 0.0000 0.682 -0.4213 
Note: This table shows the abnormal and excess returns for the forty-one days period day t_23 to day 
t+20 for the sample firms where dividends did not change and earnings fell (DNCED). An* indicates 
significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 6.9A: ANOVA for the Excess Returns on the Dividend Announcement Day 
Note: This table shows the results for an ANOVA performed on the abnormal returns of the sample on the dividend 
announcement day (Day t). SEC relates to the industry 
in which the company operates, SIZE refers to the size 
quartile in which the company is placed based on market capitalisation at 31 December 2001, GROWTH is the 
quartile in which the company was placed according to annually compounded growth in market capitalisation and 
FIRM refers to the company making the dividend announcement. Changes in dividends were coded according to 
whether the variation was an increase, a decrease or no change while changes in earnings were coded according to 
whether the variation was an increase or decrease. Finally, YEAR relates to the year in which the dividend 
announcement took place. DF is the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX 7 
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APPENDIX 7.1 
E-Mail 
Dear 
RE: Dividend payment policy in Irish companies research. 
I refer to our telephone conversation today concerning the above and appreciate your willingness to 
grant me an interview. 
As agreed I will attend at your office at ... on 2002/3. As I mentioned I propose to bring a tape 
recorder along but if you are uncomfortable with it I will take manuscript notes. 
Many thanks for your time. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tom Mc Cluskey 
Letter 
Dear 
RE: Dividend payment policy in Irish companies research. 
Many thanks for the interview. 
Please accept the attached as a small token of my appreciation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Tom Mc Cluskey 
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APPENDIX 7.2. 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
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Section 1: Determinants of dividend payment levels 
SPECIFIC ISSUES: 
Dividend to fluctuate in accordance with its current 
investment and financing needs 
Be responsive to its shareholders' preferences 
regarding dividends 
Have a target dividend pay-out ratio 
Avoid making changes in its dividend rates that might 
have to be reversed in a year or so 
Strive to maintain an uninterrupted record of dividend 
payments 
Determine the current dividend based on last year's 
dividend 
Determine the current dividend based on cash 
flow/liquidity considerations 
Base the current dividend on the amount of dividend 
paid by its competitors 
Base the current dividend on the firm's current 
earnings 
Base the current dividend on the firm's expected 
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OBSERVATIONS 
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Section 2: Market Signals 
Specific issues: 
The market views dividend announcements entirely 
independently of concurrent earnings announcements 
Dividend payments provide a signal of future earnings 
prospects 
An increase in dividends will usually lead to a rise in 
share price 
The market reaction to an increase in dividend will 
depend on how the new figure compares to investors' 
expectations 
A change in the existing dividend payout is more 
important than the actual amount of dividends paid 
Investors perceive dividends to be less risky than 
capital gains 
A decrease in dividends will usually lead to a fall in 
share price 
The market reaction to a decrease in dividend will 
depend on how the new figure compares to investors' 
expectations 
Investors base their expectations about this year's 
dividend on: 
" The previous year's dividend 
" Trends within the sector 
" Current economic conditions 
9 Last year's earnings 
" Forecast earnings 
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Section 3: Taxation 
SPECIFIC ISSUES: 
Management should determine the annual 
dividend based on their perception of the 
tax status of the shareholders 
Investors in high tax brackets are attracted 
to low dividend shares 
Investors in low tax brackets are attracted 
to high dividend shares 
The abolition of the tax credits on 
dividends has made dividend payments 
less attractive to investors 
Investors prefer returns from capital gains 
rather than dividends because of the 
reduction in the capital gains tax rate to 
20% 
The taxation of scrip dividends as income 
rather than deferred capital gains has made 
cash dividends more attractive to 
shareholders 
The introduction of the dividend 
withholding tax has made dividend 
payments less attractive to shareholders 
The introduction of the new 12.5% rate of 
Corporation Tax will lead to higher 
dividend pay-outs 
The introduction of capital gains tax 
treatment for employee share options will 
lead to higher dividend pay-out ratios 
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